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ABSTRACT
Modern critical infrastructures are highly integrated systems composed of many
complex interactions between different system modules or agents including cyber
and physical components as well as human factors. Their growing complexity
demands novel design techniques for scalable and efficient control and compu-
tations for providing system security and resilience. This dissertation develops
new game-theoretic frameworks for addressing security and resilience problems
residing at multiple layers of the cyber-physical systems including robust and re-
silient control, secure network routing and management of information security
and smart grid energy systems.
Hybrid distributed reinforcement learning algorithms are developed as practical
modeling tools for defense systems with different levels of rationality and intel-
ligence at different times. The learning algorithms enable online computations
of defense strategies, such as routing decisions and configuration policies, for
nonzero-sum security games with incomplete information. In addition, games-
in-games frameworks are proposed for system-wide modeling of complex hier-
archical systems, where games played at different levels interact through their
outcomes, action spaces, and costs. This concept is applied to robust and resilient
control of power systems in which a zero-sum differential game for physical ro-
bust control design is nested in and coupled with a zero-sum stochastic game for
security policy design.
At the networking layer of the system, multi-hop secure routing games also
exhibit the games-in-games structure, and their equilibrium solutions are charac-
terized by backward induction solving a sequence of nested games. This approach
leads to a distributed secure routing protocol that enables the resilience of network
routing and self-recovery mechanisms in face of adversarial attacks.
Finally, in order to address emerging energy management issues of the smart
grid, we establish a fundamental game-theoretic framework for analyzing system
equilibrium under distributed generations, renewable energy sources and active
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participation of utility users. Furthermore, we develop a novel game framework
and its equilibrium solution, named mirror Stackelberg equilibrium, for modeling
the demand response management in the smart grid. This approach enables quan-
titative study of the value of demand response brought by emerging smart grid
technologies as compared to the current supply-side economic dispatch model.
It facilitates fundamental understanding of pricing, energy policies and infras-
tructural investment decision in future highly interconnected and interdependent
energy systems. Examples from power systems, cognitive radio communication
networks, and the smart grid are used as driving examples for illustrating new so-
lution concepts, distributed algorithms and analytical techniques presented in this
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are pervasive in modern critical infrastructures
such as power grids, transportation systems, healthcare informatics, etc. The sys-
tem level integration of cyber and physical components has made CPSs vulnerable
to malicious events and cyber attacks [1, 2]. Distinct from traditional measures of
robustness and reliability, security and resilience are important system attributes
of CPSs that are often subject to exogenous disturbances and exposed to unex-
pected adversarial attacks or events [3, 4]. Hence there is need for fundamental
understanding of these concepts in the context of CPSs, which can lead to a new
set of system design and computational tools.
The system complexity of systems composed of interacting cyber and physi-
cal components poses many research challenges as they become highly intercon-
nected and interdependent. Cyber attacks on communication protocols can disrupt
normal operation of electric power grids, communication networks, and public
transportation systems [2]. Local faults on a transmission line or at the substation
can lead to cascading failures of an entire wide-area power network [5,6]. An ad-
versary at the battlefield can jam the communication signal of an unmanned aerial
vehicle (UAV) and trigger the collision with other UAVs [7,8]. Dealing with these
security issues first requires a good understanding of the system architecture and
desirable properties. Engineering systems often exhibit hierarchical structures,
which divide the complex system into multiple layers of different functionalities.
The natural structure of system enables us to adopt a divide-and-conquer approach
to tackle security concerns at individual layers. However, this methodology needs
to be complemented by a holistic approach that will further allow integrated and
cross-layer solution of the entire system. With this research philosophy, this dis-
sertation is composed of ensuing chapters that discuss issues residing at different
layers of CPSs. We use power systems and smart grid as driving examples of crit-
ical infrastructures; however, the methodologies and principles developed in this
dissertation are generally applicable to other modern infrastructure systems.
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The major goal of this dissertation is to address security and resilience aspects
of CPSs using decision and game-theoretic methods. Game theory is a versatile
quantitative tool, which has been used to model different types of interactions
among players or subsystems at multiple layers of the system. It has been used in
economics [9–11] for understanding the outcome of strategic behaviors of players
who make rational decisions. In control theory, game theory has successfully been
used to design robust controllers for dynamical systems that are subject to uncer-
tainties [12,13]. Recently, game theory has been used as a quantitative method for
analyzing network security policies and designing defense mechanisms [14, 15].
The wide range of application domains of game theory has made it an ideal tool
for developing a unifying framework for a holistic and fundamental understanding
of CPSs across their layers of functionalities.
This dissertation aims at developing new engineering tools for addressing fun-
damental problems of CPSs. Power systems, cognitive radio networks and the
smart grid are used as motivating examples and applications for illustrating new
solution concepts, algorithms and analytical techniques. The game-theoretic method-
ologies presented in this dissertation can be further extended and applied to a
broader class of systems, such as healthcare systems, public transportation, and
UAVs. A summary of the contributions of this dissertation will be included in
the remaining sections of this chapter, which are organized as follows. Section
1.1 summarizes the contributions on resilience engineering, and discusses the re-
search methodology and philosophy for understanding resilient CPSs. Section
1.2 introduces the new features of the smart grid enabled by the integration of
information technologies, and summarizes the contributions of this dissertation
from the perspective of smart grid applications. In Section 1.3, we discuss the
application of game-theoretic tools for modeling and analyzing CPSs. This sec-
tion summarizes the theoretic contributions of the dissertation, and provides a list
of novel game-theoretic models and solutions developed for tackling problems of
complex systems.
1.1 Resilience of Cyber-Physical Systems
Resilience is a desirable system property for modern critical infrastructures. Ac-
cording to the report on critical infrastructures by the Department of Homeland
Security [2], “Resilience has become an important dimension of the critical in-
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frastructure protection mission, and a key element of the value proposition for
partnership with the government because it recognizes both the need for security
and the reliability of business operations.” The “Smart Grid Technical Report” [5]
released by the Department of Energy designates “resilience” as one of six basic
characteristics of the emerging smart grid. NSF also declared that “being secure
and safe, resilient and capable” are critical for CPSs.
Resilience has been studied in many fields such as psychology [16], ecol-
ogy [17] and organizational behavior [18]. The concept has also appeared in vari-
ous engineering fields, such as aviation, nuclear power, oil and gas, transportation,
emergency health care, and communication networks [4,19]. The literature on re-
silience engineering is often found to be very diverse, qualitative and area-specific.
This makes it challenging (but necessary) to develop a general theory or formal
methods for quantitative analysis and design of secure and resilient systems. In
this dissertation, our aim is to address this challenge and work toward establish-
ing a comprehensive theoretical framework that can serve as the foundation for
resilience engineering.
Our approach starts with a hierarchical viewpoint toward complex systems that
are comprised of multiple agents and multiple layers. We identify relevant prob-
lems at each layer, and propose to employ appropriate tools to address the un-
derlying issues. Based on analytic models at each layer, we further investigate
the interactions between agents residing at the same layer and their cross-layer
influences. This approach and methodology leads to system design principles and
a general system theory for resilience. As our focus is on security issues, game
theory is an appropriate and versatile tool, which not only enables modeling the
decision-making process and interactions among agents in an adversarial environ-
ment, but also provides a unifying framework across different layers.
System resilience refers to the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its function-
ing prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can sustain
required operations under conditions created by both expected and unexpected
causes such as human errors, system faults, adversarial attacks, and natural dis-
asters. The concept of resilience is related to but also distinct from other system
attributes such as reliability, robustness, security, and fault-tolerance [20–22]. Ro-
bustness often refers to a system’s ability to withstand noise or small (but often
unknown) disturbances. Robustness is an antemortem concept, i.e., the system
is designed to be robust offline before it is perturbed. Security is also an ante-
mortem system feature but describes the system’s ability to withstand malicious
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behaviors and unanticipated events. Despite many engineering efforts on design-
ing robust and secure systems, it is costly and impractical, if not impossible, to
achieve perfect robustness and security against all possible attacks and events.
This fact, however, renders it essential to investigate the resilience aspect of a sys-
tem, which refers to the system’s ability to recover online after adversarial events
occur. It is a postmortem concept. Hence, in order to provide performance guar-
antee for CPSs, we need to build an inherent resilient mechanism for the system,
allowing it to self-recover from unexpected attacks and failures. This dissertation
aims to establish novel engineering tools and provide a novel system perspective
towards bringing resilience into CPSs. The major contributions of the dissertation
on resilience engineering can be summarized as follows.
• Robustness and resilient tradeoffs: The fundamental tradeoff between the
robustness of a physical control system and the system-wide resilience is
characterized in Chapter 3 through a nested and coupled game-theoretic
problem between the inner physical layer zero-sum differential game for ro-
bustness and the outer cyber layer zero-sum stochastic game for resilience.
We observe that a higher level of robustness at the physical control layer
saves the effort on cyber security design for achieving system-wide re-
silience, while on the contrary, a lower level of robustness demands more
sophisticated cyber security policy for ensuring system performance.
• Self-recovery through distributed learning: Achieving resilience requires
intelligent monitoring, learning and on-line decision-making prior to, dur-
ing, or following the events. In Chapter 4, we propose distributed learning
frameworks that require minimal information for the system to learn and re-
spond to adversarial behaviors for providing inherent self-healing and self-
recovery mechanisms to the system. The learning algorithms are integrated
with security games in Chapter 4 for dynamic online configuration, and
with routing algorithms in Chapter 5 for combatting malicious attacks in
data communication networks.
1.2 Smart Grid Applications
Smart grid refers to the next generation electrical power grid that aims to pro-
vide reliable, efficient, secure, and quality energy generation, distribution and
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consumption using modern information, communications, and electronics tech-
nologies. Unlike its predecessor (i.e., the existing electrical power grid), the smart
grid will be equipped with two-way data communication technologies and the
utility control system will be integrated with end users and consumers for effi-
cient and reliable power generation, control, and consumption. The information
technology will allow to isolate and restore power outages more quickly, facili-
tate the integration of renewable sources into the grid, and empower the consumer
with tools for optimizing their energy consumption. Moreover, smart grid will
allow active participation of users by providing user information related to de-
mand and fault reporting. Many standard bodies and organizations throughout
the world are working towards this vision of smart grid. Among many, the Elec-
trical Power Research Institute (EPRI), the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), and European Commission Research are working towards
developing the most comprehensive frameworks, communication specifications,
standards, and roadmaps for smart grid [1, 23]. These innovations brought by the
development of the smart grid will lead to economic, environmental and societal
benefits for generations to come.
From an architectural perspective, smart grid is a dynamic complex hierarchical
system. At the physical power layer of the system, electric power is generated,
transmitted and distributed to different types of utility users. At the cyber layer of
the system, data and control signals are communicated through public or dedicated
private networks between operators, power systems, and utility users. Built on the
cyber and physical layers of the smart grid, energy markets are used to regulate
the power system through pricing, public policy and law. This dissertation aims
to address the following four major features of the smart grid:
• Robust and resilient control of power systems: A novel game and control-
theoretic framework is established in Chapter 3 to address the interdepen-
dencies between cyber and physical components of the system. The optimal
control designs for the voltage and frequency regulation of the generators
take into account the impact of cyber security on the control system. Like-
wise, the optimal decision on the cyber security policies is made based on
their impact on the physical generators. The coupled design achieves a
cross-layer approach to address secure control of energy systems, which are
increasingly relying on information technologies.
• Secure routing in smart grid: A dynamic distributed routing protocol is
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proposed in Chapter 5 for routing data between measurement devices and
control center. The protocol leverages the hierarchical structure of data net-
works of the smart grid, and allows each device to make routing decisions
in a decentralized fashion. The employment of learning algorithms provides
resilience and recovery mechanisms in face of malicious attacks.
• Integration of distributed renewable energy sources: A novel power sys-
tem framework is established in Chapter 7.1 for future smart grid with dis-
tributed energy generations, integrated renewable sources and active user
participation. The impact of this new paradigm is analyzed through a game-
theoretic framework, in which Nash equilibrium solutions provide insights
on its efficiency as compared to its centralized counterpart, and quantitative
tools for studying future energy policy and management.
• Demand response management: Based on the classical economic dispatch
model, a novel demand response model is established in Chapter 7.2 by
incorporating decision model of utility users. The hierarchical architecture
of the smart grid naturally leads to a special class of Stackelberg games
in which the followers respond to the pricing signals of the leader. The
game-theoretic approach provides analytical tools to address fundamental
questions on the system equilibrium under demand response and the value
to users and generation companies created by the smart grid.
1.3 Game-Theoretic Approaches
Game theory is a powerful modeling paradigm for describing strategic interactions
between agents or players in decentralized systems. It has been widely used in
communication networks for modeling multi-agent interactions in power control
[24, 25], congestion control [26, 27], network security [14] and routing [28]. A
rich literature of game theory [10, 11, 13, 29] provides a wide range of analytical
and computational tools for designing distributed algorithms and mechanisms for
achieving system-wide objectives.
Game-theoretic frameworks arise naturally in modeling the interactions be-
tween multiple layers and multiple components in CPSs. However, many existing
tools are not directly applicable as the system has distinct features characterized
by its physical constraints and dynamics, system architecture and information
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structure. This dissertation addresses these challenges by first identifying these
features for CPSs and then developing novel techniques for modeling emerging
applications and designing new algorithms and protocols. The main theoretical
contributions are summarized as follows:
• Hybrid learning in games: Fully distributed reinforcement learning algo-
rithms are developed to capture learning behaviors under different levels
of rationality, learning capabilities and patterns at different times. Dis-
tinct from commonly known best-response [30] and fictitious-play algo-
rithms [31], they require for each player a minimal amount of information
regarding other players. A hybrid structure of learning algorithms is used
to provide a practical online algorithm for updating system security config-
urations in Chapter 4 and routing decisions in Chapter 5.
• Games-in-games: Motivated by the multi-layer architecture of CPS, games-
in-games frameworks are proposed to provide system-wide modeling of
complex hierarchical systems, where games played at different levels inter-
act through their outcomes, action spaces, and costs. New solution concepts
and algorithms are developed for designing routing algorithms in Chapter 5
and cross-layer robust and resilient controllers in Chapter 3.
• Games with coupled constraints: Aiming to establish a framework for dis-
tributed generation in the smart grid, Chapter 7.1 develops a new class of
continuous-kernel noncooperative games subject to a set of coupled nonlin-
ear constraints. An iterative algorithm based on linearization is proposed
for finding Nash equilibria that satisfy the coupled constraints and Nash
equilibrium properties.
• Mirror Stackelberg equilibrium: A Stackelberg game framework is estab-
lished in Chapter 7.2 to capture the hierarchical communication architec-
ture of the energy system, and the rational behaviors of consumers and the
market operator. As the Lagrange multiplier, or shadow price, appears in
the primal problem of the follower as well as in the dual problem of the
leader, the concept of mirror Stackelberg equilibrium is proposed as a solu-
tion concept for the game. A consistency principle is used to characterize
the equilibrium.
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1.4 Dissertation Outline
The listed contributions in Sections 1.2 and 1.3 will be discussed in the remaining
chapters in the dissertation, which are organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we present a six-layer hierarchical architecture of CPSs, which
serves as the structural backbone of this dissertation. Section 2.1 introduces the
notion of the hierarchical structure for critical infrastructural systems and uses
power systems as an illustrating example. Section 2.2 identifies problems resid-
ing at each layer of the system, which are further discussed in detail in ensuing
chapters. Section 2.3 summarizes the discussion and emphasizes the notion of
cross-layer resilience.
Chapter 3 discusses the cross-layer robustness and resilience issues at the cyber
and physical layers of the system. Section 3.1 proposes a hybrid system frame-
work for robust and resilient control design in which the stochastic switching be-
tween structure states models unanticipated events, and deterministic uncertainties
in each structure represent the known range of disturbances. We develop a set of
coupled optimality criteria for the holistic robust and resilient design for CPSs and
discuss a class of linear-quadratic problems in Section 3.2. We apply this method
in Section 3.3 to a voltage regulator design problem for a synchronous machine
with infinite bus and illustrate the solution methodology with numerical examples.
Motivated by security games in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 presents a class of fully
distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL) algorithms,
which require for each player a minimal amount of information regarding the other
player. A class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games with incomplete in-
formation is introduced in Section 4.2, and the distributed learning procedures
of each player are described in Section 4.3. We propose in Section 4.4 hybrid
learning schemes in which different players can adopt different learning patterns
at different times. We use stochastic approximation techniques to show in Sec-
tion 4.6 that, under appropriate conditions, the pure or hybrid learning schemes
with random updates can be studied using their deterministic ordinary differen-
tial equation (ODE) counterparts. Convergence to state-independent equilibria is
analyzed under specific payoff functions. In Section 4.7, the results are applied
to a class of security games in which the attacker and the defender adopt differ-
ent learning schemes and update their strategies at random times. The chapter is
concluded in Section 4.8.
Chapter 5 investigates the networking aspect of CPSs by studying secure rout-
8
ing problems in cognitive radio systems and the smart grid. It develops a dynamic
secure routing game framework to effectively malicious behaviors in multi-hop
networks. Section 5.1 proposes a stochastic multi-stage zero-sum game frame-
work based on the directional explorations of ad hoc on-demand distance vector
(AODV) algorithms. The zero-sum game captures the conflicting goals between
malicious attackers and honest nodes, and considers packet error probability and
delay as performance metrics. Distributed Boltzmann-Gibbs learning in Chapter 4
is used for an on-line routing algorithm, in which the users are not required to have
initial knowledge of the actions of the attackers and their own utility function. In-
stead, the users learn their payoff functions based on their past observations and
choose the best action based on estimated payoffs. Section 5.2 applies the game
framework to routing problems in the smart grid for providing assurance of secure
routing of PMU and smart meter data in the open network. Section 5.3 concludes
the chapter.
Chapter 6 studies the management issues of information security. It focuses on
the software vulnerability discovery, disclosure, development, and patching for
industrial control systems. In Section 6.1, we use a system approach to devise a
model to understand the interdependencies of these decision processes. In Section
6.2, we establish a decision-theoretic framework for making patching policies for
control systems, taking into account the requirement of their functionabilities. The
chapter is concluded in Chapter 6.3.
In Chapter 7, we discuss two energy management issues for the smart grid.
With the integration of distributed renewable energy sources and deregulated en-
ergy market, Section 7.1 deals with the modeling and analysis of decentralized
power generation in the smart grid. We establish a game-theoretic framework for
modeling strategic interactions between multiple energy sources. An iterative al-
gorithm is proposed in Section 7.1.4 to compute Nash equilibrium solutions based
on a sequence of linearized games. In addition, in Section 7.1.6, we present ap-
proximate solution schemes based on fast decoupled power flow and DC power
flow. Simulations and numerical examples are used to illustrate the algorithm and
corroborate the results. Section 7.2 studies demand response management en-
abled by the two-way communication between the supply and demand sides. We
build a Stackelberg game framework based on the economic dispatch problem,
which allows us to address the pivotal question: What is the value that demand
response management (DRM) can bring to generation companies and consumers
in the smart grid?
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Chapter 8 provides a general recap of the results of this dissertation research
and discusses several directions for future work. The material included in this
dissertation was partially reported in our papers [32–46].
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CHAPTER 2
HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE OF
CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS
Many industry sectors are experienced with arming automation systems with mod-
ern IT technology. The integration moves the systems from an outdated, propri-
etary technology to more common ones such as personal computers, Microsoft
Windows, TCP/IP/Ethernet, etc. It provides more efficient methods of commu-
nication, improves system interoperability and results in considerable cost and
performance benefits. However, in the meantime, it poses security challenges on
control systems as the integration exposes the system to public networks.
Many control systems do not have built-in security functionalities, and the se-
curity solutions in regular IT systems may not always apply to systems in critical
infrastructures. This is because critical infrastructures have different goals, objec-
tives and assumptions concerning what needs to be protected, and have specific
applications that are not originally designed for a general IT environment. Hence,
it is necessary to develop unique security solutions to fill the gap where IT solu-
tions do not apply.
In this chapter, we describe a layered architecture perspective towards secure
CPSs, which enables us to identify research problems and challenges at each layer,
and build models for designing security measures for control systems in critical
infrastructures. We also emphasize a cross-layer viewpoint towards the security
issues in cyber-physical systems in that each layer can have security dependence
on the other layers. We need to understand the tradeoffs between the information
assurance and the physical layer system performance before designing defense
strategies against potential cyber threats and attacks.
This chapter serves as the structural backbone for the remaining chapters of this
dissertation. We will employ game and decision theory to address major issues at
different hierarchical layers described in this chapter.
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2.1 A Hierarchical Viewpoint
The concept of hierarchical structures has been adopted in solutions for the In-
ternet and manufacturing operations. The well-known layered structure of OSI
model for the Internet has influenced the integration between software and hard-
ware [47]. The upper layers of the OSI model represent software that imple-
ments network services like encryption and management. The lower layers im-
plement more primitive, hardware-oriented functions like routing, addressing and
flow control. The layered structure introduces a practical framework for network
technology development at individual layers and also allows cross-layer methods
to investigate issues across these virtual boundaries between layers [48].
The integration between enterprise and control systems is guided by ISA95
standards for information exchange between enterprise and manufacturing con-
trol activities and their supporting IT systems. It defines levels within a manufac-
turing operation based on the Purdue Reference Model for Computer Integrated
Manufacturing (CIM) [49]. PRM has formed the basis for ISA95 standards today,
providing openness necessary to unify plant resource requirements.
The hierarchical viewpoint extends the notion from OSI and PRM models and
integrates them for control systems in smart critical infrastructures. The cyber-
physical systems we see today incorporate increasingly more smart structures and
more sophisticated integrations with many complex systems. The security chal-
lenges associated with the evolving systems need to be addressed in the same
spirit as in OSI and PRM models.
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are cyber-physical systems commonly seen
in many critical infrastructures such as electricity generation, transmission and
distribution, water treatment, manufacturing, etc. The main function of ICSs is to
monitor and control physical and chemical processes. In the past few decades, we
have seen a growing trend of integrating physical ICSs with cyberspace to allow
new degrees of automation and human-machine interactions. The uncertainties
and hostilities existing in the cyber environment have brought about emerging
concerns for the traditional ICSs. It is of supreme importance to have a system
that maintains state awareness and an accepted level of operational normalcy in
response to disturbances, including threats of an unexpected and malicious nature.
The term resilient control system (RCS) is used to describe systems that have these
essential features.
Resiliency of a control system is different from the conventional properties of
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robustness, adaptiveness, fault-tolerance, and the like [6]. Robustness of ICSs
seeks to achieve a certain level of performance with possible modeling errors in
the form of parametric or nonparametric uncertainties. Adaptiveness of ICSs aims
to attain performance by adjusting control parameters for given uncertain param-
eters of the controlled process. Fault-tolerance of ICSs focuses on overcoming
control failures with identification and precaution measures. These concepts em-
body very specific goals that a control system needs to achieve.
In the cyber-physical world, resilience is meant to encompass all the afore-
mentioned features that allow systems to attain a given level of operational nor-
malcy [3]. It concerns issues that sit at the interface between the cyber world
and the physical environment. In the physical world, the controller design can be
made to be resilient by incorporating features such as robustness and reliability.
In the cyber world, the control system can be protected by many cyber-security
measures to ensure dependability, security, and privacy. However, the integration
of optimal designs in both worlds does not necessarily ensure overall resiliency of
a control system. The interaction between the two environments can create new
challenges in addition to the existing ones. To address these challenges, we need
to understand the architecture of ICSs. In this dissertation, we adopt a layering
perspective towards ICSs. This view-point has been adopted in many large scale
system designs such as the Internet, power systems, nuclear power plants, etc. For
example, in smart grids, the hierarchical architecture includes substations, con-
trol areas, regions, and then the topological grid. We hierarchically separate ICSs
into 6 layers, namely, physical layer, control layer, communication layer, network
layer, supervisory layer and management layer. This hierarchical structure is de-
picted in Fig. 2.1. The power grid, depicted in Fig. 2.2, is structured as follows.
The power plant is at the physical layer and the communication network and secu-
rity devices are at the network and communication layers. The controller interacts
with the communication layer and the physical layer. An administrator is at the
supervisory layer to monitor and control the network and the system. Security
management is at the highest layer where security policies are made against po-
tential threats from attackers. SCADA is the fundamental monitoring and control
architecture at the control area level. The control center of all major U.S. utili-
ties have implemented a supporting SCADA for processing data and coordinating
commands to manage power generation and delivery within the EHV and HV
(bulk) portion of their own electric power system [50].
The layered structure is also commonly seen in SCADA systems [51]. In large
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Figure 2.1: The hierarchical structure of ICSs composed of 6 layers. The
physical layer resides at the bottom level and the management layer at the
highest echelon.
Figure 2.2: The hierarchical view towards a power plant.
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Figure 2.3: Typical SCADA network levels.
SCADA systems, there is usually a communication network connecting individual
PLCs to the operator interface equipment at the central control room. There are
communication networks used at lower level in the control system architecture
for communication between different PLCs in the same subsystems or facility, as
well as for communication between field devices and individual PLCs. Figure 2.3
describes typical SCADA network levels, where four layers are depicted, namely,
supervisory level, communication level, control level and device/physical level.
The information structure of SCADA systems in today’s power grids is highly
hierarchical. Each primary controller utilizes its own local measurement only,
each control area utilizes measurements in its own utility only and has its own
SCADA system. Protection mechanisms are preprogrammed to protect individual
pieces of equipment and rarely require communications [52, 53].
To further describe the functions at each layer, we resort to Fig. 2.4, which
conceptually describes a control system with a layering architecture. The lowest
level is the physical layer where the physical/chemical processes we need to con-
trol or monitor reside. The control layer includes control devices that are encoded
with control algorithms that have robust, reliable, secure, fault-tolerant features.
The communication layer passes data between devices and different layers. The
network layer includes the data packet routing and topological features of control
systems. The supervisory layer offers human-machine interactions and capabil-
ity of centralized decision-making. The management layer makes economic and
high-level operational decisions.
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Figure 2.4: A conceptual control system with layering.
Figure 2.5: Control module.
2.2 Six Architectural Layers
In the following subsections, we identify problems and challenges at each layer
and propose problems whose resolution requires a cross-layer viewpoint.
2.2.1 Physical Layer
Physical layer comprises the physical plant to be controlled. It is often described
by an ordinary differential equation (ODE) model from physical or chemical laws.
It can also be described by difference equations, Markov models, or model-free
statistics. We have the following challenges that pertain to the security and re-
liability of the physical infrastructure. Firstly, it is important to find appropriate
measures to protect the physical infrastructure against vandalism, environmental
change, unexpected events, etc. Such measures often need a cost and benefit anal-
ysis involving the value assessment of a particular infrastructure. Secondly, it is
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also essential for engineers to build the physical systems with more dependable
components and more reliable architecture. It raises the concern about the phys-
ical maintenance of the control system infrastructures that demand a cross-layer
decision-making between the management and physical levels.
2.2.2 Control Layer
The control layer consists of multiple control components, including observers/sensors,
intrusion detection systems (IDSs), actuators and other intelligent control compo-
nents. An observer has the sensing capability that collects data from the physical
layer and may estimate the physical state of the current system. Sensors may need
to have redundancies to ensure correct reading of the states. The sensor data can
be fused locally or sent to the supervisor level for global fusion. A reliable ar-
chitecture of sensor data fusion will be a critical concern. An IDS protects the
physical layer as well as the communication layer by performing anomaly-based
or signature-based intrusion detection. An anomaly-based ID is more common for
the physical layer whereas a signature-based ID is more common for the packets
or traffic at the communication layer. If an intrusion or an anomaly occurs, an
IDS raises an alert to the supervisor or works hand in hand with built-in intrusion
prevention systems (related to emergency responses, e.g. control reconfiguration)
to take immediate action. There lies a fundamental a trade-off between local deci-
sions versus a centralized decision when intrusions are detected. A local decision,
for example, made by a prevention system, can react in time to unanticipated
events; however, it may incur a high packet drop rate if the local decision suffers
high false negative rates due to incomplete information. Hence, it is an important
architectural concern on whether the diagnosis and control module need to operate
locally with IDS or globally with a supervisor.
2.2.3 Communication Layer
The communication layer is where we have a communication channel between
control layer components or network layer routers. The communication channel
can take multiple forms: wireless, physical cable, blue-tooth, etc. The communi-
cation layer handles the data communication between devices or layers. It is an
important vehicle that runs between different layers and devices. It can often be
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vulnerable to attacks such as jamming and eavesdropping. There are also privacy
concerns of the data at this layer. Such problems have been studied within the
context of wireless communication networks [14]. However, the goal and objec-
tive of a critical infrastructure may distinguish themselves from the conventional
studies of these issues.
2.2.4 Network Layer
The network layer concerns the topology of the architecture. It comprises of two
major components: network formation and routing. We can randomize our routes
to disguise or confuse the attacks so as to achieve certain security or secrecy or
minimum delay. Moreover, once a route is chosen, how much data should be sent
on that route has long been a concern for researchers in communications [32].
In control systems, many specifics to the data form and rates may allow us to
reconsider this problem in a control domain.
2.2.5 Supervisory Layer
The supervisory layer coordinates all layers by designing and sending appropriate
commands. It can be viewed as the brain of the system. Its main function is to
perform critical data analysis or fusion to provide immediate and precise assess-
ment of the situation. It is also a holistic policy maker that distributes resources
efficiently. The resources include communication resources, maintenance budget
as well as control efforts. In centralized control, we have one supervisory module
that collects and stores all historical data and serves as a powerful data fusion and
signal processing center.
2.2.6 Management Layer
The management layer is a higher level decision-making engine, where the decision-
makers take an economic perspective towards the resource allocation problems in
control systems. At this layer, we deal with problems such as (1) How to budget
resources to different systems to accomplish a system-level goal; and (2) How to
manage patches for control systems, e.g. disclosure of vulnerabilities to vendors,
development and release of patches.
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2.3 Cross-Layer Resilience
The independent resilient system design of each layer does not necessarily ensure
overall resiliency of the integrated system. The interactions between the layers
pose new challenges. The layering architecture enables us to develop quantita-
tive models and tools to investigate the interactions between the layers so that
the four characteristics of resilience can be achieved across the layers. The in-
fluences between the layers can be bi-directional, which leads to the concepts of
downward and upward resilience. Decisions made at the management layer can
ultimately influence the system design at the control and physical layers. Such
a top-down effect is called downward resilience. Likewise, the engineering de-
cisions made at the lower hierarchies can propagate to and influence the upper
layers. Such bottom-up effect is called upward resilience. The resilience of the
entire integrated system depends on both the downward resilience and the upward
resilience. The entire system is resilient when a failure at one layer has a limited
degree of propagation into other layers, and faults at one layer can be mitigated
by the mechanisms designed at other layers. For example, the defense-in-depth
strategies for critical infrastructures, which employ a multitude of security devices
and agents at multiple layers, rely on the upward and downward resilience of the
system.
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CHAPTER 3
ROBUST AND RESILIENT CONTROL
The migration of many current critical infrastructures such as power grids and
transportations systems into open public networks has posed many challenges for
control systems. The classical design of control systems takes into account model-
ing uncertainties as well as physical disturbances, providing a multitude of control
design methods such as robust control, adaptive control, stochastic control, etc.
With the growing level of integration of control systems with new information
technologies, modern control systems face uncertainties not only from the physi-
cal world but also from cyberspace. The vulnerabilities of the software deployed
in the new control system infrastructure create many potential risks and threats
from the attackers. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities can lead to severe dam-
age as has been seen in [54, 55]. It has been reported in [54] that the U.S. power
grid has been penetrated by cyberspies and the intrusions could have damaged the
power grid and other key infrastructure. In [55], it is believed that an inappropriate
software update has led to a recent emergency shutdown for 48 hours of a nuclear
power plant in Georgia. More recently, it is reported in [56, 57] that a computer
worm, Stuxnet, has been spread to target Siemens Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems that are configured to control and monitor specific
industrial processes.
IT uncertainties are often unanticipated and more catastrophic as compared to
the ones from the physical world. It is imperative to consider such IT uncertain-
ties in addition to the physical ones in the controller design. In [3,58], the concept
of resilient control system has been proposed, which emphasizes the control sys-
tem design in an adversarial and uncertain cyber environment. A resilient control
system needs to maintain the state awareness of threats and anomalies and assure
an accepted level of operational normalcy in response to disturbances, including
threats of an unexpected and malicious nature. Traditional concepts of robustness,
reliability and defense in depth need to be broadened to include the consideration
of cyber and physical security and threats from malicious behavior.
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Resilient control design pivots on the inherent system tradeoff between robust-
ness and resilience. As explained in Chapter 1, robustness refers to the operation
of a system under a known range of uncertain parameters or disturbances whereas
resilience refers to the restoration of a system under unanticipated and rare events.
Centralized systems are often more robust yet less resilient than decentralized sys-
tems. Systems with a global coordination can withstand a larger range of uncer-
tainties or disturbances, but may fail to respond to unforeseen attacks or faults.
Such tradeoff is essential to the design of system architecture and its control.
The metric of robustness in control systems has been well studied in [12, 59].
In [12], a game-theoretical approach has been used to yield a minimax, distur-
bance attenuating control by viewing the controller as the cost minimizer whereas
the disturbance as the maximizer. A metric for resilient control systems has re-
cently been studied in [60, 61]. However, very few works examine the resilient
control design, much less a holistic approach to resilient and robust control de-
sign. In this chapter, we address this design issue using a hybrid dynamic game-
theoretic approach combining the Markov chain dynamics with continuous-time
H∞ control. The hybrid model provides a holistic and cross-layer viewpoint in the
decision-making and design for cyber-physical systems. The continuous-time dy-
namics model the physical layer plant subject to disturbances and control efforts.
The discrete-time dynamics model the cyber layer of the system that involves hu-
man factors. We use a zero-sum differential game for the optimal control design at
the physical layer and a stochastic zero-sum game between an administrator and
an attacker for the design of the defense mechanisms. The designs at physical and
the cyber layers are intertwined. A policy made at the cyber layer can influence
the optimal control design for the physical system; and the optimal control design
at the lower level needs to be taken into account when security policies are deter-
mined. The overall optimal design of the cyber-physical system is characterized
by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJI) equation together with a Shapley-like optimal-
ity criterion. Our framework connects the resilient control for the cyber system
with the robust control for the physical system.
3.1 Resilient and Robust Control
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are commonly seen in many critical infrastruc-
tures such as electricity generation, transmission and distribution, water treatment
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and manufacturing. The main function of ICSs is to monitor and control physical
and chemical processes. In the past few decades, we have seen a growing trend of
integrating physical ICSs with cyber space to allow for new degrees of automa-
tion and human-machine interactions. The uncertainties and hostilities existing in
the cyber environment have brought emerging concerns for the traditional ICSs.
It is of supreme importance to have a system that maintains state awareness and
an accepted level of operational normalcy in response to disturbances, including
threats of an unexpected and malicious nature. The term resilient control system
(RCS) is used to describe systems that have these essential features.
In this section, we aim to establish a theoretical framework for designing re-
silient controllers. To address this challenge, we first need to understand the ar-
chitecture of ICSs. In this paper, we adopt a layering perspective toward ICSs.
This view-point has been adopted in many large scale system designs such as the
Internet, power systems and nuclear power plants. For example, in smart grids,
the hierarchical architecture includes substations, control areas, regions, and then
the topological grid. We hierarchically separate ICSs into 6 layers, namely, phys-
ical layer, control layer, communication layer, network layer, supervisory layer
and management layer. This hierarchical structure has been depicted in Fig. 2.1.
The physical layer comprises the physical plant to be controlled. The control
layer consists of multiple control components, including observers/sensors, intru-
sion detection systems (IDSs), actuators and other intelligent control components.
The physical layer together with the control layer can be viewed as the physi-
cal world of the system. On top of these two layers, the communication layer is
where we have physical communication channels that can be in the form of wire-
less channels, the Internet, etc., and the network layer is where the topology and
routing of the architecture is concerned. The communication and network lay-
ers constitute the cyber world of the system. The supervisory layer coordinates all
lower layers by designing and sending appropriate commands. It can be viewed as
the brain of the system. The management layer is a higher level decision-making
engine, where the decision-makers take an economic perspective towards the re-
source allocation problems in control systems. The supervisory and management
layers are interfaces with humans and hence they contain many human factors and
human-made decisions.
The layered architecture can facilitate the understanding of the cross-layer in-
teractions between the physical world and the cyber world. In Fig. 3.1, we use
x(t) and θ(t) to denote the continuous physical state and the discrete cyber state
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Figure 3.1: The interactions between the cyber and physical systems are captured
by their dynamics governed by the transition law Λ and the dynamical system f .
The physical system state x(t) is controlled by u with the presence of
disturbances and noises. The cyber state θ(t) is controlled by the defense
mechanism l used by the network administrator as well as the attacker’s action a.
of the system, which are governed by the laws f and Λ, respectively. The physical
state x(t) is subject to disturbances w and can be controlled by u. The cyber state
θ(t) is controlled by the defense mechanism l used by the network administrator
as well as the attacker’s action a. The hybrid nature of the cross-layer interaction
leads to adoption of the hybrid system model described later in (3.1) and (3.4).
In this section, we aim to establish a framework for designing a resilient con-
troller for the hybrid system model described. We view resilient control as a
cross-layer control design, which takes into account the known range of unknown
deterministic uncertainties at each state as well as the random unanticipated events
that trigger the transition from one system state to another. Hence, it has the prop-
erty of disturbance attenuation or rejection to physical uncertainties as well as
damage mitigation or resilience to sudden cyber attacks. We first derive resilient
control for the closed-loop perfect-state measurement information structure in a
general setting with the transition law dependent on the control action, and then
we simplify the result to the special case of the linear quadratic problem.
3.1.1 Control Framework
We consider a general class of systems subject to two types of uncertainties: A
continuous deterministic uncertainty that models the known parametric uncer-
tainties and disturbances, and a discrete stochastic uncertainty that models the
unknown and unanticipated events that lead to a change in the system operation
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state at random times. Let the system state evolve according to the piecewise
deterministic dynamics:
x˙(t) = f (t,x,u,w;θ(t,a, l)), x(t0) = x0, (3.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rn, x0 is a fixed (known) initial state of the physical plant at start-
ing time t0, u ∈ Rr is the control input, w ∈ Rp is the disturbance. x,u,w are
parameters that lie at the physical and control layers of the entire system.
The state of the cyber system is described by θ . We model the process θ(t), t ∈
[0, t f ], by a Markov jump process with right-continuous sample paths, with initial
distribution pi0, and with rate matrix λ = {λi j}i, j∈S , where S := {1,2, · · · ,s} is
the state space; λi j ∈ R+ are the transition rates such that for i 6= j,λi j > 0, and
λii = 1−∑ j 6=iλi j for i ∈S .
Transitions between the structural states are controlled by the attacker and the
system administrator. An attacker can exploit the vulnerabilities in the control
system software and launch an attack to bring down the operation. An example
is Stuxnet, a Windows-based worm that was recently discovered to target indus-
trial software and equipment [56]. An administrator can enforce the security by
dynamically updating the security policy of the control systems [36, 37]. Once
an attack occurs, the administrator can restore the system to normal operation.
Different from conventional computer networks, control systems are reported to
experience lower rates of attacks [62] and the software updates are less frequent
than the ones in computer networks. Hence, the transition between structural
states are at a different time scale from the evolution of physical states. We as-
sume that the systems have reached their physical steady states when the structural
transition happens. This assumption can be validated by two facts. The first one is
that the attack rate on control systems is often lower than the one on information
systems, [40], [1], and the other one is that the time scale of the failure rate of
devices and components in control systems is larger than the one of the system
dynamics and operations [63].
Let k = t/ε,ε > 0, be the time scale on which cyber events happen, which is
often on the order of days, in contrast to the one of the physical systems which
evolve on the time scale of seconds. Denote by a ∈ A a cyber attack chosen by
the attacker from his attack space A := {a1,a2, · · · ,aM} composed of all possi-
ble actions. l ∈L is the cyber defense mechanism that can be employed by the
network administrator whereL := {l1, l2, · · · , lN} is the set of all the possible de-
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fense actions. Without loss of generality, we assume thatA andL do not change
in time even though, in practice, they can change due to technological updates and
advances. We consider the mixed strategies f(k) = [ fi(k)]Ni=1 ∈Fk,g(k) ∈ Gk of
the defender and the attacker, respectively, where fi(k) and g j(k) are the proba-
bilities of choosing li ∈L and a j ∈A , respectively, whereFk and Gk are sets of
admissible strategies, defined by
Fk :=
{
f(k) ∈ [0,1]N :
N
∑
i=1
fi(k) = 1
}
, (3.2)
Gk :=
{
g(k) ∈ [0,1]M :
M
∑
j=1
g j(k) = 1
}
. (3.3)
The transition law of the cyber system state θ(k) at time k depends on the actions
of the attacker as well as the defense mechanism employed by the administrator.
More precisely, the rate matrix has
Prob{θ(k+∆) = j|θ(k) = i}=
{
λi j(f(k),g(k)), j 6= i,
λii(f(k),g(k)), j = i.
, (3.4)
where ∆> 0 which is on the same time scale as k, i.e., in days, and λi j(f(k),g(k))
are the average transition rates in terms of the transition rates λ˜i j(a(k), l(k)), i, j ∈
S , defined by
λi j(f(k),g(k)) =
N
∑
i=1
M
∑
j=1
fi(k)g j(k)λ˜i j(ai(k), l j(k)). (3.5)
3.1.2 H∞ Optimal Control
Systems described by (3.1) and (3.4) are hybrid ones with continuous and discrete
states and they have been investigated in [64], [65], [66]. LetFt be the sigma-field
generated by θ[t0,t] := {θ(s),s 6 t}. Denote by U and W the sets of admissible
controls and disturbance processes, respectively, which are Ft−measurable, and
piecewise continuous. We assume that f is piecewise continuous in t and Lips-
chitz continuous in (x,u,w), for each fixed sample path of θ , with probability one.
The process θ models the unanticipated or rare uncertainties that arise from cyber
attacks or component failure. These events result in random structural changes in
the dynamics of the system. We consider a closed-loop perfect state information
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structure for the control design. The controller has access to x[t0,t] and θ[t0,t] at time
t and has the form
u(t) = µ(t,x[t0,t];θ[t0,t]), t ∈ [t0, t f ], (3.6)
where µ is an admissible closed-loop control strategy, piecewise continuous in
its first argument, and Lipschitz continuous in its second argument. We denote
the class of all such control strategies by MCL ⊆ U . Analogously, denote by
NCL ⊆W the class of all closed-loop disturbance strategies
v(t) = ν(t,x[t0,t];θ[t0,t]), t ∈ [t0, t f ]. (3.7)
The performance index for the hybrid control system is given by the expected cost
over the statistics of θ given by
J(u,v) := Eθ{L(x,u,w;θ)}, (3.8)
with the cost function L given as
L(x,u,w;θ) = q f (x(t f );θ(t f ))+
∫ t f
t0
g(t,x(t),u(t),w(t);θ(t))dt
+q0(x0;θ(t0)), (3.9)
where q f is continuous in x, and g is jointly continuous in (t,x,u,w). In the
infinite-horizon case, q f is taken to be 0 and t f → ∞. The objective is to find
a minimax closed-loop controller µ∗CL ∈MCL that infimizes the supremum of J
over all closed-loop disturbance policies:
sup
ν∈NCL
J(µ∗CL,ν) = infµ∈MCL
sup
ν∈NCL
J(µ,ν). (3.10)
A cost structure of interest is the separable one:
g(t,x,u;θ) = g0(t,x,u;θ)− γ2r(w;θ). (3.11)
The solution of (3.10) parameterized in γ is denoted by µ∗γ and γCL is the smallest
value of γ > 0 for which the right hand side of (3.10) is bounded. Then µ∗γ,CL is
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the H∞ controller for the hybrid system, with respect to the performance index:
sup
w∈W
{
Eθ{q f (x f ;θ(t f ))+
∫ t f
t0 g0(t,x(t),u(t);θ(t))dt}
Eθ{‖w‖2+q0(x0;θ(t0))}
}
, (3.12)
where ‖ · ‖ denotes the L2-norm of w for each sample path of θ . The mini-
mum value of (3.12) is γ2CL. It defines a measure of disturbance attenuation in the
nonlinear hybrid system. Note that in (3.10), we have considered x0 as part of
disturbance.
Consider the differential game described by (3.10). Let V (·) : R×Rn×S
denote the cost-to-go function associated with this differential game, i.e., V (t,x, i)
is the upper value of a similar game defined on the shorter interval [t, t f ], with
initial state x, and initial structure θ(t) = i. We assume that the differential game
defined by (3.10) has an upper value V for every initial time t, state x(t), and
structure θ(t), which is jointly continuously differentiable in (t,x). Under this
assumption, we have the associated Isaacs equation:
−V it (t,x) = infu∈Rr supw∈Rp
{
V ix(t,x) f (t,x,u,w, i)+
g(t,x,u,w, i)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(u)V j(t,x)
}
(3.13)
V i(t f ,x) = q f (x(t f ); i); i ∈S . (3.14)
Any control u ∈ U that achieves the minimum on the right hand of (3.13) will
be a memoryless function of (x,θ). Denote any such control by µF ∈MCL and
(3.13) can be rewritten as
−V it (t,x) = sup
w∈Rp
{
V ix(t,x) f (t,x,µ
F(t,x, i),w, i)+g(t,x,µF(t,x, i),w, i)
+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(µF(t,x, i))V j(t,x)
}
.
Furthermore, if Isaacs condition holds and if there exists a disturbance policy,
νF ∈NCL, that achieves the maximum in 3.13, then νF is also a Markov policy,
and (µF,νF) are in saddle-point equilibrium. In this case, the upper value is also
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the value function, satisfying the PDE:
−V it (t,x) = sup
w∈Rp
{
V ix(t,x) f (t,x,µ
F(t,x, i),νF(t,x, i), i)
+ g(t,x,µF(t,x, i),νF(t,x, i), i) + ∑
j∈S
λi j(µF(t,x, i))V j(t,x)
}
.
The optimal cost V i(t0,x0) yields a measure on the resilience and robustness of
the system. It is desirable that the costs on faulty structure states are kept rela-
tively lower than the normal operation states. The tradeoff between resilience and
robustness can be seen from the two-fold controller design in which one goal is to
spend control effort to bring the system back to normal operation mode following
the unanticipated events and the other goal is to yield optimal performance for the
control system in each operating state.
3.1.3 Optimal Defense
The defense against attacks happens on a longer time scale and involves decision-
making at the human and cyber levels of the system. Using time-scale separation,
the optimal defense mechanism can be designed by viewing the physical control
system at its steady state at each cyber state θ at a given time k. The interaction
between an attacker and a defending administrator can be captured by a zero-
sum stochastic game with the defender aiming to maximize the long-term system
performance or payoff function whereas the attacker aiming to minimize it [67].
We use a discounted payoff criterion Vβ (s, f,g), defined as
Vβ (i, f(k),g(k)) :=
∫ ∞
0
e−βkEf(k),g(k)i V
i(f(k),g(k))dk,
where β is the discount factor. The operator Ef,gi is the expectation operator and
V i(f(k),g(k)) is the value function at state i with starting time at k in (3.9) and its
dependence on f(k),g(k) is from the state transition between states in (3.4). We
consider a class of mixed stationary strategies fi ∈ F i and gi ∈ G i, i ∈ S , that
are only dependent on the current cyber state i. Let F = {fi}i∈S ∈FS and G =
{gi}i∈S ∈ GS, whereFS :=∏i∈S F i and GS :=∏i∈S G i. The following theorem
characterizes the stationary saddle-point equilibrium of the stochastic zero-sum
game in a similar fashion as in [67], [68], [69] and [70] .
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Theorem 1 Assume that λi j(k) are continuous in fi and gi and the value functions
V i(k) are bounded. There exists a pair of stationary strategies (F∗,G∗)∈FS×GS
such that, for all i ∈S , the following fixed point equation is satisfied.
βv∗β (i) = V
i(F∗,G∗)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F∗,G∗)v∗β ( j) (3.15)
= sup
F∈FS
{
V i(F,G∗)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F,G∗)v∗β ( j)
}
= inf
G∈GS
{
V i(F∗,G)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F∗,G)v∗β ( j)
}
= sup
F∈FS
inf
G∈GS
{
V i(F,G)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F,G)v∗β ( j)
}
=: Lβ (i)
= inf
G∈GS
sup
F∈FS
{
V i(F,G)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F,G)v∗β ( j)
}
=: Uβ (i)
where vβ (i) = Vβ (i,F,G) and Lβ (i), Uβ (i) are defined to be the lower value and
the upper value of the game. In addition, (F∗,G∗) from (3.15) is a pair of saddle-
point equilibrium strategies and the value of game v∗β (i) is unique and has the
property that v∗β (i) = Lβ (i) =Uβ (i).
The saddle-point equilibrium strategies can be computed using a value iteration
scheme [68], [69]. Let {vnβ (i)}∞n=1 be a sequence of values of the game which
obeys the following update law:
vn+1β (i) = V
i(F∗n,G
∗
n)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F∗n,G
∗
n)v
n
β ( j) (3.16)
= sup
F∈FS
{
V i(Fn,G∗n)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(Fn,G∗n)v
n
β ( j)
}
,
= inf
G∈GS
{
V i(F∗n,Gn)+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F∗n,Gn)v
n
β ( j)
}
.
The following theorem provides a convergence result on the iterative algorithm in
(3.16).
Theorem 2 Let {F∗n,G∗n} be the sequence of strategies in FS×GS produced by
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Figure 3.2: Games-in-Games structure for resilient control system design
the value iteration scheme described in (3.16). Then, any limit point (Fn,Gn) of
the sequence is s pair of saddle-point equilibrium strategies. Moreover, the limit
point yield the unique game value v∗β (i), i ∈S .
The optimality criterion (3.15) in Theorem 1 together with HJI equation in
(3.13) defines a set of coupled optimality conditions for cyber-physical systems
that we need to solve to obtain the cyber policy F∗ and the robust controller u and
its associated performance index γ∗.
Remark 1 As seen in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3, the zero-sum differential game
for H∞ robust control design is strongly coupled with the zero-sum stochastic
game for equilibrium defense policy. In fact, due to the layering architecture and
the time-scale separation, the joint robust and resilient control design exhibits
a games-in-games structure as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. The physical layer game
is nested in the cyber layer game, where the outcome of the inner game affects
the cost structure of the outer game. In addition, the solution to the inner game
depends on the equilibrium solution (F∗,G∗) from the outer game. Solutions to
this game structure define the trade off between robust and resilient control of
cyber-physical systems.
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3.2 Linear-Quadratic Problem
In this section, we consider a special case of linear quadratic problem in which
λi j’s are constant in x,u but can be time-varying, and
f (t,x,u,w; i) = Aix+Biu+Diw,
q f (t f ; i) = |x(t f )|2Qit f ,
q0(x0, i) = |x0|2Qi0,
g0(t,x,u, i) = |x|2Qit f + |u|
2
Ri,
r(w;θ) = |w|2,
where i∈S , |·| denotes the Euclidean norm with appropriate weighting, Ai,Bi,Di,Qi,Ri
are matrices of appropriate dimensions, whose entries are continuous functions of
time t. Qi(·) > 0,Ri(·) > 0, and Qi0 is a positive-definite matrix and Qif is a con-
stant nonnegative-definite matrix.
We consider an infinite horizon case with the cost function defined by
L(x,u,w;θ) = E
∫ ∞
t0
(|x(t)|2Qi + |u(t)|2Ri− γ2|w(t)|2)dt. (3.17)
Before stating Theorem 3, we make the following assumptions:
(A1): Matrix functions Ri and Qi0 are positive definite for i ∈S .
(A2): The Markov chain θ is irreducible for any admissible strategies.
(A3): The pair (Ai,Bi) is stochastically stabilizable.
(A4): The pair (Ai,Qi) is observable for each i ∈S .
Theorem 3 ( [65]) Consider the soft-constrained zero-sum differential game with
perfect measurements in infinite-horizon case. Let assumptions (A1)-(A4) hold.
Then, γ∗CL,∞ <+∞, and for any γCL > γ
∗
CL,∞, there exists a set of minimal positive
definite solutions Zi, i ∈S , to GARE’s,
Ai
′
Zi+ZiAi−Zi
(
Bi(Ri)−1Bi
′− 1
γ2
DiDi
′
)
Zi
+Qi+
s
∑
j=1
λi j(F,G)Z j = 0; i ∈S , (3.18)
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which further satisfy the condition
γ2CLQ
i
0−Zi > 0, i ∈S , (3.19)
and a strategy µ∗γ∞ for P1 that guarantees the zero upper value:
u∗γ∞(t) = µ
∗
γ∞(t,x(t),θ(t)) =−(Ri)−1Bi
′
Zix(t). (3.20)
For almost all γ > γ∗∞, the jump linear system driven by both the optimal control
and the optimal disturbance,
x˙(t) =
(
Ai− (Bi(Ri)−1Bi′)− 1
γ2
DiDi
′
)Zi
)
x(t) (3.21)
is also mean-square stable, i.e., limt→∞E{|x(t)|2}= 0.
For γ < γ∗CL,∞, on the other hand, either condition (3.19) is not satisfied or the
set of GARE’s does not admit nonnegative definite solutions, and in both cases,
the upper value of the game is +∞.
On a longer time scale, the continuous-time zero-sum game between the attacker
and the administrator has the stationary saddle-point equilibrium characterized by
Theorem 1. More specifically, the fixed-point equation (3.15) can be written as
βv∗β (i) = x
′
0Zi(F
∗,G∗)x0+ ∑
j∈S
λi j(F∗,G∗)v∗β ( j). (3.22)
The optimal control u∗ and the optimal defense strategy F∗ need to be found by
solving the coupled equations (3.22) and GARE’s in Theorem 3.
3.3 Application to Power Systems
In this section, we apply the framework in Section 3.1 to the voltage regulation
problem of a power generator subject to sudden faults or attacks. A power sys-
tem has multiple generators interconnected through a large dynamic network. A
common approach to designing control systems for generators is to model the
dynamics of a single generator and to approximate everything else as an infinite
bus, i.e., the voltage and the phase of the entire network are not affected by the
input power or field excitation of the generator. Shown in Fig. 3.4, a single gen-
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erator is connected to an infinite bus through parallel transmission lines. We de-
sign a stabilizing control, called the power system stabilizer (PSS), used to damp
out the low-frequency oscillations for a single-machine infinite-bus (SMIB) sys-
tem [71–73]. A fault can occur as a result of an unanticipated cyber attack. For
example, an attacker can break into the IT system and damage the circuit breakers
in a power grid, leading to an operation under a faulty state. It is important that
we design a controller to regulate the system to equilibrium as quickly as possible
if such failure happens [74], and at the same time a defense mechanism to protect
the systems from possible attacks. In Fig. 3.3, we describe a two-state operation.
One is under the normal state (θ = 1) and the other is the post-attack state (θ = 2).
Denote by δ the power angle, ω the relative speed, Pe the active electrical power
delivered by generator; and u f the input of the amplifier of the generator as the
control variable. The system equations to model SMIB are:
δ˙ (t) = ω(t);
ω˙(t) = − D
2H
ω(t)+
ω0
2H
(Pm(t)−Pe(t));
P˙e(t) = − 1T ′d0
Pe(t)+
1
T ′d0
{
Vs
xds
sin(δ (t))
[
kcu f
+T ′d0(xd− x′d)
Vs
x′ds
ω(t)sin(δ (t))
]
+T ′d0ω(t)cot(δ (t))
}
+w,
where w is the disturbance, T ′d0 =
x′ds
xds
Td0; xds = xT + xL + xd; x′ds = xT + xL + x
′
d;
the main parameters listed in Table 3.1 and their values are chosen based on [72].
Under normal operation (θ = 1), the control objective is to regulate the syn-
chronous machine states (δ ,ω,Pe) to the level of (δ0,0,Pm). We can use the
linearized system below to achieve the goal.
x˙ = A1x+B1u+D1w, (3.23)
where
A1 =
 0 1 00 −0.625 −39.2699
−0.156627 1.65884 −0.738602
 ;
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Table 3.1: Table of parameters for power system simulation
Symbol and Value Meaning
kc = 1 Gain of the excitation amplifier
D = 5.0 Per unit damping constant
H = 4.0 Per unit inertia constant
ω0 = 100pi Synchronous machine speed
Pm = 0.9 Mechanical input power
Td0 = 6.9 Direct axis transient short circuit time constant
Vs = 0.83+ i0.38 Infinite bus voltage
xd = 1.863 Direct axis reactance of the generator
x′d = 0.257 Direct axis transient reactance of the generator
xT = 0.127 Reactance of the transformer
xL = 0.4853 Reactance of the transmission line
B1 =
 00
−0.271287
 ; D1 =
 00
1
 .
An unanticipated fault caused by a cyber attack can happen at the rate λ12. When
a circuit breaker is compromised, the total reactance on the transmission line will
change accordingly. Let xFL be the reactance under the post-attack state. The
linearized system at (δ0,0,Pm) at θ = 2 is given by
x˙ = A2x+B2u+D2w, (3.24)
where
A2 =
 0 1 00 −0.625 −39.2699
−0.0691878 0.960155 −0.407174
 ;
B2 =
 00
−0.119837
 ; D2 =
 00
1
 .
We can use the design strategy based on the linear quadratic criteria described in
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Section 3.1, by choosing the weighting matrices
Q1 = Q2 =
 1000 0 00 1 0
0 0 10
 ; R1 = 10,R2 = 1,
where we have emphasized the regulation of power angle and the willingness to
use more control under a post-attack state.
The probability transitions λ˜i j, i, j = 1,2, take the following parametrized form:
λ˜12 = p, λ˜11 =−p, λ˜21 = λ˜22 = 0, where we have assumed that the operation after
the attacker cannot be immediately recovered. At the cyber layer, the administra-
tor can take two actions, i.e., to defend (l1 =D) and not to defend (l2 =ND). The
attacker can also take two actions, i.e., to attack (a1=A) or not to (a2=NA). The pa-
rameter p determines the probability transition law with respect to pure strategies
and its values are tabulated as follows:
A NA
D 0.1 0.05
ND 0.95 0.05
In the above table, we have assumed a higher probability of transition to a
failure state if the attacker launches and attack while the cyber system does not
have proper measures to defend itself. On the other hand, the probability is lower
if the cyber system can defend itself from attacks. In the above table, we have
assumed a base transition rate 0.05 to denote the inherent reliability of the phys-
ical system without exogenous attacks. We use the optimal criterion (3.22) and
GARE’s in Theorem (3) to obtain the discounted value functions v∗β (i), i = 1,2,
with the discount factor chosen to be β = 1. We set x0 = (δ0,0,Pm) and yield
V 2 = 7.2075× 104 independent of the parameter p. Hence, v∗β (2) = V 2 and v∗β
obeys the following fixed-point equation
v∗β (1) = val
{
H− v∗β (1)G
}
, (3.25)
where
H =
[
1.4396×104 0.9994×104
8.4867×104 0.9994×104
]
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Figure 3.3: A two-state operation model for a power system with one normal
operation state (θ = 1) and one post-attack state (θ = 2).
and
G =
[
0.1 0.05
0.95 0.05
]
,
where val is the value operator for a matrix game [68], [69]. Use value iteration
with initial value of v∗β (1) set to 0, we find, within 5 iterations, v
∗
β (1) = 1.3087×
104 as illustrated in Fig. 3.5 and the corresponding stationary saddle-point strategy
f∗ = [1,0]′,g∗ = [0,1]′, which is a pure strategy leading to an optimal value of p=
0.05. The stationary saddle-point equilibrium strategy informs that the defender
should always be defending and the attacker should not be attacking. At p= 0.05,
the physical layer robust feedback control at each state i is obtained by
uF(t,x,1) =−(R1)−1B1′Z1,uF(t,x,2) =−(R2)−1B2′Z2,
where
Z1 =
 399.3266 31.8581 −162.233431.8581 5.7083 −15.2963
−162.2334 −15.2963 149.7459
 ,
and
Z2 =
 2.8512 0.1066 −2.85750.1066 0.0345 −0.1041
−2.8575 −0.1041 4.1506
 ,
and the performance index γ∗∞ = 8.5. In Fig. 3.6, we show the evolution of state
x2 with failure happens at time t = 10. The optimal control design allows the state
x2 to be stabilized after a fault occurs.
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Figure 3.4: An illustration of a synchronous machine infinite bus system. A
cyber attack can lead to the breaker failure and result in power loss. A control
scheme is needed to regulate the system to equilibrium as quickly as possible
after the attack.
Figure 3.5: Value iteration to find v∗β (1).
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of state x2 with failure happens at t = 10.
3.4 Conclusion
Control design in many critical infrastructures is challenged by the uncertainties
from the cyber world. The goal of resilient control is to maintain an acceptable
level of operation or service in face of undesirable incidents. In this chapter,
we have proposed a holistic theoretical framework for the robust and resilient
control design problem for cyber-physical systems. We have applied the design
methodology to a synchronous machine with infinite bus and obtained a robust
and resilient feedback control strategy.
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CHAPTER 4
LEARNING FOR SECURITY GAMES
The equilibrium cyber security game in Chapter 3 relies on offline analysis. In
practice, we will require learning algorithms to respond to the environment based
on observed payoffs. The need for online mechanisms motivates us to investigate
distributed reinforcement learning algorithms for security games. In this chapter,
we consider a class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games with incomplete
information. We develop fully distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learn-
ing (CODIPAS-RL) algorithms, which require for each player a minimal amount
of information regarding the other player. At each time, each player can be in
an active mode or in a sleep mode. If a player is in an active mode, she updates
her strategy and estimates of unknown quantities using a specific pure or hybrid
learning pattern. In contrast to the standard reinforcement learning algorithms
which focus only on either strategy or payoff reinforcement for the equilibrium
learning, the algorithm that couples the payoff reinforcement learning together
with strategy-reinforcement learning allows an immediate prediction, and updates
the strategies by updated estimations based on recent experiences. The payoff
reinforcement learning in our proposed algorithms bears a connection with the Q-
learning algorithms in [75, 76], which have been commonly applied to learn the
Q-functions of Markov decision processes (MDPs).
In order to render the learning algorithm practical to implement in the context
of network security, we introduce the following features:
(F1) In addition to exogenous environment uncertainties, we introduce inherent
mode uncertainties in players. Each player can be in an active mode or a
sleeping mode. Players learn their strategies and average payoffs only when
they are in an active mode.
(F2) We allow the interaction between the players to occur at random times un-
known to the players.
(F3) Each player requires a minimal amount of information regarding the other
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player. The players are not assumed to have the knowledge of the action
spaces of the others and their own payoff functions.
(F4) Players exhibit different levels of intelligence, rationality and computational
power, and the levels can be time-varying.
(F5) Players make their decisions independently without communication or syn-
chronization.
4.1 Motivation and Literature Review
In recent years, game-theoretic methods have been applied to study resource al-
location problems in communication networks [28], security mechanisms for net-
work security and privacy [15,77], and economic pricing in power networks [78].
Most frameworks have assumed the rationality of the agents or the decision-
makers as well as the complete information about their payoffs and strategies.
However, in practice, due to the noise and the uncertainties in the environment,
agents often have information limitations in their knowledge not only of other
players’ payoffs and strategies, but also of their own. For this reason, we must
consider the learning aspects of the decision-makers and address their estimation
and assessment of the payoff and strategy based on the information accessible to
them.
In this chapter, we consider a class of two-player nonzero-sum stochastic games
with incomplete information. We develop fully distributed payoff and strategy re-
inforcement learning (CODIPAS-RL) algorithms, which require for each player
a minimal amount of information regarding the other player. At each time, each
player can be in an active mode or in a sleep mode. If a player is in an active mode,
she updates her strategy and estimates of unknown quantities using a specific pure
or hybrid learning pattern. In contrast to the standard reinforcement learning al-
gorithms which focus only on either strategy or payoff reinforcement for the equi-
librium learning, the algorithm that couples the payoff reinforcement learning to-
gether with strategy-reinforcement learning allows an immediate prediction and
updates the strategies by updated estimations based on recent experiences. The
payoff reinforcement learning in our proposed algorithms bears a connection with
the Q-learning algorithms in [75,76], which have been commonly applied to learn
the Q-functions of Markov decision processes (MDPs).
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We specifically discuss five pure CODIPAS-RL algorithms and use stochastic
approximation techniques to show that, under appropriate conditions, the pure or
hybrid learning schemes with random updates can be studied using their deter-
ministic ordinary differential equation (ODE) counterparts. Convergence to state-
independent equilibria is analyzed under specific payoff functions such as those
in games with two actions, and Lyapunov games.
We apply the learning algorithms to a class of security games where an at-
tacker and an intrusion detection system (IDS) strategically choose their actions
to optimize their payoffs. Many forms of security games have been formulated
to provide quantitative security and dependability analysis of networked systems
[15, 77, 79]. However, technical difficulties in quantifying appropriate security
metrics or payoff functions render it difficult to specify the utility functions for
the attacker and the defender. In addition, the inevitable false positive and false
negative errors in the detection often lead to incomplete information in a dynamic
network environment. Our hybrid learning framework for the two-person game
with incomplete information provides an appropriate theoretical basis for the on-
line implementation of game-theoretic algorithms.
4.1.1 Related Work
Learning in games has been investigated in several papers in the recent litera-
ture. In [29, 80], a fictitious-play algorithm is used to find Nash equilibrium in a
nonzero-sum game. Players observe opponents’ actions and update their strate-
gies in reaction to others’ actions in a best-response fashion. The authors in [81]
propose a modified version of the fictitious play called joint fictitious play with
inertia for potential games, in which players alternate their updates at different
time slots. In all these learning schemes, players have to monitor the actions of
every other player and need to know their own payoff so as to find their optimal
actions. In this chapter, we are interested in fully distributed learning procedures,
where players do not need any information about the actions or payoffs of the
other players, and, moreover, they do not need to have complete information of
their own payoff structure.
Young proposes in [82] such a completely uncoupled learning rule, called in-
teractive trial and error learning. Players occasionally try out new actions and
accept them if they lead to higher payoffs. If a player experiences a decrease in
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payoff due to strategy changes by some other players, he initiates a random search
for a new strategy and settles on one with a probability that increases monoton-
ically with its realized payoff. When used by all players, the learning scheme
yields pure-strategy Nash equilibrium behavior under an interdependency condi-
tion. However, in games without pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, it fails to yield
Nash equilibrium strategies.
In [83, 84], strategy reinforcement learning in finite games has been studied.
The ordinary differential equation (ODE) approximation of the learning algo-
rithm is shown to be equivalent to an adjusted replicator dynamics [85]. In [86],
a multiple-time scale model-free algorithm is introduced and it is shown to be
asymptotically equivalent to the smooth fictitious play algorithm. In [37, 79], we
introduce a class of combined distributed payoff and strategy reinforcement learn-
ing schemes (CODIPAS-RL), and propose a heterogeneous learning algorithm for
two-person zero-sum stochastic games with incomplete information, where differ-
ent players can adopt different learning schemes and learning rates. In [125], we
propose a Q-learning algorithm for zero-sum stochastic games and apply it to dy-
namic configuration problems of intrusion detection systems.
4.2 Two-Person Nonzero-Sum Game (NZSG) Model
Let Ξ := 〈N ,{Si}i∈N ,{Ωi}i∈N ,{Ai}i∈N ,{Ui(s,B2, .)}s∈S ,b∈B,i∈N 〉 be the
stochastic NZSG, where N = {1,2} is the set of players P1 and P2 who max-
imize their payoffs, and A1,A2 are the finite sets of actions available to players
P1 and P2, respectively. The set Si := [si,1,si,2, · · · ,si,NiS ] comprises all possible
NiS external states of Pi, which describes the environment where Pi resides. We
assume that the state space S := ∏i∈N Si and the probability transition on the
states are both unknown to the players. A state si is randomly and independently
chosen at each time from the set Si. We assume that the action spaces are the
same in each state.
In addition, players do not interact at all times. A player can be in one of the
two modes: active mode or sleep mode, denoted by mode Bi = 1 and Bi = 0,
respectively. Let Bi, i ∈N , be an i.i.d. random variable on Ωi := {0,1} whose
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probability mass function is given by
ρ iB =
{
pi, Bi = 1,
1− pi, Bi = 0
, i ∈N . (4.1)
The player modes can be viewed as internal states that are governed by the inher-
ent randomness of the player. The system mode B2 ∈ Ω := Ω1×Ω2 is a set of
independent modes of the players and we denote byB2 ⊆N as the set of active
players corresponding to B2.
The NZSG is characterized by utility functions Ui :S ×Ωi×A1×A2→R. Pi
collects a payoff Ui(s,B2,a1,a2) when P1 chooses a1 ∈ A1 and P2 uses a2 ∈ A2
at state s ∈S and mode B2.
The preceding game model can be viewed as a special class of stochastic games
in which the state transitions are independent of the player actions as well as the
current state.
We have slotted time, t ∈ {0,1, . . .}, when players pick their mixed strategies as
functions of what has transpired in the past, to the extent the information available
to them allows. Toward this end, we let xi,t(ai) denote the probabilities of Pi
choosing ai ∈ Ai at time t, and let xi,t = [xi,t(ai)]ai∈Ai be the mixed strategies of
Pi at time t, where more precisely,
xi,t ∈Xi :=
{
xi ∈ R|Ai| : xi(ai) ∈ [0,1], ∑
ai∈Ai
xi(ai) = 1
}
.
In particular, we define eai ∈ R|Ai|, with ai ∈ Ai, as unit vectors of sizes |Ai| ,
whose entry that corresponds to ai is 1 while others are zeros. We assume that
the mixed strategies of the players are independent of the current state s and the
player mode Bi. For any given pair of mixed strategies, (x1,x2) ∈X1×X2, and
for a fixed si ∈ Si,B2 ∈Ω, we define the expected utility (as expected payoff to Pi)
as
Ui(s,B2,x1,x2) := Ex1,x2Ui(s,B
2,a1,a2),
where Ex1,x2Ui denotes expectation of Ui over the action sets of the players under
the given mixed strategies. A further expectation of this quantity over the states
s and B2, denoted Es,B2 , yields the performance index of the expected game. We
now define the equilibrium concept of interest for this game, that is the equilibrium
of the expected game.
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Definition 1 (State-independent equilibrium) A strategy profile (x∗1,x
∗
2)∈X1×
X2 is a state-independent equilibrium of the game Ξ if it is equilibrium of the ex-
pected game, i.e., ∀x1 ∈X1,x2 ∈X2,
Es,B2U1(s,B
2,x∗1,x
∗
2) > Es,B2U1(s,B2,x1,x∗2),
Es,B2U2(s,B
2,x∗1,x
∗
2) > Es,B2U2(s,B2,x∗1,x2).
Since the expected game is a two-player game with finite actions for each player,
we can show the existence of the equilibrium using Nash’s existence theorem [87]
and state the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Existence) The stochastic NSZG Ξ with unknown states and changing
modes admits a state-independent equilibrium.
4.3 Learning Procedures
In many practical applications, the players in the two-person NZSGs do not have
the complete knowledge of their payoff functions and the state of their environ-
ment. Moreover, they do not know whether they interact with the other player
or not. Hence, the equilibrium strategy has to be learned online by observing the
payoffs at each time slot. A general learning procedure is outlined as follows.
At each time slot t ∈ Z+, each player generates an internal mode Bi to determine
whether to participate in the game or not. If both players are active, they interact
and receive a payoff after the play. If only one of the players is active, then the
active player receives his payoff as an outcome of his action at t only without the
interaction with the other player. If players do not have the knowledge of their
active mode probability pi, then each player keeps count of its interaction with
others by updating its vectors θi j,t ∈ R2, i, j ∈ {1,2}, as follows:
θi j,t = θi j,t−1+1l{B j=1},
where θi j,t is Pi’s count of P j’s number of activities since t > 0 and the initial
condition is given by θi j = 0,∀i, j ∈ {1,2}. The active players choose an action
ai,t ∈ Ai at time t and observe or measure an output u j,t ∈ R as an outcome of
their actions. Players estimate their payoffs by updating the entry of the estimated
payoff vector uˆi,t+1 ∈ R|Ai| that corresponds to the chosen action ai,t . In a sim-
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ilar way, players update their strategy vectors xi,t+1 based on a specific learning
scheme (to be introduced later). The update of the strategy vectors can exploit
the payoff information uˆi,t from the previous time step. In this case, we say the
learning is coupled; otherwise, we say that it is uncoupled.
The general coupled learning updates on the strategy and utility vectors take
the following form:{
xi,t+1 = xi,t +Πi,t(λi,t ,ai,t ,ui,t , uˆi,t ,xi,t),
uˆi,t+1 = uˆi,t +Σi,t(νi,t ,ai,t ,ui,t , uˆi,t ,xi,t),
(4.2)
where Πi,t ,Σi,t , i ∈N , are properly chosen functions for strategy and utility up-
dates, respectively. The parameters λi,t ,νi,t are learning rates indicating players’
capabilities of information retrieval and update. The vectors xi,t ∈Xi are mixed
strategies of the players at time t. uˆi,t , i ∈N , are estimated average payoffs up-
dated at each iteration t, and ui,t , i ∈ N , are the observed payoffs received by
players at time t. The learning rates λi,t ,νi,t ∈ R+ need to satisfy the conditions
(C1) ∑t>0 |λi,t |2 < ∞, ∑t>0 |νi,t |2 < ∞.
(C2) ∑t>0 |λi,t |=+∞, ∑t>0 |νi,t |=+∞.
The learning rate of Pi is relative to its frequency of activity. In general, the
learning rates are functions of θii, i∈N , and can be written as λi,θii(t),νi,θii(t). We
need to adopt a time reference for the game using maximum learning rates among
the active players, i.e., λ ∗t := maxi∈B2(t)λi,θii(t), ν
∗
t := maxi∈B2(t)νi,θii(t). It can
be verified that the reference learning rates λ ∗t ,ν∗t satisfy (C1) and (C2) if λi,t ,νi,t
satisfy the conditions for every i ∈N . The learning rates λ ∗t ,ν∗t , as we will see
later, affect the ODE approximation.
We call the learning in (4.3) a COmbined DIstributed PAyoff and Strategy Rein-
forcement Learning (CODIPAS-RL) [37]. The players can have different learning
rates for their utility and strategy updates. The payoff learning rate is on a faster
time scale than strategy learning rate if λi,t/νi,t → 0 as t → ∞; it is on a slower
time scale if νi,t/λi,t → 0 as t→ ∞. In the former case, the payoff learning can be
seen as quasi-static compared to the strategy learning and vice versa for the latter.
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4.4 Hybrid Learning
There are many learning schemes in the form of (4.3) for the stochastic NZSG.
Let L be a set of a finite number of pure learning schemes. A player Pi chooses
a learning schemePi := 〈Π(l)i ,Σ(l)i 〉, l ∈L , from the setL . We call the learning
homogeneous if both players use the same pure learning schemes and heteroge-
neous if players use different learning schemes, i.e., P1 6=P2. A player may
change his learning scheme in the game. We call the learning hybrid if the player
adopts multiple learning scheme in the entire learning process. Consider the hy-
brid and switching learning{
xi,t+1 = xi,t +∑l∈L 1l{li,t=l}Π
(l)
i,t (λi,t ,ai,t ,ui,t , uˆi,t ,xi,t),
uˆi,t+1 = uˆi,t +∑l∈L 1l{li,t=l}Σ
(l)
i,t (νi,t ,ai,t ,ui,t , uˆi,t ,xi,t),
(4.3)
where li,t ∈L is the learning pattern chosen by Pi at time t.
4.5 Learning Schemes
We introduce different learning schemes in the form of (4.3) for the stochastic
NZSG. Let L = {Lk,k = 1,2, · · · ,5} be a set of five pure learning schemes. A
player Pi chooses a learning schemesPi from the setL . We call the learning ho-
mogeneous if both players use the same pure learning schemes and heterogeneous
if players use different learning schemes, i.e.,P1 6=P2.
4.5.1 Bush-Mosteller-based CODIPAS-RLL1
Let Γi ∈ R be a reference level of Pi and
Γ˜i,t :=
ui,t−Γi
sups,B2,a |Ui(s,B2,a)−Γi|
. (4.4)
The learning patternL1 is given by xi,t+1(ai) = xi,t(ai)+λi,t1l{i∈B2(t)}Γ˜i,t
(
1l{ai,t=ai}− xi,t(ai)
)
,
uˆi,t+1(ai) = uˆi,t(ai)+νi,t1l{ai,t=ai,i∈B2(t)} (ui,t− uˆi,t(ai)) .
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The updates on the strategy and the estimated payoff are decoupled. The strategy
update does not exploit the knowledge of estimated payoff but only relies on the
observed payoffs at each time slot. The strategy update ofL1 is widely studied in
machine learning and has been initially proposed by Bush and Mosteller in [88].
Combined with the payoff update, we obtain a COPIDAS-RL based on Bush-
Mosteller learning. When Γi = 0, we obtain the learning schemes in [89, 90].
4.5.2 Boltzmann-Gibbs-based CODIPAS-RLL2
Let β˜i,ε :R|Ai|→R|Ai| be the Boltzmann-Gibbs (B-G) strategy mapping given by
β˜i,ε(uˆi,t)(ai) :=
e
1
ε uˆi,t(ai)
∑a′i∈Ai e
1
ε uˆi,t(a
′
i)
, ai ∈Ai. (4.5)
It is also known as the soft-max function. When ε → 0, the B-G strategy yields
a (pure) strategy that picks the maximum entry of the payoff vector uˆi,t . The
learning patternL2 is given by xi,t+1(ai) = xi,t(ai)+λi,t1l{i∈B2(t)}
(
β˜i,ε(uˆi,t)(ai,t)− xi,t(ai)
)
,
uˆi,t+1(ai) = uˆi,t(ai)+νi,t1l{ai,t=ai,i∈B2(t)} (ui,t− uˆi,t(ai)) .
The strategy and the estimated payoff are updated in a coupled fashion. The
numerical value of experiment is used in the estimation, and the estimated payoffs
are used to build the strategy (here the estimations are crucial since a player does
not know the numerical value of the payoff corresponding to the other actions
that he did not use). The strategy update is a B-G based reinforcement learning.
Combined together one gets the B-G based CODIPAS-RL. The rest point L2
can be seen as the equilibrium for a modified game with the perturbed payoff
Es,B2Ui+ εiHi, where Hi is the extra entropy term as discussed in [80].
4.5.3 Imitative B-G CODIPAS-RLL3
Let β Ii,ε,t :Xi×R|Ai|→ R|Ai| be the imitative B-G strategy mapping given by
β˜ Ii,ε,t(xi,t , uˆi,t)(ai) =
xi,t(ai)e
1
ε uˆi,t(ai)
∑a′i∈Ai xi,t(a
′
i)e
1
ε uˆi,t(a
′
i)
, ai ∈Ai. (4.6)
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The learning patternL3 is given by xi,t+1(ai) = xi,t(ai)+λi,t1l{i∈B2(t)}
(
β˜ Ii,ε,t(uˆi,t)(ai)− xi,t(ai)
)
,
uˆi,t+1(ai) = uˆi,t(ai)+νi,t1l{ai,t=ai,i∈B2(t)} (ui,t− uˆi,t(ai)) .
The imitative B-G learning weights the B-G strategy with the current strategy
vector xi,t and the strategy mapping β˜ Ii,ε,t is time-dependent. It allows the learning
strategies to be attained at the boundary of the simplexXi.
4.5.4 Weighted Imitative B-G CODIPAS-RLL4
Let β˜Wi,t : Xi×R×R|Ai|→R|Ai| be the imitative weighted B-G strategy mapping
given by
β˜Wi,t (xi,t ,λi,t , uˆi,t)(ai) :=
xi,t(ai)(1+λi,t)uˆi,t(ai)
∑a′i∈Ai xi,t(a
′
i)(1+λi,t)
uˆi,t(a′i)
, (4.7)
for every ai ∈Ai. The learning patternL4 is given by xi,t+1(ai) = xi,t(ai)+1l{i∈B2(t)}
(
β˜Wi,t (xi,t ,λi,t , uˆi,t)(ai)− xi,t(ai)
)
,
uˆi,t+1(ai) = uˆi,t(ai)+νi,t1l{ai,t=ai,i∈B2(t)} (ui,t− uˆi,t(ai)) .
Note that the exploitation function learning β˜Wi,t is time dependent in L4 and is
independent of parameter ε . If the learning yields an interior point as the equilib-
rium, then it is the exact equilibrium of the expected game, while the equilibrium
inL2 is an approximated one for the ε−perturbed game.
4.5.5 Weakened Fictitious-PlayL5
Let β˜Fi,t : R|Ai|→ 2R
|Ai| be a point-to-set mapping (correspondence)
β˜Fi,t(uˆi,t) := (1− ε)δβi(uˆi,t)+
ε
|Ai|1, (4.8)
where 1 ∈ R|Ai| is a vector with all its entries being 1; βi : R|Ai|→ 2Ai is the best
response correspondence:
βi(uˆi,t) ∈ arg max
a′i∈Ai
uˆi,t(a′i) (4.9)
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and δZ ,Z ⊆Ai, denotes a set of unit vectors {eai,ai ∈Z }.
The learning patternL5 is given by xi,t+1(ai) = xi,t(ai) ∈ 1l{i∈B2(t)}
(
β˜Fi,t(uˆi,t)− xi,t(ai)
)
,
uˆi,t+1(ai) = uˆi,t(ai)+νi,t1l{ai,t=ai,i∈B2(t)} (ui,t− uˆi,t(ai)) .
The weakened fictitious playL5 has been discussed in [81,86]. Different from
the classical fictitious play, a player does not observe the action played by the
other player at the previous step and the payoff function is unknown. Each player
estimates its payoff by updating uˆi,t using perceived payoffs. The strategy update
equation is composed of two parts. A player chooses one of his optimal actions
with probability (1− ε) by optimizing the up-to-date payoff estimate uˆi,t , and
plays an arbitrary action with equal probability ε.
Remark 1 We note that the average payoff-learning in the five pure learning
schemes can be seen as the reinforcement learning of Q-functions in MDPs, which
have been introduced in [75,76]. Since we have considered a stochastic game with
state transitions that are independent of the actions of the players, the Q-function
in MDPs is reduced to the average-payoff function uˆi,t .
4.6 Convergence Results
In this section, we introduce the new paradigm of hybrid learning, present the
main results on learning in two-person general-sum games, and discuss their con-
vergence properties for some special classes of games.
4.6.1 Stochastic approximation of the pure learning schemes
The pure learning schemes introduced above share the same learning structure for
average utility but differ in their strategy learning. Denote by Π(l)i,t the strategy
learning function for l ∈ L in the general form (4.3). Following the multiple
time-scale stochastic approximation framework developed in [91–94], one can
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write the pure learning schemes into the form xi,t+1−xi,t ∈ qi,t
(
f (l)i (xi,t , uˆi,t)+M
(l)
i,t+1
)
uˆi,t+1− uˆi,t ∈ q¯i,t
(
Es,x−i,t ,B2Ui− uˆi,t + M¯i,t+1
) ,
where f (l)i = E[Π
(l)
i,t+1|Ft ], l ∈L , is a learning pattern in the form of stochastic
approximation. qi,t is a time-scaling factor which is a function of the learning rates
λi,t and the probability of Pi in active mode at time t, denoted by P(i ∈B2(t));
q¯i,t is the time-scaling factor for uˆi,t . To use ODE approximation, we check first
the conditions given in the Appendix. The term M(l)i,t+1 is a bounded martingale
difference because the strategies are in the product of simplices which are convex
and compact, and the conditional expectation of Mi,t+1 given the sigma-algebra
generated by the random variables st ′,xt ′ ,ut ′, uˆt ′, t ′6 t, is zero. Similar properties
hold for M¯t+1. The function f is a regular function, and hence Lipschitz over a
compact set, which implies linear growth. Note that the case of constant learning
rates can be analyzed under the same setting but the convergence result is weaker.
Thus, the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories for the non-vanishing time-scale ratio,
i.e., λi,t/νi,t → γi for some γi ∈ R++ are
d
dt xi,t ∈ gi,t
(
f (l)i (xi,t , uˆi,t)
)
d
dt uˆi,t = g¯i,t
(
Es,x−i,t ,B2Ui− uˆi,t
) ,
where gi,t (resp. g¯i,t) are the asymptotic functions of qi,t ,λ ∗t , pi (resp. q¯i,t , ,ν∗t , pi).
If the learning rates have the vanishing ratio, i.e., λtµt → 0, the asymptotic pseudo-
trajectories are {
d
dt xi,t ∈ gi,t
(
f (l)i (xi,t ,Es,x−i,tUi)
)
uˆi,t −→ Es,x−i,B2Ui.
4.6.2 Stochastic approximation of the hybrid learning scheme
Players can choose different patterns at different time slots. Consider the hybrid
and switching learning{
xi,t+1−xi,t ∈ qi,t
(
∑l∈L 1l{li,t=l} f
(l)
i (xi,t , uˆi,t)+M
(l)
i,t+1
)
uˆi,t+1− uˆi,t ∈ q¯i,t
(
Es,x−i,tUi− uˆi,t + M¯i,t+1
) ,
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where li,t ∈L is the learning pattern chosen by Pi at time t.
Theorem 4 Assume that each player Pi, i ∈ N , adopts one of the CODIPAS-
RLs in L with probability ωi = [ωi,l′]l′∈L ∈ ∆(L ) and the learning rates satisfy
conditions (C1) and (C2). Then, the asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of the hybrid
and switching learning can be written into the form{
d
dt xi,t ∈ gi,t
(
∑l∈L ωi,l f
(l)
i (xi,t , uˆi,t)
)
d
dt uˆi,t = g¯i,t
(
Es,x−i,tUi− uˆi,t
)
for the non-vanishing time-scale learning ratio λi,t/νi,t; and{
d
dt xi,t ∈ gi,t
(
∑l∈L ωi,l f
(l)
i (xi,t ,Es,x−i,t ,B2Ui)
)
uˆi,t −→ Es,x−i,B2Ui
for the vanishing learning ratio λi,t/νi,t .
Proof: We first examine the strategy learning given by
xi,t+1−xi,t ∈ 1l{i∈B2(t)}λi,t
(
∑
l∈L
1l{li,t=l} f
(l)
i (xt)+M
(l)
i,t+1
)
By taking λt as the reference learning rate, the drift (expected change in one step)
can be computed via
lim
λi,t−→0
E
(
xi,t+1−xi,t
λi,t
∣∣Ft)= P(i ∈B2(t))(∑
l∈L
ωi,l f
(l)
i (xt)
)
where we used the fact that E
(
M(l)i,t+1 |Ft
)
= 0. The drift has the form
gi,t ∑
l∈L
ωi,l f
(l)
i (xt).
We check that the assumptions A1-A4 given in the Appendix are all met. The
asymptotic pseudo-trajectory reduces to
d
dt
xi,t = gi,t ∑
l∈L
ωi,l f
(l)
i (xt).
For two time-scales CODIPAS-RL, we use the same lines as in [37, 91]. 
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Table 4.1: Asymptotic pseudo-trajectories of pure learning
Learning Patterns Class of ODE
L1 Adjusted replicator dynamics
L2 Smooth best response dynamics
L3 Imitative BG dynamics
L4 Time-scaled replicator dynamics
L5 Perturbed best response dynamics
In Table 4.1, we give the asymptotic pseudo-trajectory of the pure learning
when the rate of payoff learning is faster than that of strategy learning. Let
U j(x) :=Es,B2U j(s,B2,x), j ∈N . In Table 4.1, the replicator dynamics are given
by
x˙ j(a j) = q jx j(a j)
U j(ea j ,x− j)− ∑
a′j∈A j
U j(ea′j ,x− j)x j(a
′
j)
 .
The smooth best response dynamics are given by
x˙ j(a j) = q j
 e 1εU j(ea j ,x− j)
∑a′j e
1
εU j(ea′j
,x− j)
− x j(a j)
 .
The best response dynamics are given by
x˙ j ∈ q j(β j(x− j)−x j),
and the payoff dynamics are
d
dt
uˆ j(a j) = q¯ jx j(a j)(U j(ea j ,x− j)− uˆ j(a j)).
The imitative Boltzman-Gibbs dynamics are given by
x˙ j(a j) = q j
 x j(a j)e 1εU j(ea j ,x− j)
∑a′j x j(a
′
j)e
1
εU j(ea′j
,x− j)
− x j(a j)
 .
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4.6.3 Connection with equilibria of the expected game
We study the convergence properties of the dynamics and their connection with
the state-independent Nash equilibrium for three special classes of games.
Games with two actions
For two-player games with two actions, i.e., A1 = {a11,a21},A2 = {a12,a22}, one
can transform the system of ODEs of the strategy-learning into a planar system
under the form
α˙1 = Q1(α1,α2), α˙2 = Q2(α1,α2), (4.10)
where we let αi = xi(a1i ). The dynamics for Pi can be expressed in terms of α1,α2
only as x1(a21) = 1− x1(a21), and x2(a22) = 1− x2(a22).
We use the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem and the Dulac criterion [95] to estab-
lish a convergence result for (4.10).
Theorem 5 ( [95]) For an autonomous planar vector field as in (4.10), the Du-
lac’s criterion states as follows: Let γ(.) be a scalar function defined on the unit
square [0,1]2 . If ∂ [γ(α))α˙1]∂α1 +
∂ [γ(α)α˙2]
∂α2
is not identically zero and does not change
sign in [0,1]2, then there are no cycles lying entirely in [0,1]2.
Corollary 1 Consider a two-player two-action game. Assume that each of the
players adopts the Boltzmann-Gibbs CODIPAS-RL with λi,tνi,t =
λt
νt −→ 0. Then, the
asymptotic pseudo-trajectory reduces to a planar system in the form
α˙1 = β1,ε(u1(ea1,α2))−α1; α˙2 = β2,ε(u2(α1,ea2))−α2.
Moreover, the system satisfies the Dulac’s criterion.
Proof: We apply Theorem 5 with γ(·) ≡ 1 and find the divergence to be equal
to −2, which is strictly negative. Hence, the result follows. 
Note that for the replicator dynamics, the Dulac criterion reduces to
(1−2α1)(U1(ea11,α2)−U1(ea21,α2))+(1−2α2)(U2(α1,ea12)−U2(α1,ea22)),
which vanishes for (α1,α2) = (1/2,1/2). It is possible to have limit cycles in
replicator dynamics and hence the Dulac criterion does not apply. However, the
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stability of the replicator dynamics can be directly studied in the two-action case
by identifying the game as one of four types: coordination, anti-coordination,
prisoner’s dilemma, hawk-and-dove [96, 97].
The following corollary now follows from Corollary 1.
Corollary 2 Consider a two-player two-action game.
(CR1) Heterogeneous learning: If P1 is with Boltzmann-Gibbs CODIPAS-RL
and P2’s learning leads to replicator dynamics, then the convergence condition
reduces to (1−2α2)(u2(α1,ea12)−u2(α1,ea22))< 1 for all (α1,α2).
(CR2) Hybrid learning: If the players use hybrid learning obtained by combin-
ing Boltzmann-Gibbs CODIPAS-RL with weight ωi,1 and the replicator dynamics
with weight 1−ωi,1 then the Dulac criterion reduces to
ω1,2[(1−2α1)(u1(ea11,α2)−u1(ea21,α2))]
+ ω2,2[(1−2α2)(u2(α1,ea12)−u2(α1,ea22))]
< w1,1+w2,2
for all (α1,α2).
Remark 2 (Symmetric games with three actions) If the expected game is a sym-
metric game with three actions per player, then the symmetric game dynamics re-
duce to the two-dimensional dynamical system. This allows us to apply the Dulac
criterion.
Lyapunov games
We say that a game Ξ is a Lyapunov game under a given hybrid dynamics if the
resulting dynamics has an associated Lyapunov function V (x) : ∆ ⊆ R∑i |Ai| →
R+. Note that a Lyapunov function V (x) is positive definite on R∑i |Ai| for every
x 6= x∗ ∈ ∆, and its time-derivative is negative, dVdt < 0, for all x 6= x∗, where x∗ is
a stationary point of the dynamics [98]. The Lyapunov function can also defined
to be negative definite as in [99]; in this case, the time derivative will need to be
positive.
Theorem 6 Consider a Lyapunov game under the learning schemesL1,L4. Then,
the learning procedure has convergence to the set of equilibria of the expected ro-
bust game for all interior initial conditions.
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Proof: Lyapunov function V provides the stability of the set of rest points. Since
the dynamics are positively correlated for adjusted replicator dynamics [96, 97],
the state-independent equilibria are rest points of the dynamics obtained fromL1
andL4. The stability of any convex combination of these dynamics follows. 
Note that Theorem 6 says that starting from interior initial points, the hybrid
dynamics lead to one of the equilibria, which we do not know which one in ad-
vance. The set can have either a finite number or a continuum of equilibria. This
result holds also for n−player stochastic games with random updates.
Potential games
We say that the stochastic game Ξ is an expected robust potential game if the
expected payoff derives from a potential function. Potential games are a special
class of games where the payoff functions of the players are governed by a po-
tential function Φ : R∑i∈N |Ai|→ R, i.e., Ui(eai,x−i) = ∂Φ(x)∂xi(ai) , i ∈N ,ai ∈Ai. We
use a Lyapunov approach to show the global convergence of hybrid learning for
potential games.
Lemma 2 Assume that the stochastic NZSG Φ has a potential function Φ. Then,
there exists a Lyapunov function V R(x1,x2) :R|A1|+|A2|→R for learning schemes
L1,L4-associated replicator dynamics and it is given by its potential V R = Φ.
Hence, the replicator dynamics converge to a rest point. In addition, if starting
from an interior point of the simplex, the dynamics converge to the Nash equilib-
rium of the game Ξ.
Proof: Since the payoff matrix is bounded, we can study its strategically equiv-
alent game [13], [9] by subtracting a certain offset from every matrix entries so
that Ui(a) is negative for every strategy pair a, and hence Es,B2Ui(ea j ,x−i,t) is
negative. Without loss of generality, we can assume the game payoff matrix or
its strategically equivalent game payoff matrix is negative entry-wise. Therefore,
V R = Φ is negative. We take the time derivative of the Lyapunov function V R as
follows:
d
dt
V R(x1,t ,x2,t) = ∑
i∈N
∑
a j∈Ai
(
dxi,t(a j)
dt
)(
∂V R
∂xi,t(a j)
)
,
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which leads to the following set of inequalities
d
dt
V R(x1,t ,x2,t) = ∑
i∈N
gi,t
{
∑
a j∈Ai
xi,t(a j)
(
Es,B2Ui(ea j ,x−i,t)
)2
−
(
∑
a j∈Ai
xi,t(a j)Es,B2Ui(ea j ,x−i,t)
)2
> ∑
i∈N
gi,t
{
∑
a j∈Ai
xi,t(a j)
(
Es,B2Ui(ea j ,x−i,t)
)2
− ∑
a j∈Ai
x2i,t(a j)
(
Es,B2Ui(ea j ,x−i,t)
)2}> 0.
The last two inequalities result from Jensen’s inequality and the positivity and the
range of xi,t . We have dV
R
dt > 0 with equality only at the equilibrium. Hence, con-
vergence to equilibria holds for all initial conditions in the interior of the simplex.

Lemma 3 Let V B(x1,x2) : R|A1|+|A2| → R be a Lyapunov function for learning
patternLl-associated replicator dynamics f l, l = 2, such that
V B(x1,x2) =Φ(x1,x2)+ ε1H1(x1)+ ε2H2(x2),
where Hi :R|Ai|→R+ are strictly concave perturbation functions which can take
different forms depending on the pure learning scheme l. The ODEs correspond-
ing to the learning schemes converge to a set of perturbed equilibria of the game
Ξ.
Proof: Using the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 2, we can assume
Φ or its strategic equivalent form is positive without loss of generality, and hence
V B is nonnegative. The Lyapunov function V B has its critical points given by
∇x1V B = ∇x2V B = 0, i.e.,
∇xiΦ+ εi∇xiHi = 0, i = 1,2. (4.11)
The first-order condition (4.11) yields the perturbed equilibria of the B-G type of
learning schemes. By taking the time derivative of V B, we arrive at
dV B
dt
= ∑
i∈N
∑
a j∈Ai
∂xi(a j)
∂ t
∂Φ
∂xi(a j)
+ εi
∂xi(a j)
∂ t
∂Hi
∂xi(a j)
.
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Denote the perturbed payoff function by U˜i(x1,x2) :=Es,B2Ui(s,B2,x1,x2)+εiHi(xi).
The first-order condition for a maximum satisfies, for every a j ∈Ai,
Es,B2Ui(s,B
2,ea j ,x−i)+ εi
∂Hi(β¯i(x−i))
∂xi(a j)
= 0, (4.12)
where β¯i(·) is a type of B-G strategy that corresponds to the learning type. Since
the game is assumed to be a potential game, we have
∂Φ
∂xi(a j)
=−εi∂Hi(β¯i(x−i))∂xi(a j) . (4.13)
Hence, we obtain from (4.12) and (4.13),
dV B
dt
= ∑
i∈N
∑
a j∈Ai
εigi,t
(
∂Hi(β¯ (x−i))(a j)
∂xi(a j)
− ∂Hi(xi(a j))
∂xi(a j)
)
·(β¯i
(
x−i)(a j)− xi(a j)
)
. (4.14)
Due to the strict concavity of the perturbation functions Hi, we conclude that
dV B
dt 6 0, with equality only at the equilibrium. Hence, the pure learning dynamics
converge to the set of perturbed equilibria. 
Theorem 7 Assume that the stochastic NZSG Ξ has a potential function Φ. The
hybrid learning withL1 andL2 converges locally to a perturbed state-independent
Nash equilibrium x∗1,x
∗
2 of the potential game Ξ for sufficiently small εi .
Proof: The Lyapunov functions for replicator and G-B dynamics share the same
termΦ. For hybrid learning between these two dynamics, we can pickΦ as a Lya-
punov function. For small εi close to zero, the Lyapunov functionΦ for pure learn-
ing L2 yields a strictly positive time derivative for non-equilibrium points due to
continuity. Let xε be a maximizer of V R(x) = Φ(x) +∑i εiHi(xi). Then, there
exists εh > 0 such that V˜ (x) = Φ(x)+∑i ε ′i Hi(xi) is strictly positive in a neigh-
borhood of the considered non-equilibrium point with ε ′i =min(εh,
εi
Mi
), where Mi
is the maximum of Hi over Xi. Since the maximizer of V˜ is an ε ′− equilibrium
where ε ′ = maxi ε ′i , there exists a subsequence of xε converging to x∗ which is an
equilibrium and x∗ maximizes Φ and this holds for any convergent subsequence.
This means the time derivative of V˜ is strictly positive in all the neighborhood
of x∗ and vanishes only at x∗. Thus, when ε ′ = maxε ′i goes to zero, one gets an
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Figure 4.1: An illustration of the network security game scenario where an
attacker attempts to breach the network security by compromising the servers
and workstations whereas the network administrator monitors the network
activity to prevent possible intrusions.
equilibrium. Hence, in view of Lemma 3, we can conclude that for sufficiently
small εi > 0, we have local convergence of the hybrid learning. 
Note that the equilibrium x∗1,x
∗
2 in Theorem 7 may not be unique, which de-
pends on the rest point of the nonlinear hybrid dynamics.
4.7 Application to Security Games
In this section, we use the learning algorithm to study a two-person security game
in a network between an intruder and an administrator. In Fig. 4.1, we show a
local network connected to the Internet where an attacker attempts to launch an
internal denial-of-service attack to bring down a network server capture important
data from a workstation. Let P1 and P2 denote the administrator and the intruder,
respectively. An administrator P1 can use different levels of protection. The in-
truder P2 can launch an attack that can be of high or low intensity. Let the action
sets for P1 and P2 be A1 := {H,L} and A2 := {S,W}, respectively. The network
administrator is assumed to be always on alert while the intruder attacks with a
probability p. Hence, the set B2(t) can be of two types, i.e., (C1) {P1, P2} or
(C2) {P1}. The former case (C1) corresponds to the scenario where the intruder
and the administrator attack and defend, respectively, whereas the latter (C2) sug-
gests that the administrator faces no threat. We represent the payoff under these
58
two scenarios by M1 and M2, respectively:
M1 :=
 S WH 1,−1 1,0
L −2,1 2,0
 , M2 :=
[
H 1
L 2
]
. (4.15)
In (C1), a successful defense against attack yields a payoff of 2 for P1 while a
failure results in a payoff of -2. A successful attack yields P2 a payoff of 1 while
a failed attack yields a zero payoff. The employment of strong defense (H) or
strong attack (S) costs an extra unit of effort as compared to the low defense (L)
and the weak attack (W) for P1 and P2, respectively. In (C2), P1 stays secure
without the threat from the intruder, and hence yields a payoff of 2. However, the
high security level costs an extra unit of energy from the player.
The payoffs in M1 and M2 are subject to exogenous noise which varies in dif-
ferent environmental states s. The state-independent equilibrium of the game
is found to be at x∗1 = [
1
2 ,
1
2 ]
T ,x∗2 = [
1
3 ,
2
3 ]
T and the optimal average payoffs are
uˆ∗1 = [
2
3 ,
2
3 ]
T , uˆ∗2 = [0,0]
T . In Figs. 4.2 and 4.3, we show the payoffs and mixed
strategies of both players when both players use the learning pattern L1. We can
see that the replicator dynamics from L1 do not converge. However the time av-
erage strategies limT→∞ 1T
∫ T
0 xi,tdt converge to x∗1,x
∗
2, respectively, and, the time
average payoffs limT→∞ 1T
∫ T
0 uˆi,tdt converge to uˆ∗1, uˆ
∗
2, respectively.
In Figs. 4.4 and 4.5, we show the payoffs and mixed strategies of the players
when they both adopt the learning pattern L2. We choose ε = 1/50 and observe
that the mixed strategies converge to x¯1 = [0.5277,0.4723]T , x¯1 = [0.3333,0.6667]T
and the payoffs converge to ¯ˆu1 = [0.6667,0.6667]T , ¯ˆu2 = [−0.027,0]T , which are
in the close neighborhood of uˆ∗1, uˆ
∗
2.
In Figs. 4.6 and 4.7, we show the convergence of the heterogeneous learning
scheme where P1 usesL1 and P2 usesL2. With ε = 1/50, we find the converging
strategies at x¯1, x¯1 and the payoffs at ¯ˆu1, ¯ˆu2. We can see that the adoption of L2
by P2 in the heterogeneous learning facilitates the convergence of the algorithm
even though the learning exhibits high magnitude of oscillations at the beginning,
which is mainly due toL1 learning pattern adopted by P1.
In Figs. 4.8 and 4.9, we show the convergence of the hybrid learning scheme
where P1 and P2 adoptL1 andL2 with equal weights. The strategies converge to
[0.5145,0.4855]T , [0.3334,0.6666]T for P1 and P2, respectively, whereas the pay-
offs converge to [0.6666,0.6666]T , [−0.01459,0]T for P1 and P2, respectively. We
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Figure 4.2: The payoffs to the players with both players usingL1.
can see that the hybrid mixture of L1 and L2 learning patterns leads to conver-
gence with smaller magnitude of oscillations in comparison to the ones shown in
Figs. 4.6 and 4.7.
4.8 Conclusion
We have presented distributed hybrid strategic learning algorithms for a class of
two-person nonzero-sum stochastic games along with their general convergence
and non-convergence properties. The players are assumed to have information
limitations in their knowledge not only of other players’ payoff functions and
strategies but also of their own. In addition, the interactions among the players
occur at random times according to their modes. We have applied the framework
to security games where the noncooperative behaviors between an attacker and a
defender are well characterized by the features of distributed hybrid learning.
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Figure 4.3: The mixed strategies of the players with both players usingL1.
Figure 4.4: The payoffs to the players with both players usingL2.
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Figure 4.5: The mixed strategies of the players with both players usingL2.
Figure 4.6: The payoffs to the heterogeneous players with P1 usingL1 and P2
usingL2.
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Figure 4.7: The mixed strategies of the heterogeneous players with P1 usingL1
and P2 usingL2.
Figure 4.8: The payoffs to the players with both players using hybrid learning
scheme with equal weights onL1 andL2.
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Figure 4.9: The mixed strategies of the players with both players using hybrid
learning scheme with equal weights onL1 andL2.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURE NETWORK ROUTING
Communication networks play an important role in providing device-to-device
communications, human and machine interactions, and two-way communication
between users and operators. This chapter investigates at the network layer of
CPSs a dynamic secure routing game framework to effectively malicious behav-
iors in cognitive radio networks and smart grid data networks. We first estab-
lish a stochastic multi-stage zero-sum game framework for cognitive radio net-
work based on the directional explorations of ad hoc on-demand distance vector
(AODV) algorithms. The zero-sum game captures the conflicting goals between
malicious attackers and honest nodes and considers packet error probability and
delay as performance metrics. Distributed Boltzmann-Gibbs learning is used for
an on-line routing algorithm, in which the users are not required to have initial
knowledge of the actions of the attackers and their own utility function. Instead,
the users learn their payoff functions based on their past observations and choose
the best action based on estimated payoffs.
Based on the novel multi hop routing game framework, we apply it to the com-
munication networks of the smart grid, providing assurance of secure routing of
PMU and smart meter data in the open network, which is enabled by the adoption
of IP- based network technologies. The quality-of-service in routing is measured
by the data integrity, latency and packet loss rate. We leverage the hierarchi-
cal structure of power grids and propose a routing protocol that maximizes the
quality-of-service along the routing path to the control room. In addition, we
optimize the data communication rates between the super data concentrator at the
penultimate level with the control center. We propose a hybrid structure of routing
architecture to enable the resilience, robustness and efficiency of the smart grid.
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5.1 Secure Routing in Cognitive Radio Networks
In distributed cognitive radio (CR) networks, routing is inherently fragile and can
easily be compromised by unknown attacks, malicious behaviors and even unin-
tentional misconfigurations. Many of these attacks have been studied in the liter-
ature such as primary user (PU) emulation attacks [100], jamming attacks [101],
false reporting of sensing data in collaborative spectrum sensing [102], false evac-
uation attacks [103], denial-of-service attacks [104], and possibly some other
attacks in the network layer. Consequently, it is imperative to design routing
schemes that can enhance the security of routing in distributed cognitive radio
networks [105]. Moreover, the primary users can affect the spectrum opportu-
nities available for the secondary users (SUs), leading to dynamically changing
network topology in multi-hop CR networks [106]. Therefore, the secure routing
scheme needs to allow SUs to learn their environment in a distributed and dynamic
fashion and to yield optimal routing decisions that can defend against malicious
attacks with minimum level of compromise in performances.
The dynamic game framework has been applied to network formation problems
in wireless mobile networks [32] and on-demand routing in CR networks [33].
However, the structure of the game is different in nature. In [32] and [33], the hi-
erarchical levels are defined logically and geographically by a high-level network
manager, whereas in our distributed secure routing frameworks, users define their
own hierarchies by their multi-stage exploration processes of neighboring nodes.
In addition, the secure routing games capture the conflicting goals between the
attackers and the users, whereas the network formation game models have consid-
ered interactions among competing agents of the same nature. Another challenge
that we address here is the users’ lack of knowledge of the action set of the attack-
ers and their utility function in practice due to the distributed routing mechanism
without centralized information.
5.1.1 System Model
In this section, we describe the network system model for the secure multi-hop
CR networks. Let G := (N ,E ) be a topology graph for a multi-hop CR network,
where N = {n1, ...,nN} is a set of N secondary user nodes; and E := {e1, ...eE}
is a set of E links connecting the secondary users. In addition, we let M :=
{m1, ...,mK} be a set of K primary users and K be the set of channels. We
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assume that a primary user is associated with one frequency channel, and the
set of frequency channels is identical to the set of primary users. Primary user
mp ∈M is associated with a channel, which can be in an either occupied state
(sp = 1) or an unoccupied state (sp = 0) . Let Sp := {0,1},mp ∈M , be the set
of binary channel states of SU mp. A system state s= [sp]mp∈M ∈S :=∏Kp=1Sp
is a collection of individual states of each primary user channel mp. We assume
that the system state s is an identically distributed random variable defined on the
setS .
We consider a secure routing problem in which SU ni ∈N needs to find an
optimal routing path to its destination ndi ∈N . To initiate the routing process,
SU ni starts with an exploration of neighboring nodes for connections by sending
them request messages. After ni obtains a list of confirming nodes, it chooses a
connecting node among them. Once the secondary user routes data to the selected
node, the selected node initiates another exploration process to discover adjacent
nodes along the direction towards the destination node. This process continues
until the data of SU ni reaches its destination. Denote by Li the total number of
explorations until a destination node is reached for SU ni, and by li ∈ {0,1, · · · ,Li}
the li-th exploration process with ni as the initial node. Let Ali ⊆N be the set of
nodes explored in li-th exploration and A = ∪Lili=0Ali ⊆N be the total set of ex-
plored nodes along the path to the destination, including SU ni and its destination
node. By default, the exploration stage li = 0 refers to the initialization process
of the routing, i.e., A0 is the singleton set containing SU ni itself alone, and the
Li-th exploration refers to the final stage of the routing, i.e., ALi is the singleton
set which includes the destination node ndi . In this work, we consider single des-
tination for each source node; however, it can be naturally extended to multiple
destinations by defining a set of destination nodes.
Let (ni, li) ∈ Ali be the node chosen after li-th exploration to carry the data
of node ni. By default, at stage li = 0, we define (ni,0) := ni, and at stage
li = Li, we define (ni,Li) := ndi . Let Pi(li, l
′
i) := {(ni,h),h = li, li+1, · · · , l′i ; l′i >
li, li, l′i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,Li}} be the set of connecting nodes along the multi-hop path
between node (ni, li) at stage li and node (ni, l′i) at stage l′i that routes the data
of SU node ni. Hence the path Qi(li, l′i) ⊂ E between (ni, li) and (ni, l′i) can be
represented by the set of directed edges induced by Pi(li, l′i), i.e., Qi(li, l′i) :=
{{(ni, li),(ni, li + 1)},{(ni, li + 1),(ni, li + 2)}, · · · ,{(ni,Li− 1),(ni,Li)}}. In par-
ticular, the complete multi-hop path from node ni to its destination is denoted
by Qi(0,Li). Note that the following composability property of Pi,Qi, i.e.,
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Pi(li, l′i) =Pi(li, l′′i )∪P(ni,l′′i )(l′′i , l′i) and Qi(li, l′i) = Qi(li, l′′i )∪Q(ni,l′′i )(l′′i , l′i),
where li < l′′i < l′i , li, l′i , l′′i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,Li}.
The multi-hop CR network can be subject to jamming attacks from multiple
adversaries. LetJ := {1,2, · · · ,J} be the set of jammers in the CR network, and
R j, j ∈J , be the set of nodes within the influence range of jammer j. Since
the range of an attacker R j ⊂ N is wider than the effective jamming area of
a power constrained jammer with directed antenna, without loss of generality,
we can assume that the range R j ⊂N of an attacker can only affect one local
exploration stage, i.e.,R j∪Ah 6= /0 for some h= 1,2, · · · ,Li−1, andR j∪Ah′ = /0,
for all h′ 6= h,h′ = 1,2, · · · ,Li−1. However, in the case where a jammer can cover
a wide area enabled by multiple antennae, we can view the jammer equivalently
as multiple local jammers over its covered area. Note that we have limited the
stages between 1 and Li because jamming at initial stage 0 can be easily detected
by the source. The objective of a jammer j is to choose a node r j ∈R j to jam and
interrupt the data transmission of node ni ∈N to its destination. LetJli be the set
of jammers whose influence range affectsAli , i.e.,Jli := { j ∈J ,R j∩Ali 6= /0}.
The action profile of jammers Jli is denoted by rli := [r j] j∈Jli . The joint action
profile of all the jammers is denoted by r = [r j] j∈J . The set of nodes within
the jamming range by the set of jammers Jli is denoted by Rli := ∪ j∈JliR j.
Likewise, the set of nodes jammed by the set of jammers J is denoted by R =
∪ j∈JR j. In general, ∪Lili=1Jli ⊆J ; however, without loss of generality, we can
assume that ∪Lili=1Jli =J because we can exclude jammers that do not affect the
routing of SU ni.
The goal of SU node ni is to choose an optimal path from the source to the des-
tination that circumvents multiple jammers distributed along the path and yields
the best routing performance. In the next section, we introduce metrics and utility
functions to quantify routing performances and formulate a game theoretic model
between SUs and multiple jammer for achieving secure routing.
In Fig. 5.1, we illustrate the routing mechanism with a snapshot of the CR
network. The source node n1 follows multiple stages of explorations includ-
ing A1 = {n2,n3},A2 = {n4,n5},A3 = {n6,n7}, and A4 = {n8,n9}. Without
attackers, the routing path (dotted line) is found by maximizing the aggregate util-
ity from the source n1 to the destination n12, i.e., Q1(0,4) = {(n1,n2),(n2,n5),
(n5,n6),(n6,n9)} and P1(0,4) = {n1,n2,n5,n6,n9}. At stage l1 = 4, the chosen
node n6 at stage l1 = 3 chooses n9. However, with the presence of attacker 1,
who attacks n9, the path (solid line) is formed by finding the saddle-point equi-
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Figure 5.1: A snapshot of secure routing in distributed cognitive radio networks:
A source SU node n1 routes its data to its destination node n12. SU nodes
perform multi-stage explorations until they find the destination node. A
malicious attacker launches a jamming attack against n9. The secure routing
protocol responds by changing to a new route that circumvent the jammer.
librium strategies at different exploration sites. The path Q1(0,4) is changed to
{(n1,n2),(n2,n5),(n5,n6),(n6,n8)} andP1(0,4) = {n1,n2,n5,n6,n8}.
5.1.2 Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model
The exploration and decision processes in the routing are composed of multi-
stages. The strategic behaviors of SUs and jammers can be modeled using dy-
namic games. In this section, we define the utility functions and describe the
game-theoretic model for secure routing in distributed cognitive radio networks
with presence of multiple jamming adversaries.
Utility Function
The performance of routing can be characterized by signal to interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) that indicates physical-layer channel conditions, and routing
delay that indicates the network-level congestions. Hence the utility function
needs to capture these from the source to destination along the routing path. The
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average SINR from node (ni, li−1) to node (ni, li) is defined by
γ(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) =
α(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) ·P(ni,li−1)
σ2
(ni,li)
+ I(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)
, li = 1,2, · · · ,Li, (5.1)
where P(ni,li−1) is the transmit power of node (ni, li−1) and α
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)= δ ·(d
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1))
−ω
is the channel gain between the node (ni, li−1) and its selected node at (ni, li)with
d(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) the distance between (ni, li−1) and (ni, li); ω ∈ R++ is the path loss ex-
ponent and δ ∈ R++ is the path loss constant; σ2(ni,li) is the variance of Gaussian
noise at (ni, li). The term I
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) is the interference perceived by neighboring
nodes or malicious jammers at (ni, li) and is given by
I(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) = ∑
n′∈N(ni,li)∪Jli−{(ni,li−1)}
α(ni,li)n′ ·Pn′, (5.2)
where N(ni,li) ⊆N is the set of nodes n′ communicating with (ni, li), including
(ni, li−1), with each using transmission power Pn′; and α(ni,li)n′ is the channel gain
between n′ and (ni, li). The term I
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) represents the interference from the other
nodes including jammers at (ni, li). An adversary jJli is assumed to jam one node
at his maximum power Pmaxj , and depending on which node the jammer chooses,
the term Pj in (5.2) takes the following form:
Pj =
{
Pmaxj if r j = (ni, li)
0 otherwise
, (5.3)
for every j ∈Jli .
The primary goal of a jammer is to maximize the probability of packet error rate
(PER) of SU ni.The physical layer data communication PER q
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) between
(ni, li− 1) and (ni, li) is related to SINR γ(ni,li)(ni,li−1) and the modulation and coding
schemes as follows:
q(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) = φ
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) exp
(
−ε(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) · γ
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)
)
, (5.4)
where φ (ni,li)
(ni,li−1) is the maximum PER and ε
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) is a parameter depending on the
modulation and coding schemes [107].
Another metric for routing is the communication delay at higher layers such
as network or session layer. We recall the Pollaczek-Khinchin formula [108] for
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the M/G/1 queueing system and define the expected total packet delay τ(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)
perceived at node (ni, li) as follows:
τ(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) =
η(ni,li−1)X2(ni,li)
2(1−ρ(ni,li)
(ni,li−1))
+X (ni,li), (5.5)
where η(ni,li−1) is the arrival rate of packets at the chosen node (ni, li);
ρ(ni,li)
(ni,li−1) := η(ni,li−1)/µ(ni,li) = η(ni,li−1)X (ni,li),
with µ(ni,li) being the service time at the node (ni, li). X (ni,li) is the mean service
time per packet at the chosen node and X2(ni,li) is the expected variance of X (ni,li).
When node (ni, li) experiences a higher volume of incoming data, more delay will
be perceived by (ni, li−1) if (ni, li) is selected.
Remark 3 Note that in (5.4) and (5.5), we have suppressed the dependence of
the system state s and attacker’s actions rli in the notation. The parameters can
be dependent on the primary user state s, in particular, the interference term and
the path loss. In addition, the attackers’ decisions rli on which nodes to jam will
affect the utility through (5.3) in (5.2).
The goal of SU ni is to maximize its expected total utility Ui from the source
to the destination, which is measured by the overall probability of successful
transmission q and the total delay τ . Using (5.4) and (5.5), q and τ are de-
fined, respectively, by q(s,Pi(0,Li),r) =∏Lili=1 q
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1), and τ(s,Pi(0,Li),r) =
∑Lili=1 τ
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1). Note that minimizing (the expected value of) q is equivalent to
minimizing (the expected value of)
q˜(s,Pi(0,Li),r) :=
Li
∑
li=1
lnq(ni,li)
(ni,li−1).
Let λ ∈ R++ be a weighting parameter. We can use q˜ and τ to construct the
multi-objective total utility as
Ui(s,Pi(0,Li),r) = −
Li
∑
li=1
(
lnq(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)+λτ
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)
)
,
=
Li−1
∑
li=1
u(ni,li−1)(s,(ni, li),rli), (5.6)
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from which we can define the stage utility of node (ni, li−1) selecting node (ni, li)
as follows: for li = 1, · · · ,Li,
u(ni,li−1)(s,(ni, li),rli) :=− lnq
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1)−λτ
(ni,li)
(ni,li−1). (5.7)
Note that in general, λ can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier if we formu-
late the problem as optimizing q˜ subject to hard delay constraint. In addition, λ
can be chosen to depend on the system state s. The stage utility and total utility
are random variables as they are functions of s.
Maximin Problem
With (5.6) and (5.7), SU node ni aims to find an optimal routing path that maxi-
mizes the expected total utility Ui along the route to the destination node, i.e.,
max
Pi(0,Li)
EsUi(s,Pi(0,Li),r). (5.8)
The expected utility averages over the state spaceS . It can also be interpreted as
the time-average utility as s is an i.i.d. random variable over its supportS . How-
ever, the jammers intend to minimize the expected total utility (5.8) by choosing
to attack the nodes between ni and its destination. A jammer j at stage li can
only jam a SU node (ni, li) ∈Ali within its range of influence R j. Hence, in our
framework we will only need to concern ourselves with a set of SU nodes in Ali
that have overlap with R j. It is easy to show that, for an adversary, an action in
R j ∪Ali dominates an action in R j\Ali . Hence, without loss of generality, we
can take Ali as the action spaces for attackers and the SU node at stage li.
The security strategy1 for node ni is a sequence of nodes {(ni, li), li = 1, · · · ,Li−
1} that achieves the lower value
U i = max
Pi(0,Li)
min
r
EsUi(s,Pi(0,Li),r). (5.9)
The maximizing and minimizing strategies in (5.9) are denoted byP∗i (0,Li) and
r∗, respectively.
The problem (5.9) has a very special structure. Every SU node can only choose
1Note that “security strategy” is a game-theoretic term, referring the worst-case optimal strate-
gies. It should not be interpreted as “cyber security strategy” as the term in computer science and
engineering.
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a connecting node for the next hop. The action space of SU ni is limited to the set
of neighboring nodes A1. In order for SU ni to optimize over the entire path, it
can select the best neighboring node that will yield the best utility in the future, or
utility-to-go. This can be observed by decomposing (5.9) into two components:
one is current stage utility and the other one is the utility-to-go. Given maximin
strategy pairsP∗(ni,1)(1,Li) and {r∗li}
Li
li=1
for the exploration starting from SU node
(ni,1) to the destination, the problem (5.9) can be decomposed into
U i(P
∗
i (0,Li),r
∗) = max
(ni,1)
min
r1
{Esui(s,(ni,1),r1)
+EsU (ni,1)(s,P
∗
(ni,1)(1,Li),{r∗li}
Li
li=1
)} (5.10)
where the first term is the current utility and the second term is the utility-to-go.
Solution to (5.10) yields a pair of maximin strategiesP∗i (0,1) and r∗1 for node ni.
Hence the optimal path can be obtained asP∗i (0,Li) =P∗i (0,1)∪P∗(ni,1)(1,Li).
Another special structure of the problem (5.9) is that, at each stage li, SUs face
a distinct set of attackers. Hence, given a routing path, minimizing over r is the
same as minimize over rli at every stage. However, an intelligent attacker will
minimize the current utility together with utility-to-go as in (5.10), taking into
account the future routes of the SUs.
Leveraging these special properties of the problem, we arrive at a backward in-
duction method to compute the maximin security strategies, which is summarized
as follows:
Theorem 8 Let (P∗i (0,Li),r∗) be the pair of maximin solution to the problem
(5.9) and U (ni,li) be the lower value of the utility from stage li to the destination,
achieved under
(
P∗(ni,li)(li,Li),{r∗h}
Li
h=li
)
of this strategy pair. Then, the solution
satisfies the following properties:
U (ni,li) = max(ni,li+1)
min
rli+1
{
Esu(ni,li)(s,(ni, li+1),rli+1)
+EsU (ni,li+1)(s,P
∗
(ni,li+1)(1,Li),{r∗h}
Li
h=li+1
)
}
(5.11)
li = 0,1,2, · · · ,Li−2.
U (ni,Li−1) = Esu(ni,Li−1)(s,n
d
i ,r
∗
Li), (5.12)
where r∗Li = {ndi ,∀ j ∈JLi}, and U (ni,0)(P∗i (0,Li),r∗) =U i defined in (5.9).
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Proof: At the penultimate stage Li−1, the chosen SUs (ni,Li−1) ∈ALi−1 only
need to connect to the destination ndi , which incurs a utility Esu(ni,Li−1)(s,n
d
i ,r
∗
Li)
where all adversary at the stage will jam the destination node. Using the argument
(5.10), at stage Li− 2, the utility function is composed of the stage utility and
utility-to-go, which is given by (5.12). Using backward induction, we arrive at the
relation (5.11) for an arbitrary stage li. 
Remark 4 The above result provides a computation method to find the SU se-
curity strategies. The solution can be found by starting from the very last stage
and propagates backwards to the initial stage. Such dynamic programming-like
solutions have the properties of strong consistency or sub-game perfectness that
will ensure the robustness of the solution.
Zero-Sum Game and Saddle-Point Strategy
The maximin problem in (5.9) yields the security strategies for the SUs. On the
other hand, intelligent jammers also intend to find their security strategies by solv-
ing an associated minimax problem as follows:
U i(P◦i (0,Li),r
◦) = min
r
max
Pi(0,Li)
EsUi(s,Pi(0,Li),r), (5.13)
where the strategy pair (P◦i (0,Li),r◦) is minimax solution to (5.13) and r◦ is a
security strategy for the jammers. A parallel result to Theorem 8 can be obtained,
and we state in the following without a proof.
Theorem 9 Let (P◦i (0,Li),r◦) be the pair of minimax solution to the problem
(5.13) and U (ni,li) be the upper value of the utility from stage li to the destination,
achieved under
(
P◦(ni,li)(li,Li),{r◦h}
Li
h=li
)
of this strategy pair. Then, the solution
satisfies the following properties:
U (ni,li) = minrli+1
max
(ni,li+1)
{
Esu(ni,li)(s,(ni, li+1),rli+1)
+EsU (ni,li+1)
(
s,P◦(ni,li+1)(1,Li),{r◦h}
Li
h=li+1
)}
(5.14)
li = 0,1,2, · · · ,Li−2.
U (ni,Li−1) = Esu(ni,Li−1)(s,n
d
i ,r
◦
Li), (5.15)
where r◦Li = {ndi ,∀ j ∈JLi}, and U (ni,0)(P◦i (0,Li),r◦) =U i defined in (5.9).
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Following the problems defined in (5.9) and (5.13), we can define a zero-sum
secure routing game between jamming adversaries and SUs for a SU source ni,
which is denoted by Ξi := {(ni,N ,J ),(Pi,r),Ui}. The solution to the zero-
sum game Ξi can be characterized by saddle-point equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Saddle-Point Equilibrium) Let (P?i (0,Li),r?) be a feasible strat-
egy pair. The zero-sum game Ξi has a saddle-point in pure strategies, if the fol-
lowing inequalities hold, i.e.,
EsUi(s,Pi(0,Li),r?)6 EsUi(s,P?i (0,Li),r?)6 EsUi(s,P?i (0,Li),r),
for all feasible paths Pi(0,Li) and jamming actions r. The value of the game is
given by
U?i := EsUi(s,P?i (0,Li),r?).
Saddle-point equilibrium, if exists, has many properties, which are described by
the following theorem.
Theorem 10 Suppose that the routing game Ξi for secondary user ni has its upper
value equal to its lower value, i.e., U i = U i defined in (5.9) and (5.13), respec-
tively. Then,
(i) the game has a saddle-point in pure strategies;
(ii) an ordered pair of strategies provides a saddle point of Ξi if, and only if, the
first of these is a security strategy for node ni and the second one is a security
strategies for the jammers;
(iii) U?i is uniquely given by U
?
i =U i =U i.
Saddle-Point in Mixed Strategies
The value of the game Ξi may not exist in pure strategies if U i 6=U i. In this sub-
section, we consider mixed strategies for the game Ξi. Let fi,li = [ fi,li(ni′)]ni′∈Ali ∈
Fi,li be the mixed strategy at exploration li, which is a distribution over the action
set Ali , where
Fi,li :=
fi,li : ∑ni′∈Ali fi,li(ni′) = 1, fi,li(ni′)> 0,∀ni′ ∈Ali
 .
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Likewise, let g j = [g j(r j)]r j∈R j ∈ G j be the mixed strategies of the jammer, where
G j :=
{
g j : ∑
r j∈R j
g j(r j) = 1,g j(r j)> 0, ∀r j ∈R j
}
.
Let Fi = {fi,li}Lili=1 ∈Fi := ∏
Li
li=1
Fi,li be mixed strategies for SUs in the secure
routing game. Such strategies are also known as behavioral strategies, and Fi is
the set of all feasible behavioral strategies. Note that, at stage Li, the destination
node ndi will be chosen. Hence the mixed strategy fi,Li at stage Li is degenerated
into a point distribution over the singleton action space ALi . Let Gli = [g j : j ∈
Jli] ∈ ∏ j∈Jli G j and G = [g j] j∈J ∈ G := ∏ j∈J G j. The average stage utility
for node i to send data from (ni, li−1) to (ni, li) in mixed strategies is
u(ni,li)(s, fi,li+1,Gli+1) = Es,fi,li ,Gli u(ni,li)(s,(ni, li+1),rli+1). (5.16)
The total average utility for node i to reach its destination node in mixed strategies
is
Ui(s,Fi,G) =
Li−1
∑
li=1
u(ni,li−1)(s, fi,li,Gli). (5.17)
The upper value and lower value of the game are given by
Ui := max
Fi∈Fi
min
G∈G
EsUi(s,Fi,G),
Ui := minFi∈Fi
max
G∈G
EsUi(s,Fi,G),
and the corresponding maximizing and minimizing pairs are (F∗i ,G∗) and (F◦i ,G◦),
respectively.
Theorem 11 Consider the game Ξi described in Section 5.1.2. Then,
(i) Ξi has a saddle-point in mixed strategies (F∗i ,G∗), satisfying
EsUi(s,Fi,G∗)6 EsUi(s,F∗i ,G∗)6 EsUi(s,F∗i ,G),
for all feasible mixed strategies Fi ∈Fi,G ∈ G .
(ii) The zero-sum game has a value in mixed strategies uniquely given by U∗i =
Ui = Ui.
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(iii) A pair of mixed strategies provides a saddle point for Ξi if, and only if, the
first of these is a mixed security strategy for node ni, and the second one is
the mixed security strategy for the jammers.
Proof: The multi-hop game Ξi with finite number of players and finite discrete
pure-strategy action spaces. Using Theorem 2.4 in [13], there exists a saddle-point
in mixed strategies. In addition, due to the multi-stage structure of the game, the
behavioral strategies can be found using backward induction in the same fashion
outlined in Theorem 8 and Theorem 9. The results in (ii) and (iii) then directly
follow from Corollary 2.3 in [13]. 
Theorem 11 provides the existence of saddle-point equilibrium, and the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the value of the game Ξi. The saddle-point in mixed
strategies can be computed using backward induction similar to the security strate-
gies in Section 5.1.2 and Section 5.1.2. Let val(·) be the value operator and the
value of the game U∗i can be written as
U∗i = val{EsUi(s,Fi,G)}, (5.18)
(F∗i ,G
∗) ∈ arg val{EsUi(s,Fi,G)}, (5.19)
where (F∗i ,G∗) ∈ Fi×G is the saddle-point equilibrium strategy pair achieved
under the val operator. We can use the result described in Theorem 12 to compute
the strategies.
Theorem 12 Let U∗(ni,li) be the value of the game Ξ(ni,li), which is a truncated
game of Ξi, which starts from stage li to the destination. Then, the saddle-point
equilibrium satisfies
U∗(ni,li) = val
{
Esu(ni,li)
(
s, fli+1,{g j} j∈Jli+1
)
+EsU∗(ni,li+1)
(
s,F∗(ni,li+2),{g∗j , j ∈Jh}
Li
h=li+2
)}
(5.20)
(f∗li+1,{g∗j , j ∈Jli+1}) ∈ arg val
{
Esu(ni,li)
(
s, fli+1,{g j} j∈Jli+1
)
+EsU∗(ni,li+1)
(
s,F∗(ni,li+1),{g∗j , j ∈Jh}
Li
h=li+1
)}
(5.21)
li = 0,1,2, · · · ,Li−2.
U∗(ni,Li−1) = Esu(ni,Li−1)(s, f
∗
Li,{g∗j , j ∈JLi}), (5.22)
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where the saddle-point strategies at last exploration stage Li are given by
f∗Li = n
d
i , w. p. 1,
g∗j = n
d
i , w. p. 1, ∀ j ∈JLi.
The saddle-point equilibrium computed from (5.21) forms a behavioral mixed
strategy equilibrium (F∗(ni,li),{g∗j , j∈Jh}
Li
h=li
) associated with the truncated game.
With li = 0,U∗(ni,0)=U
∗
i defined in (5.18) and (F∗(ni,0),{g∗j , j ∈Jh}
Li
h=0) coincides
with (F∗i ,G∗) defined in (5.19) .
Proof: Based on Theorem 11, there exists a game value and mixed saddle-point
strategies for each truncated game. At last stage, ndi is chosen for connection and
jamming. Using backward induction, similar to the arguments in Theorems 8 and
9, we obtain the results above. 
Remark 2 The solution procedure outlined in Theorem 12 reveals the games-in-
games structure of the routing problem. At each stage li, there is a zero-sum game
involving the relay node (ni, li) and adversaries. The outcome of the game affects
the game associated with stage li− 1 through the payoff function. This leads to
a sequence of nested and coupled games, which is analogous to the multi-layer
structure of an onion or a Russian doll. Equilibrium solution to this type of games
requires a backward induction from the innermost layer of the game to the outer
most layer of the game.
5.1.3 Learning and Secure Routing Algorithm
In this section, we introduce novel distributed learning algorithms for secure rout-
ing. We propose two dynamic and secure routing algorithms for the SU nodes
to maximize their utilities against malicious jammers in distributed manner. One
is based on fictitious play algorithms and the other is Boltzmann-Gibbs learning.
These learning algorithms provide us tools towards design and implementation of
practical protocols.
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The Fictitious-Play Leaning
We use fictitious play at each exploration li ∈ Ali to find the mixed Nash equi-
librium. Let fki,li = [ f
k
i,li(ali)]ali∈Ali+1 be a |Ali+1|-dimensional probability vector
of SU (ni, li), with each entry denoting the empirical probability that (ni, li) ∈N
chooses an action ali ∈ Ali+1 at the k-th iteration of the algorithm. Similarly, let
gkj,li be the |Ali|-dimensional probability vector of jammer j ∈Jli at exploration
site li. At each iteration, SUs and jammers update their strategies fki,li and g
k
li as
follows:
fk+1i,li = f
k
i,li +
1
k+1
(vki,li− fki,li), (5.23)
gk+1j,li = g
k
j,li +
1
k+1
(wkj,li−gkj,li), (5.24)
where vki,li = [v
k
ai,li
]ai,li∈Ali+1 is an |Ali+1|-dimensional vector with vki,ali = 1 if at
time k, i-th player chooses the action ai,li and otherwise v
k
ai,li
= 0. Similarly, wkj,li =
[wkj,a j,li
]a j,li∈Ali+1, j ∈Jli , is the vector of proper dimension for jammer j at stage
li with wkj,ali
= 1 if at time k, jammer i attacks node a j,li; and w
k
j,a j,li
= 0, otherwise.
Since SU node (ni, li) chooses only one action at every step, vki,li is a vector with
the entry that corresponds to the chosen action ai,li being 1 while the remaining
terms equal 0. Likewise, wkj,li is the similar vector for jammer j at time k. In the
fictitious learning play, the action ai,li of the i-th node at time k is the best response
to the observed empirical strategies of the opponents (5.24), i.e.,
ai,li ∈ argmaxEs,{gk−1j,li , j∈Jli}U
k−1
(ni,li)
(s,(ni, li+1),rli)+EsU
k−1
(ni,li+1)
, (5.25)
where Uk−1
(ni,li)
is the total utility along the path from SU (ni, li) at time k−1. Like-
wise, at time k, the jammers respond to the observed empirical strategies of SUs
(5.23) and choose the following best-response actions:
a j,li ∈ argminEs,fk−1i,li U
k−1
(ni,li)
(s,(ni, li+1),rli)+EsU
k−1
(ni,li+1)
, ∀ j ∈Jli. (5.26)
Distributed Boltzmann-Gibbs Learning
Fictitious-play algorithms require the players to have the initial knowledge of the
expected total utility and the action space of the jammers so that the empirical
probability updates (5.23) and (5.24) can be made, and the optimal actions (5.25)
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and (5.26) can be selected. Such knowledge may be available to some experi-
enced and sophisticated SUs. However, in the case where the players do not know
their own payoff functions and the action spaces of the other players, we will
need to have another type of learning algorithms that are capable of estimating the
expected utility and making decisions without the initial knowledge of their ad-
versaries. In this subsection, we introduce a distributed Boltzman-Gibbs learning
algorithm to achieve that goal.
Let fki,li be the mixed strategy of SU node (ni, li) at time k, and g
k
j,li be the mixed
strategy of the set of jammer j ∈Jli at time k. The attackers and SU nodes at
stage li receive a payoff Uk(ni,li). The SU nodes jointly update their strategies (5.27)
and average payoffs (5.28), using the following reinforcement learning algorithm.
fk+1i,li =
(
1−λ ki,li
)
fki,li +λ
k
i,li β˜i,li(uˆi,li) (5.27)
uˆk+1i,li = uˆ
k
i,li +
µki,li
f ki,li(ai,li)
1{ni,li+1=ai,li} ·
(
Uk(ni,li)− uˆki,li
)
, (5.28)
∀ ai,li ∈Ali+1, li = 1,2, · · · ,L−1.
Likewise, each jammer j ∈Jli learns according to
gk+1j,li =
(
1−λ kj,li
)
gkj,li +λ
k
j,li β˜ j,li(uˆ
k
j,li) (5.29)
uˆk+1j,li = uˆ
k
j,li +
µkj,li
gkj,li(a j,li)
1{r j,li+1=a j,li} ·
(
Uk(ni,li)− uˆkj,li
)
, (5.30)
∀a j,li ∈Ali+1, li = 1,2, · · · ,L−1.
Parameters λ ki,li,λ
k
j,li ∈ R are strategy learning rates for the user and the jammers
respectively. µki,li,µ
k
j,li are payoff learning rates for the user and the jammer re-
spectively. All the learning rates are assumed to satisfy λ ki,li > 0, ∑
∞
k=1λ ki,li =
+∞, ∑∞k=1(λ ki,li)
2 6∞. The function β˜i,li :R|Ali |→R|Ali | and β˜ j,li :R|Ali |×|Jli |→
R|Ali |×|Jli | are the Boltzmann-Gibbs strategies or the soft-max functions parametrized
by ε > 0 which take in the average payoff vector and produce a vector of the same
dimension that assigns proportionally more weight to the maximum component.
The weights assigned to a particular action ai,li,a j,li ∈ Ali are given by, respec-
80
tively,
β˜i,li(uˆi,li)(ai,li) =
e
1
ε uˆ
k
i,li
(ai,li)
∑a′i,li∈Ali+1
e
1
ε uˆ
k
i,li
(a′i,li)
,
β˜ j,li(uˆ j,li)(a j,li) =
e
1
ε uˆ
k
j,li
(a j,li)
∑a′j,li∈Ali+1
e
1
ε uˆ
k
j,li
(a′j,li)
,
for j ∈Jli , li = 1,2, · · · ,Li− 1. It is clear that when ε is high, the output of the
β˜i, β˜ j function does not distinguish among the actions and assign equal weights to
them; when ε approaches zeros, β˜i, β˜ j functions resemble the maximum function,
assigning one to the action yielding the maximum average payoff but zeros to the
other ones.
At every time step k, the players generate their actions according to the current
mixed strategies fki,li,g
k
j,li and then observe their payoff as a result of the joint ac-
tions and the current primary user state. Using the observed payoff, the players
update their average payoff vectors and then their mixed strategies. In the rein-
forcement learning algorithms, we assume that the agents learn utility faster than
their strategies, i.e.,
λ ki,li
µki,li
→ 0 and λ
k
j,li
µkj,li
→ 0. Common choices of learning rates
are λ ki,li =
1
(k+1) log(k+1) and µ
k
i,li =
1
k+1 , for li = 1,2, · · · ,Li, and the same for the
jammers. The convergence properties of the algorithm are studied in [36], [37]
and the references within.
Secure Routing Algorithm
Depending on the initial knowledge of SUs, we can adopt fictitious play for expe-
rienced nodes that have the knowledge of their utility functions and adversaries.
On the other hand, SUs without initial knowledge can use distributed Boltzmann-
Gibbs learning algorithms due to its capability of estimating the expected utility
and making decision without the complete knowledge of adversaries and the pay-
off structure. The Boltzmann-Gibbs learning starts with a local procedure defining
the set of nodes for direct links, calculates his payoff and selects the best routing
node at the next hop with the maximum utility, i.e., the total path utility Ui, and dy-
namically updates whenever the SUs acquire the new estimate system knowledge.
Once the source to the destination pair is determined, SUs learn and update their
total path payoffs. Each node updates its mixed strategies by the Boltzmann-Gibbs
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learning until the process converges to an ε-saddle-point equilibrium as shown in
Algorithm 1. Under different learning rates on the strategies and the average pay-
offs, the learning algorithm converges at each exploration site. Here, we have
assumed that the convergence of the learning algorithms is faster than the speed
of exploration. The employment of such learning algorithms at each stage will
lead to the mixed-strategy saddle-point equilibrium discussed in Section 5.1.2.
Theorem 13 Suppose that payoff learning in the Boltzmann-Gibbs learning al-
gorithm is faster than the strategy learning at each stage for every SU (ni, li), li =
0,1, · · · ,Li, and jammer j ∈Jli . Then, if the multi-stage learning algorithm con-
verge, it yields a mixed-strategy saddle-point equilibrium of the game Ξi as t→∞
and ε → 0, .
Proof: At the last stage Li, the mixed-strategies for SU node (ni,Li− 1) and
adversary j, j ∈ |Li are given in (11). The learning at stage Li− 1 under the B-G
algorithm will lead to uˆki,li→U∗(ni,Li−2) as k→∞, and fki,li→ f∗li,gkj,li→ g∗j , j ∈Jli
(See [36] and [37]). After the learning at stage Li−1 reaches its steady state, we
can conclude the same convergence results for stage Li−2. Hence, by backward
induction, at initial stage, the source ni will learn the game value U∗i and saddle-
point equilibrium (Fi,G) as t is sufficiently long and ε → 0 across the stages.

The proposed secure routing algorithm above is used to combat jamming at-
tacks in distributed cognitive radio networks. The state of primary channels evolves
in the network and hence the routing is state-dependent. The secure routing game
can spatially circumvent jammers along the routing path and can learn to defend
against malicious attackers as the state changes. In the algorithm, the first step of
the secure routing game is to establish an initial routing path from the source node
to the destination node by initializing local game for direct links and for global
paths. Once the initial path is established and it is converged to the saddle-point
equilibrium by the Boltzmann-Gibbs learning, the source node starts transmitting
packet data through the initial path. If the packet data transmission is terminated,
then the secure routing game is concluded for the session transmission and another
game will start for transmitting another session.
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Algorithm 1 Secure Routing with Distributed Learning
1: Initialization
2: Each node (ni, li) explores network topology by update the routing table of
neighboring hops
3: States si of primary users by collaborative spectrum sensing
4: Pi = 0, an initial path from source to destination
5: Ji, Jammer nodes
6: Payoff vectors, uˆi,li and strategy vectors f
k
i,li , g
k
i,li
7: Repeat node (ni; li) explores neighboring nodes
8: Previous payoff vectors, uˆi,li and strategy vectors f
k
i,li , g
k
i,li
9: The nodes engage in a secure routing game Ξi
10: Each node searches for saddle-point strategies
11: Repeat (iteration k)
12: a) Generate actions using mixed strategies fki,li and g
k
i,li
13: b) Observe instantaneous payoff and estimate uˆi,li
14: c) Each node ni updates its mixed strategies, fk+1i,li and g
k+1
i,li
15: Increase li to li+1 and go to step 7 until (ni, li) is the destination
16: until convergence to an ε- saddle-point equilibrium
17: Exit saddle-point search
18: Select Pi
19: If any session has broken during transmission go to step 24
20: Start transmission of packets
21: If any node detect (uˆi,li) < threshold due to jammer then
22: Save current number i of packets
23: Go to step 7 for adjusting local routes by updating strategies
24: Retransmit i+1 packet
25: else continue transmission of packets
24: If (si) is changed then
25: Go to step 7
26: else continue transmission of packets
27: End Transmission packets
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5.1.4 Simulation Results
We first illustrate the routing algorithm in a 2-by-2 network, depicted in Fig. 5.2,
where the source node is shown in blue whereas the destination in yellow. The
simple network involves only one level of exploration and hence the zero-sum
game can be represented by a matrix game. In Fig. 5.2, we observe that the
proposed secure routing algorithm yields the path delineated by the dotted line
without a jammer. When the jammer is present, the algorithm gives rise to the
path described by the solid line with some probability through learning.
Figure 5.2: A snapshot of attacking in a 2-by-2 network.
The evolutions of the average payoff functions and the strategies are described
in Fig. 5.3 and Fig. 5.4, respectively. It is clear that fictitious-play algorithm con-
verges faster than the Boltzmann-Gibbs learning due to the complete knowledge
of the source node.
In Fig. 5.5, we show the normalized delay performances of the proposed secure
routing algorithm in comparison to AODV routing. AODV routing algorithm can-
not adjust the routing path in the case of malicious attack one of secondary relay
nodes. In our simulation, at time t = 40, an attacker starts to jam the established
routing path. We observe that in AODV routing, the path is disconnected and a
new routing path needs to be established, which results in a large delay. In com-
parison, the proposed secure routing algorithm can dynamically adjust the routing
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Figure 5.3: The utilities of learning algorithms, fictitious-play learning and
distributed Boltzmann-Gibbs learning for both players.
path as shown in Fig. 5.5 and reduce the incurred delay due to jamming attacks.
In the next experiment, we used network simulator 2 (NS-2) to determine the
performance analysis of proposed Distributed Secure Routing Protocol (DSRP).
In the simulation set up, we used an omni-directional antenna with two-ray-ground
as propagation model. IEEE 802.11b protocol is employed for medium access by
wireless nodes, where we used standard values for all the parameters defined by
the IEEE802.11b. Each wireless node interface has queue length of 50 packets
and follows drop tail queuing mechanism. Nodes are placed according to the
topology depicted in Fig. 5.6 in the area 1000× 1000 m2. Each wireless node’s
transmission range is set to 250 m, while the wireless link data rate used is 1
Mbps. Transfer Control Protocol (TCP) is employed as transport layer protocol,
while File Transfer Protocol (FTP) is used as a source for the generation of data
traffic. Different pairs of source-destination are used with single data flow.
We compared our proposed DSRP with the Ad-hoc On-demand Distance Vector
(AODV) routing protocol. The proposed DSRP targets to reduce the path recovery
in case of node failures to defense any jamming attacks. In the proposed DSRP,
each node tends to employ learning from the environment. In this experiment,
we tend to show the effectiveness of proposed DSRP against node failure such as
jamming attack, Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack, and primary users.
In the Fig. 5.7, instantaneous throughput performance of the proposed DSRP is
compared with throughput performances of no-attack and AODV when a jamming
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Figure 5.4: The mixed strategies of fictitious-play learning and distributed
Boltzmann-Gibbs learning algorithm for both players.
attacks. The initial path was from source node 1 to destination node 15 via 1, 2,
5, 9, 11, 14, 25 in Fig. 5.6. The jamming attack is launched at time between 15
and 20 seconds, the attack compromised the node 2 and the path to destination via
node 2 is no more valid. The alternate path that can lead to destination go via node
4, 7, 11, 12, 14. From Fig. 5.7, instantaneous throughput degrades at the time
attack is launched, the proposed DSRP fast recovers the path while the typical
AODV is slower as shown in Fig. 5.7. Further, the instantaneous throughput
of DSRP is still better then AODV, because DSRP employs continuous learning
mechanism at each node and keeps updating the fluctuations of link conditions.
The impact of different attacks such as jamming attacks and PUE attacks af-
fects throughput of the network and results in higher delay and lower throughput.
Figure 5.8 depicts the comparison of instantaneous throughput performances be-
tween different attacks such as a jamming and a PUE attack and shows how much
delay is encountered for path recovery and how much throughput degrades in the
simulations. Source and destination nodes are 7 and 15 respectively and the attack
is launched in the time between 15 and 20 seconds. In the Fig. 5.8, node 10 be-
comes un-available to connect due to PUE attack, so the route establishment delay
is encountered. In the PUE attack, the path established is changed from original
path, when there is no attack (10, 11, 14), to secondary path (4, 8, 11, 14). The
path established is still better, so the throughput is not degraded too much, while
in case of jamming attack the path followed is longer and throughput is degraded
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Figure 5.5: The normalized delay of AODV and the proposed secure routing
when an attacker jams a secondary user relay on the routing path as shown in
Fig. 5.2. (The normalized delay is the ratio between AODV routing and the
proposed secure routing).
more than previous case. In our topology, the jammer node (node 11) becomes
un-available due to attack. So, after delay of route establishment, data transmis-
sion starts, but the path followed is longer (4, 8, 6, 9, 12) as compared to previous
case.
In Fig. 5.9, we demonstrate the comparison of the proposed DSRP and AODV
under multiple jamming attacks. In this scenario, node 10 is in range of primary
user and node 5 and node 11 are under simultaneous jamming attacks which de-
creases their utilities at 35 second, so the path to destination becomes (4, 8, 6, 9,
and 12). The impact of multiple attacks degrades throughput as shown in the Fig.
5.9, but the proposed DSRP still fast recover and outperforms AODV.
Figure 5.10 shows the end-to-end recovery delay which is the required time
to establish route from source to destination after any node on the initial path is
attacked by a jammer. Figure 5.10 compares the end-to-end recovery delays be-
tween the proposed DSRP and AODV. The increasing number of jammers affects
the delay required for the alternate path recovery due to the route establishment
overhead and change in routing paths. The proposed DSRP takes less time to
recover compared to the typical AODV routing protocol.
Figure 5.11 compares the overhead required to recover the end-to-end path be-
tween the proposed DSRP and AODV. Since AODV uses broadcasting request
packets to every node to recover a new path whenever there is a jammer, the over-
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Figure 5.6: The random network topology for 15 SU nodes with a jammer, a
primary user, a source, and a destination in 1×1 km2 area.
head is steeply increased by increasing number of jammers while the proposed
DSRP algorithm recovers it locally and dynamically; the overhead for recover
paths is smaller than the overhead of AODV.
5.2 Secure Routing in Smart Grid
One of the challenging issues at the data communication and networking layers
of the smart grid in Fig. 2.4 is the assurance of secure routing of phasor mea-
surement unit (PMU) and smart meter (SM) data in the open network, which is
enabled by the adoption of IP-based network technologies. It is forecasted that
276 million smart grid communication nodes will be shipped worldwide during
the period from 2010 to 2016, with annual shipments increasing dramatically from
15 million in 2009 to 55 million by 2016 [109]. The current dedicated network or
leased-line communication methods are not cost-effective to connect large num-
bers of PMUs and SMs. Thus, it is foreseen that IP-based network technologies
are widely adopted since they enable data to be exchanged in a routable fash-
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Figure 5.7: Instantaneous throughput performance of the proposed DSRP
algorithm, when a jammer attacks node 2 at time between 15 to 20, compared
with no-attack and AODV. The source is node 1 and the destination is node 15 in
Fig. 5.6.
ion over an open network, such as the Internet [110–114]. This will bring bene-
fits such as efficiency and reliability, and risks of cyber attacks as well. Without
doubt, smart grid applications based on PMUs and SMs will change the current
fundamental architecture of the communication network of the power grid, and
bring new requirements for communication security. Delay, incompleteness and
loss of PMU and SM data will adversely impact smart grid operation in terms
of efficiency and reliability. Therefore, it is important to guarantee integrity and
availability of those PMUs and SMs data. To meet the QoS requirements in terms
of delay, bandwidth, and packet loss rate, QoS-based routing technologies have
been studied in both academia and the telecommunications industry [115–118].
Unlike video and voice, data communications of PMUs and SMs have differ-
ent meanings of real-time and security, especially in terms of timely availabil-
ity [23,110,119–122]. Therefore, QoS-based and security-based routing schemes
for smart grid communications should be studied and developed to meet smart
grid application requirements in terms of delay, bandwidth, packet loss, and data
integrity.
In this section, we leverage the hierarchical structure of power grids and pro-
pose a routing protocol that maximizes the QoS along the routing path to the
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Figure 5.8: Instantaneous throughput performance of the proposed DSRP
algorithm against different jamming attacks such as a jammer attack and a PUE
attack.
control room. In addition, we optimize the data communication rates between the
super data concentrator at the penultimate level with the control center. We pro-
pose a hybrid structure of routing architecture to enable the resilience, robustness
and efficiency of the smart grid.
5.2.1 Hierarchical Routing
Smart grid has a hierarchical structure that is built upon the current hierarchi-
cal power grid architecture. The end-users, such as households, communicate
their power usage and pricing data with a local area substation which collects and
processes data from SMs and PMUs. In the smart grid, the path for the mea-
surement data may not be predetermined. The data can be relayed from smaller
scale data concentrators (DCs) to some super data concentrators (SDCs) and then
to the control room. With the widely adopted IP-based network technologies,
the communications between households and DCs can be in a multi-hop fashion
through routers and relay devices. The goal of each household is to find a path
with minimum delay and maximum security to reach DCs and then substations.
This optimal decision can be enabled by the automated energy management sys-
tems built in SMs. Figure 5.12 illustrates the physical structure of the smart grid
90
Figure 5.9: Instantaneous throughput performance of the proposed DSRP
algorithm against different jamming attacks such as a jammer attack and a PUE
attack.
communication network. The PMUs and SMs send data to DCs through a public
network. DCs process the collected data and send the processed data to SDCs
through (possibly) another public network.
The physical communication structure from local meters to the control room
can be logically divided into several levels. Figure 5.13 illustrates a snapshot of
routing paths in a simplified example of the hierarchical structure of the physical
communication architecture, which is divided logically into 5 levels. For sim-
plicity, we depict only level of routers in Figure 5.13. In practice, there can be
multiple levels of routers and they can be found in the public network between
DCs and SDCs as well as SDCs and the control room. In the depicted smart
grid, the data from a PMU or a SM has to make four hops to reach the control
room. The decision for a meter to choose a router depends on the communi-
cation delay, security enhancement level and packet loss rate. In addition, the
decisions for a DC to choose a SDC also depends on the same criteria. The com-
munication security at a node is measured by the number of security devices such
as firewalls, intrusion-detection systems (IDSs) and intrusion-prevention systems
(IPSs) deployed to reinforce the security level at that node. We assign higher util-
ity to network routers and DCs that are protected by a larger number of firewalls,
IDSs/IPSs and dedicated private networks in contrast to public networks. This
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Figure 5.10: The end-to-end recovery delay time for the proposed DSRP
compared with AODV versus the number of jammers.
relatively simple metric only considers one aspect of the control system cyber se-
curity. It can be further extended to include more security aspects by considering
the authorization mechanisms, the number of exploitable vulnerabilities, potential
damage as well as recovery time after successful attacks. The readers can refer
to [60, 61, 123, 124] for more comprehensive metrics.
A trade-off with higher security is the latency and packet loss rate incurred in
data transmission. A secure network inevitably incurs delays in terms of process-
ing (encrypting/decrypting) and examining data packets. We can model the pro-
cess of security inspection by a tandem queueing network. Each security device
corresponds to an M/M/1 queue whose external arrival rate follows a Poisson pro-
cess and the service time follows an exponential distribution. The latency caused
by the security devices such as IDSs/IPSs is due to the number of pre-defined at-
tack signatures and patterns to be examined [38, 125, 126]. In addition, devices
such as IPSs can also lead to high packet loss due to their false negative rates in
the detection.
Furthermore, a node with higher level of security may be preferred by many
meters or routers, eventually leading to a high volume of received data and hence
higher level of congestion delay. This fact enables a game-theoretical approach to
analyze the distributed routing decisions in the smart grid. The solution concept
of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium [13] as a solution outcome is desirable for
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Figure 5.11: The overhead for recovery paths for the proposed DSRP compared
with AODV versus the number of jammers.
two reasons. First, in theory, a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium always exists
for a finite matrix game [13] and many learning algorithms such as fictitious play
and replicator dynamics can lead to it [31,35–37]. Second, the randomness in the
choice of routes makes it harder for an attacker to map out the routes in the smart
grid.
5.2.2 Game-Theoretic Model for Secure Routing
Let M = {m1,m2, · · · ,mM} be the set of M meters in a local area SG. Let N =
{n1,n2, · · · ,nN} be the set of routers, DCs and SDCs in SG. Let CS denote the
control station. The entire communication infrastructure is represented by I :=
〈N ,M ,CS〉. LetL = {1,2, · · · ,L} be the set of L hierarchies in the infrastructure
I . Denote by Nl, l ∈ L , the set of nodes at level l. By default, the terminal
level L consists of only the control station CS and the initial level 1 consists of M
meters. The devices inN form layers between levels 1 and L. Denote by li ∈L
the level where a node ni ∈N resides. A meter mi chooses a node a(mi,2) ∈N2
at level 2. The chosen node a(mi,2) picks the next hop a(mi,3) ∈N3 and a similar
decision is made by node a(mi,3) at level 4. The process ends at penultimate level
L−1 where every node chooses to send to CS. The pathPi,mi ∈M , formed by
mi→ a(mi,2)→ a(mi,3) · · ·a(mi,L−1)→CS is the route taken by the meter mi to reach
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Figure 5.12: An example of the physical structure of the hierarchical smart grid
communication network.
Figure 5.13: A snapshot of routing paths in the hierarchical smart grid.
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CS. Denote by default that a(mi,1) := mi. Let u(mi,l)(a(mi,l+1),a(m−i,l+1)),mi ∈M ,
be the stage utility of node a(mi,l) choosing a route between a(mi,l) and a(mi,l+1),
where a(m−i,l) denotes the set of choices made of the other meters at the same
level, more precisely,
a(m−i,l) := {a(m j,l) ∈Nl, j 6= i, mi,m j ∈M }.
The utility along the pathPi for mi is given by the sum of the stage utilities
Ui(Pi,P−i) :=
L
∑
l=1
u(mi,l)(a(mi,l),a(m−i,l)). (5.31)
The goal of a meter mi is to maximize its total utility Ui. Note that the utility
depends on not only its own choice but the paths of other meters as well. Since
the routing decisions at the levels beyond the second one are made by the relay
nodes in the setN , the total utility maximization can be decomposed as follows:
max
Pi
U(m j,l) = maxa(m j ,l)∈Nl
{
u(m j,1)(a(mi,l),a(m−i,l))+ maxP(m j ,l+1)
U(mi,l+1)
}
. (5.32)
Such a decomposition allows us to find the optimal path using a backward induc-
tion from the last stage L. The mixed strategies yielded by this method belong to
a class of behavioral strategies and carry the property of strong consistency [13].
We choose the stage utility as a ratio between the security performance index
and the delay.
u(mi,l)(a(mi,l+1),a(m−i,l)) =
p(mi,l+1)r(mi,l+1)
τ(mi,l)(a(mi,l+1),(m−i, l+1))
, mi ∈M , (5.33)
where r(mi,l+1) is the security index at the node (mi, l+1) chosen by user (mi, l),
which is measured by the number of built-in security devices and features. An
alternative measure is by security investment in dollars at the node. τ is the sojourn
time experienced by node (mi, l) in the queue of (mi, l+1). p(mi,l+1) is the packet
loss rate at (mi, l+1).
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5.2.3 Flow Control in the Smart Grid
In Section 5.2.1, we have proposed a mechanism for meter data to reach the SDCs
and then the control station. The decision at the penultimate level is trivial as
all the data should route to the control station. In reality, a local control station
pulls data from its communicating SDCs. SDCs cannot send data to the control
station at an arbitrary rate. The bandwidth and communication resources of a con-
trol station are often constrained. We next formulate a game-theoretical problem
where SDCs choose data rates to communicate with the control room similar to
the framework described [26].
Let Ns =NL−1 := {n1,n2, · · · ,nNs} be the set of Ns SDC substations. A SDC
substation ni ∈ Ns serves a load of Li(t) at time t and communicates with the
control center CS. Let di(t) be the data rate at which SDC ni decides to send and
the service rate at the control room is sr(t). We assume that all the data come into
one server and the control center allocates its resources to monitor the data from
the substations. Different SDCs have different levels of significance wi ∈ (0,1)
to the control center. A substation with higher values of wi are often the ones
that serve a large area. The control center processes the data by differentiating
their sources. The data from each substation is served at a service rate si(t) =
aisr(t), where ai ∈ [0,1] denotes the fraction of service capacity dedicated to CPS
substation ni, satisfying ∑ni∈Ns ai = 1. Let q(t) be the queue length of the server
and ui(t) = di(t)− si(t). The queue evolves according to the following dynamics:
q˙(t) = ∑
ni∈Ns
di(t)− si(t) =
N
∑
i=1
ui. (5.34)
The objective of the control problem is to ensure queue length to stay around
some desired level Q¯. The choice of Q¯ has a direct impact on loss probabilities
and throughput the communications between SDCs and the control room. Denote
by x(t) = q(t)− Q¯ the shifted queue length with origin at Q¯. Then, the dynamics
in (5.34) become
x˙ =
N
∑
i=1
ui(t). (5.35)
We consider two problems. The first is a centralized problem where the control
center makes data rate decision for each SDCs to achieve the optimal “social wel-
fare.” The second is a decentralized problem where each SDC decides on its own
data rate sent to the control station.
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In the centralized problem, the control room makes a global planning on the
sending rates di(t) and hence ui(t). The goal of each SDC is to minimize its cost
functional
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
ci|x(t)|2+ ri|ui(t)|2dt, (5.36)
where ri is the cost on the control action ui. The higher sending rates will consume
a high bandwidth at cost ri inversely proportional to the load Li and wi, i.e., it is
relatively less expensive for more important SDC to send information. The cost ri
can be seen as a variable controlled by the control center that provides incentive
for SDCs to respond in an efficient way. ci is the cost on the queue length such
that ∑ni∈Ns ci = 1. Each substation with higher data rate di(t) or Li(t) also shares
a higher responsibility of keeping the queue away from overflow.
A centralized planning seeks u◦I = {u◦1,u◦2, · · · ,u◦Ns} ∈ U I that maximizes the
social welfare J := 1N ∑
N
i=1 Ji, whereU
◦ is a set of admissible control under infor-
mation structure I. Denote by J◦I the optimal welfare achieved under the optimal
control u◦. On the other hand, the decentralized problem constitutes a differential
game Ξ := 〈Ns,{Ji}ni∈Ns,{Ui}ni ∈Ns〉, where Ns is the set of the players; U Ii
is the set of admissible controls of a player ni, which depends on the information
structure I of the game; Ji is the cost functional that player ni attempts to minimize
independently of the other players. We denote the set of equilibrium solution to
Ξ by U∗I and the social welfare achieved under an equilibrium u∗I ∈ U∗I by J∗I (u∗I ).
The measure of efficiency loss can thus be described by the price of anarchy (PoA)
ρI := min
u∗I∈U∗I
J∗I (u∗I )
J◦I
,
which is always upper bounded by 1. In Appendix 8, we will discuss at length
PoA in the framework discussed above. We obtain bounds and approximations on
them, with computable bounds available in the large population regime.
5.2.4 Centralized vs. Decentralized Architectures
Subsection 5.2.1 introduced a hierarchical routing problem for the smart grid.
The decision at the penultimate level is trivial since all the data should route to the
control station. In reality, a local control station pulls data from its communicat-
ing SDCs. SDCs cannot send data to the control station at an arbitrary rate. The
bandwidth and communication resources of a control station are often constrained.
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Hence, it becomes important to consider an appropriate resource allocation at the
data communication between SDCs and the control station. The resource alloca-
tion scheme can be either centralized, i.e., determined by the control station, or
decentralized, i.e., determined by individual SDCs.
A centralized routing architecture ensures global efficiency and it is robust to
small disturbances from SMs and individual DCs or SDCs. However, it is costly
to implement centralized planning on a daily basis for a large-scale smart grid. In
addition, global solutions can be less resilient to unexpected failures and attacks
as they are less nimble for changes in routes and it takes time for the centralized
planner to respond in a timely manner.
On the other hand, decentralized decision-making can be more computationally
friendly based on local information and hence the response time to emergency is
relatively fast. The entire system becomes more resilient to local faults and fail-
ures, thanks to the independence of the players and the reduced overhead on the
response to unanticipated uncertainties. However, the decentralized solution can
suffer from high loss due to inefficiency [43, 44]. Hence, we need to assess the
tradeoff between efficiency, reliability and resilience for designing the communi-
cation protocol between the control stations and the SDCs.
Illustrated in Figure 5.14, a hybrid architecture of the communication infras-
tructure of L levels allows us to incorporate desirable features of the two archi-
tectures. One can adopt a centralized planning at the top levels L−1 and L while
building a decentralized routing protocol between levels 1 and L− 1. Such an
architecture can enable robustness at the critical data centers and resilience at the
lower user level.
Hence, the last-stage utility is determined in a centralized manner by the control
room based on priority and load. The resource allocation at the last level is robust
to small parametric disturbances and is independent of routing decisions between
level 1 and level L−1. The routing decisions of the meters are resilient to router
failures in a public network. The learning algorithms in [31, 36, 37] can be used
for responding to a dysfunctional router by selecting a new router once the one in
use is compromised.
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Figure 5.14: An illustration of the architecture of the routing protocol in the
smart grid.
5.3 Conclusion
We have presented an on-line secure routing scheme based on a dynamic zero-
sum game framework. We have used the distributed Boltzmann-Gibbs learn-
ing algorithm for routing in an adversarial environment with unknown attack-
ers. In comparison to fictitious-play learning, we observe that the convergence of
Boltzmann-Gibbs learning algorithm is slower due to the inherent learning pro-
cess of unknown information. We have seen that the proposed scheme allows
nodes to recover from path failure caused by unknown attacks and that the delay
and throughput performances are optimized in comparison to its AODV shortest
path routing counterpart.
We have also studied the secure routing problem in smart grids as the power in-
frastructure is migrating to new communication technologies. We have proposed
a hybrid routing protocol that enables the resilience, robustness and efficiency of
routing in smart grids. The smart meter data are routed to the control room in a
hierarchical manner, where decisions are made in a decentralized manner between
the first level and the penultimate one. We show that the mixed Nash equilibrium
can be computed using backward induction and it can be achieved through learn-
ing algorithms such as fictitious play and best response dynamics. The data rates
between the penultimate level and the control center are determined in a central-
ized way to achieve Pareto efficiency as well as the robustness of smart grids.
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CHAPTER 6
MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION
SECURITY
The use of information technologies in control systems poses additional potential
threats due to the frequent disclosure of software vulnerabilities. The management
of information security involves a series of policy-making decisions on the vul-
nerability discovery, disclosure, patch development and patching. In this chapter,
we study the issue of information security management of critical infrastructural
systems. We use a system approach to devise a model to understand the inter-
dependencies of these decision processes. Specifically, we establish a theoretical
framework for making patching decisions for control systems, taking into account
the requirement of their functionability. We illustrate our results with numerical
simulations and show that the optimal operation period of control systems given
the currently estimated attack rate is roughly around half a month.
6.1 Control System Vulnerability
The use of technologies with known vulnerabilities exposes power systems to
potential exploits. In this section, we discuss information security management
which is a crucial issue for power systems at the management layer in Fig. 2.4.
The timing between the discovery of new vulnerabilities and their patch avail-
abilities is crucial for the assessment of the security risk exposure of software
users [127–130]. The security focus in power systems is different from the one
in computer or communication networks. The application of patches for control
systems needs to take into account the system functionability, avoiding the loss of
service due to unexpected interruptions. The disclosure of software vulnerabilities
for control systems is also a critical responsibility. Disclosure policy indirectly af-
fects the speed and quality of the patch development. Government agencies such
as CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response Team/Coordination Center) cur-
rently act as a third party in the public interest to set an optimal disclosure policy
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Figure 6.1: A holistic viewpoint toward vulnerability discovery, disclosure,
development, and patching. An attacker can discover a vulnerability or learn it
from a disclosure process, eventually influencing the speed of patch application.
A discoverer can choose to fully disclose through a forum or report to the vendor
or may provide to an attacker. A vulnerability can be disclosed to a vendor for
patch development or leaked to the attacker.
to influence behavior of vendors [131].
The decisions involving vulnerability disclosure, patch development and patch-
ing are intricately interdependent. In Fig. 6.1, we illustrate the relationship be-
tween these decision processes. A control system vulnerability starts with its dis-
covery. It can be discovered by multiple parties, for example, individual users,
government agencies, software vendors or attackers and hence can incur different
responses. The discoverer may choose not to disclose it to anyone, may choose
to fully disclose through a forum such as bugtraq [132], may report to the vendor,
or may provide to an attacker. Vulnerability disclosure is a decision process that
can be initiated by those who have discovered the vulnerability. Patch develop-
ment starts when the disclosure process reaches the vendor and finally a control
system user decides on the application of the patches once they become available.
An attacker can launch a successful attack once it acquires the knowledge of vul-
nerability before a control system patches its corresponding vulnerabilities. The
entire process illustrated in Fig. 6.1 involves many agents or players, for example,
system users, software vendors, government agencies, attackers. Their state of
knowledge has a direct impact on the state of vulnerability management.
We can compartmentalize the task of vulnerability management into different
submodules: discovery, disclosure, development and patching. The last two sub-
modules are relatively convenient to deal with since the agents involved in the
decision making are very specific to the process. The models for discovery and
disclosure can be more intricate in that these processes can be performed by many
agents and hence specific models should be used for different agents to capture
their incentives, utility, resources and budgets.
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Figure 6.2: An illustration of control system patching model.
6.2 User Patching Model
In this subsection, we establish a model for users to determine the optimal time
to patch their control systems. In control systems, it is known that the attack
rate is low and the patching rate is low as well. It often occurs that users do not
patch until there is a security alert, an available patch announcement or an expe-
rienced security breach. The operation of control system is separated into several
operating periods. A control system cannot halt its operation until the end of an
operating period. Let Bk,k = 1,2, · · · , denote the k-th operating period since the
last patching and Tk = Tk−1+Bk = ∑ki=1 Bi, where T0 is the beginning of the first
operation period. Let τ be the time length between the start of the first operation
period and a security alert or an attack. Let fτ(t), t > 0, be its probability density
function, which is taken to be hyper-exponential with n phases and parameters
λ = (λ1, · · · ,λn) and normalized weighting factor q = (q1, · · · ,qn), i.e.,
fτ(t) =
n
∑
i=1
qigi(t) =
n
∑
i=1
qiλi exp(−λit),
n
∑
i=1
qi = 1. (6.1)
Each phase i can be interpreted differently. For example, let g1(t) be the distribu-
tion of the arrival rate of alerts; g2(t) be the arrival rate of an attack; g3(t) be the
arrival rate of an announcement of an available patch. We illustrate this model in
Fig. 6.2. At every Tk−1,k> 1, a control system starts to operate for a period of Bk
and then stops for monitoring and patching.
The decision of an administrator is to determine Bk so that the risk of an un-
patched control system subject to potential attacks is minimized. The decision-
making process can be viewed as a black box as in Fig. 6.3, where the decision
input is the knowledge of the arrival rates of an attack; the intrinsic system param-
eters are the monitoring cost cm and the production cost parameters c0 and c1; and
the decision output is the operation period Bk. The input and output characteristics
102
Figure 6.3: A system viewpoint towards control system patching decision.
of the decision process assist us in integrating it into the system model in Fig. 6.1.
Let cm ∈ R+ be the monitoring cost at the end of each operation period and
cp(tk,bk+1) :R2+→R+ be the operation cost of running the plant for bk+1 starting
from tk. We have the following dynamic programming (DP) equation to find the
optimal decision policy to be taken at each period, taking into account the whole
lifetime of the system:
V ∗k (tk) = minbk+1>0
{E[c(tk,bk+1)+P(τtk > bk+1)V ∗k+1(tk+1)]}, (6.2)
where bk is the decision variable of operating time; V ∗k (tk) represents the optimal
cost at time tk. The term P(τtk > bk+1) represents the transition probability given
by the conditional probability
P(τtk > bk+1) := P(τ > tk +bk+1|τ > tk). (6.3)
The term E[c(tk,bk+1)] is the stage cost at tk given by
E[c(tk,bk+1)] = γˆE[(bk+1− τtk)1(τtk6bk+1)]+ cm+ cp(tk,bk+1), (6.4)
where γˆ denotes the unit cost of untimely patching; τtk is the conditional residual
time counting from tk given that τtk > tk. By solving the DP equation, we can find
a dynamic policy for the operation of the plants at each starting time tk.
We can simplify the general model by assuming that the arrival of security alerts
or breaches form a single Poisson process with rate λ and the arrival time τ and
the conditional residual time τt are exponentially distributed with parameter λ .
Let C0k =
1
2c0b
2
k be the cost for operating a plant non-stop for a period of time bk.
Denote by C1k = c1bk the linear gain or profit from running the plant. Hence, we
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can assume that the cost cp is given by
cp(tk,bk+1) :=C0k −C1k =
1
2
c0b2k− c1bk. (6.5)
Due to the memoryless property of exponential distribution, the DP equation in
(6.2) can be simplified to
V ∗(λ ) = min
b>0
{
γˆE[(b− τ(λ ))1(τ(λ )6b)]+
1
2
c0b2− c1b+P(τ(λ )> b)V ∗(λ )
}
.
For each fixed b > 0, V (λ ) can be solved from (6) (without the minimum) to
yield
V (λ ,b) =
γˆE[(b− τ(λ ))1(τ(λ )6b)]+ 12c0b2− c1b
1−P(τ(λ )> b) . (6.6)
Note that in the above,
E[(b− τ(λ ))1(τ(λ )6b)] =
λb−1+ exp(−λb)
λ
, (6.7)
and the term in the denominator of (6.6) is as follows:
P(τ(λ )> b) = exp(−λb). (6.8)
Hence, solving the DP is equivalent to finding a solution to the optimization prob-
lem (R-OPT) that takes into account the risk factor of potential threats and at-
tacks1:
(R-OPT) V ∗(λ ) = min
b>0
V (λ ,b). (6.9)
Note that a simple solution for operation time b without security risk consider-
ation, i.e., ignoring the potential costs that can be incurred by attacks in (R-OPT),
is based on a cost and benefit analysis solving the risk-free optimization problem
(NR-OPT)2:
(NR-OPT) min
1
2
c0b2k− c1bk + cm, (6.10)
which yields a benchmark solution b? = c1/c0.
We can numerically solve the DP equations for a given scenario of control sys-
tems. Set the parameters c1 = 10,c0 = 0.1, γˆ = 10,cm = 10,λ = 0.001 as the
nominal case. In Fig 6.4, we show the optimal operation period versus the moni-
1“R-OPT” stands for risk-based optimization.
2“NR-OPT” stands for no-risk-based optimization.
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Figure 6.4: Operation period vs. monitoring cost.
Figure 6.5: Operation period vs. attack rate.
toring cost. It can be seen that when the cost becomes higher, the control system
cannot afford a frequent checking and monitoring and hence the operation period
increases. In Fig. 6.5, we show the optimal operation period versus the attack
rate. We observe that when the attack rate is high, the control system needs to de-
crease its operation period to monitor and update its system more often. From the
simulation results, we notice that an optimal operation period of control systems
given the currently estimated attack rate is roughly around half a month.
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6.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed a systematic approach to tackle the management
of control system information security by compartmentalizing the processes into
multiple input-output blocks. We have investigated in detail the decision process
of control system patch management and established a theoretical model to find
an optimal operation period of a control system taking into account the risks of
potential threats and the operation costs. A similar framework can be employed
to study the disclosure process. From the simulation results, we notice that an
optimal operation period of control systems given the currently estimated attack
rate is roughly around half a month. It is important for us to point out that the
model described in the chapter is idealized in that we have assumed that an attack
can be prevented by a timely patching decision. However, in reality, for zero-day
vulnerabilities, an attack can be successfully made regardless of patch rate. Hence,
it is also essential to study the resilient control design in the event of unanticipated
or rare attacks.
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CHAPTER 7
SMART GRID MANAGEMENT
Smart Grid has brought about new challenges for efficient and reliable energy
management. The future power grid will be integrated with distributed energy
resources and will be equipped with two-way communications to allow real-time
pricing and demand response management. This chapter aims to address the re-
search challenges imposed by these emerging features of the smart grid.
Renewable energy plays an important role in distributed energy resources in
smart grid systems. Deployment and integration of renewable energy resources
require an intelligent management to optimize their usage in the current power
grid. The distributed nature of these energy resources and the capability of de-
centralized power generation naturally lead to game-theoretic modeling of future
power systems in which participants of the grid can decide whether to buy or
sell energy in the energy market. In Section 7.1, we establish a game-theoretic
framework for modeling the strategic behavior of buses that are connected to re-
newable energy resources and study the equilibrium distributed power generation
at each bus. Our framework takes a cross-layer approach, taking into account the
economic factors as well as system stability issues at each bus.
Demand response management is another important feature of the future grid.
Based on real-time pricing information and two-way communications, users are
capable of making adjustment on their power consumption. The demand-side
management is believed to improve the efficiency and reliability of the current
power grid, which has led to new research challenges for demand response mech-
anisms. In Section 7.2, we establish a Stackelberg game framework that captures
the hierarchical communication architecture of the energy system, and the rational
behaviors of the consumers and the market operator. Based on this new frame-
work, we raise the question: What is the value that demand response management
(DRM) can bring to generation companies and consumers in the smart grid? The
question is fundamental for understanding the efficiency and impact of DRM on
the future power grid. We define the value of demand response based on the mir-
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ror Stackelberg equilibrium (MSE) solution to the hierarchical two-person game
problem, and the standard optimal solution to economic dispatch problem. We use
logarithmic utility functions to model the user’s satisfaction or comfort level with
respect to power consumption. They are used to illustrate the solution concept and
we show that in some cases, DRM provides conflicting values to the gencos and
consumers.
7.1 Management of Distributed Renewables
The Smart Grid (SG) initiative aims to modernize the electricity transmission and
distribution system to maintain a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure that
can meet future demand growth [5]. One of the goals of the SG initiative is to
deploy and integrate distributed resources and generation into the current power
grid, which can increase system reliability and energy efficiency. Renewable en-
ergy plays an essential role in distributed energy resources. Renewable energy
sources such as wind, solar energy and geothermal heat can be exploited to supply
power through PV arrays, wind turbines, fuel cells, and natural gas reciprocating
engines, etc. However, their different physical characteristics as well as relatively
high cost will require intelligent management systems to optimize their usage in
the current power grid [133].
In this section, we consider a decentralized energy management scheme to man-
age the distributed generation of renewable energies in the SG. The grid is conven-
tionally operated in a centralized manner, where the planning of power generation
is made to optimize the social welfare in the grid, and the real-time grid operation
is monitored and controlled with SCADA supervisory scheme. With deregulation,
independent power providers can enter the electricity market and sell cheap power
to the grid, and the deployment of distributed renewable energy resources is be-
lieved to be able to increase system reliability and efficiency. In addition, climate
change concerns, together with high oil prices and government support, are driv-
ing increasing renewable energy legislation, incentives and commercialization.
Motivated by this, we propose a game-theoretic framework which integrates
distributed renewable-based energy resources as distributed resources into power
grids. Figure 7.1 depicts a 9-bus power system as an example for the integration
of renewable resources. Buses 1 and 5 are conventional power plant generators
that are used to serve loads in the system. Buses 3, 6, and 7 are connected to
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Figure 7.1: 9-Bus power system example: buses 3, 6, and 7 are connected to
renewable resources that can generate geothermal, solar and wind power,
respectively.
renewable energy resources that can generate geothermal, solar, and wind power,
respectively. Different from conventional load buses, buses 3, 6, and 7 are capa-
ble of their own independent energy generation, which can be used to provision
power to their loads or sell it to the power market. Since the decisions of each bus
are made independently based on many physical and economic factors such as the
load requirement, cost of production and electricity market price, we use a game-
theoretic framework to understand the strategic behavior in the multi-agent power
grid from a cross-layer perspective. The goal of such a framework is to design a
control and automated energy management system for renewable energies in the
SG. Depicted in Fig. 7.2, the control module is used to provide operations plan-
ning on energy generation at each bus using inputs from bus load Pli , electricity
market price α , and production cost ci.
Game-theoretic tools have been used to study multi-agent systems such as con-
gestion control in the Internet [27, 28], security and privacy issues in wireless
communications [14], mechanism design in pricing issues [134], etc. As the num-
ber of intelligent devices, agents and players in power grids grows, game-theoretic
models become important for understanding strategic interactions among agents
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Figure 7.2: Control module at bus i: the amount of power generations (Pi,Qi)
depends on the bus load (Pli ,Q
l
i), electricity market price α , production cost ci,
power flow in the smart grid, etc.
that are coupled across different layers in the power grid. Our work is related
to [135], [136], [137] and [138]. In [135], a scheme that uses intelligent agents is
implemented to relieve line overloads by controlling certain loads in the grid. In
addition, a decentralized optimization algorithm is presented to minimize power
losses in the distribution network. In [136], dynamic games are proposed to model
the operation of large and widely distributed networks. In [137], a game-theoretic
approach is used to control the decision process of individual sources and loads
in small-scale and DC power systems. In [138], a differential game-theoretic
approach is proposed to provide decentralized control of energy resources in a
shipboard power system.
7.1.1 System Model
In this section, we propose a game-theoretic framework to model the independent
decision making of generators and loads on renewable energy generation. Let
N := {s,1,2, · · · ,N} be the set of N+1 buses in a power system network, where
bus s is the slack bus. The slack bus is an arbitrarily selected generator bus whose
voltage magnitude Vs and voltage phase angle θs are known. Without loss of
generality, we can set Vs = 1p.u. and θs = 0.
The power system is composed of load buses and generator buses. Denote by
Nd := {1,2, · · · ,Nd} ⊆ N the set of Nd 6 N buses that are capable of gener-
ating and provisioning electricity for themselves independently using renewable
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resources such as solar, wind and geothermal energies. Buses in the set Nd can
generate power to meet their own need of energy. We let Ng := {Nd + 1,Nd +
2, · · · ,N} =N \Nd denote a set of Ng buses consisting of buses that are either
PQ-loads or generators. Note that Ng+Nd = N. Each bus i ∈N has its specified
load (Pli ,Q
l
i) if i is a PQ-load bus, and it has its pre-determined generation power
(Pi,Qi) if it is a generation bus. Each bus i ∈Nd has its specified load (Pli ,Qli) to
be serviced and its power (Pi,Qi) to be determined. For convenience, we can by
default set PQ-load bus i’s generation power as Pi = 0,Qi = 0, and likewise, we
set generation bus i’s load power as Pli = 0,Q
l
i = 0.
Each bus i ∈Nd can also buy an amount of power Pi from utility companies,
sell and inject power into the power network, and at the same time, aim to regulate
its bus voltage magnitude Vi ∈ V ⊂ R+ to a nominal level Vˆi, and to keep the
voltage angle θi ∈ [0,pi] close to some reference angle θ¯ . The regulation of angles
can provide some certainty that the system will be small-signal stable. θ¯ can be
chosen to be the angle of the center of inertia (COI), which represents the “mean
motion” of the system [74], i.e., θ¯ = 1MT ∑
N
i=1 Miθi, where MT = ∑
N
i=1 Mi, and
Mi, i ∈N , are the inertia constants. Assume that one of the generators, say the
slack bus s, is an infinite bus whose inertia constant is very large, then we can
approximate θ¯ ∼ 0.
Each bus i ∈ Nd decides on the amount of power Pi ∈Pi ⊂ R+ to generate
from its renewable resources at a cost ci ∈ R+. We can represent the goal of bus
i ∈Nd by its cost function Ui :Pi×R+× [0,pi]→ R given by
Ui(Pi,Vi,θi) = ciPi+α(Pli −Pi)+
1
2
γ1i (Vi−Vˆi)2+
1
2
γ2i (θi− θ¯)2, i ∈Nd, (7.1)
where γ1i ,γ2i ∈ R+ are weighting parameters that indicate the importance or pri-
ority of the regulations of voltage magnitude and voltage angle, respectively. The
term Pli −Pi denotes the power bought or sold by bus i ∈Nd from the power grid
at the unit cost α ∈ R. It can be either positive or negative. When it is positive, it
means that bus i buys power from the network, and when it is negative, it means
that bus i sells power to the network. The unit cost α is determined by the power
market, which depends on the total supply and demand in a wide-area power net-
work. Here, we assume that all the b uses are price-taking entities and α is a given
cost parameter. The power generation Pi, i ∈N , needs to satisfy the constraints
06 Pi 6 Pi,max, (7.2)
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where Pi,max is the maximum power that can be generated by bus i. Vˆi is the
nominal voltage level that bus i attempts to regulate at and Vi is the voltage at
bus i. We can take Vˆi = 1p.u. for all i ∈Nd where we adopt normalized units.
The power flow in the power network obeys Kirchhoff laws. The power Pi,Qi,
voltage Vi and voltage angle θi of every bus i ∈N need to satisfy the power flow
equations with reference to the slack bus 0 as follows:
Pi = ∑
j∈Hi
ViVj[Gi jcos(θi−θ j)+Bi jsin(θi−θ j)], (7.3)
Qi = ∑
j∈Hi
ViVj[Gi jsin(θi−θ j)+Bi jcos(θi−θ j)], (7.4)
i, j ∈N ,
where Hi ⊂ N is a subset of N + 1 buses that are directly connected to bus i,
Gi j,Bi j, i, j ∈N , are the real part and the imaginary part of the entry (i, j) in the
bus admittance matrix Y ∈ CN×N , respectively. The matrix Y is symmetric and
it is a function of line admittances and shunt load resistance [139]. We can write
Y=G+ jˆB, where jˆ=
√−1, G∈RN×N is the conductance matrix and B∈RN×N
is the susceptance matrix. In lossless transmission lines, G = 0. Note that (7.3)
and (7.4) constitute a system of 2(N+1) nonlinear equality constraints. Since the
voltage magnitude and angle are known, the nonlinear system can be reduced to a
set of 2N equations.
We make the following assumptions before we formulate the game-theoretic
framework.
(A1) Each bus i ∈Nd can only directly control its real power Pi.
(A2) The generations of reactive power Qi, i ∈Nd, are close to 0 and hence neg-
ligible.
(A3) There exists a solution to the power flow equations (7.3) and (7.4) when Nd
buses all act as loads.
(A4) Each bus is aware of the physical constraints when making decisions.
(A5) Each bus has a high-quality forecast mechanism for the renewable resources
connected to the bus.
The assumptions made above are justifiable. According to recent IEEE Stan-
dard 1547 [133], distributed resources are not required to absorb and supply reac-
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tive power and hence they will not be capable of active voltage regulation. Imple-
mentation of renewable sources under assumptions (A1) and (A2) abides by the
IEEE Standard 1547 voltage requirement. Note that the loads at the bus can still
consume reactive power, i.e., Pli 6= 0, i ∈Nd .
Assumption (A3) suggests that a solution to the power flow equations exists
when no bus in the setNd produces renewable energies, and all loads of Nd buses
need to be provisioned by the power network. This assumption ensures that the
power supply in the network can meet the maximum load demand, and hence no
blackout can occur in this case. Under this assumption, the power grid system will
not incur a blackout when buses start to provision power for themselves, which,
from the perspective of engineering practice, leads to the existence of solution to
the power flow equations (7.3) and (7.4) with renewable energy sources.
Assumption (A4) states that each bus makes decisions by taking the coupled
constraints into account, or in other words, the power flow constraints (7.3) and
(7.4) are common knowledge to all buses in Nd . This is reasonable when all
agents are in their planning stage and no sudden topological changes occur in the
system. Assumption (A4) can be lifted if we consider an asymmetry in the knowl-
edge of planners. Assumption (A5) allows each bus to acquire high confidence
estimation of the maximum amount of renewable energies that can be generated.
Hence, we can view Pi,max, i ∈Nd, as deterministic quantities instead of a random
variable.
We adopt the following vector notations for convenience: V := [V1,V2, · · · ,VN ]′ ∈
RN , P := [P1,P2, · · · ,PN ]′ ∈RN , Q := [Q1,Q2, · · · ,QN ]′ ∈RN , θ = [θ1,θ2, · · · ,θN ]′ ∈
RN ; Vd := [V1,V2, · · · ,VNd ]′ ∈ RNd , Pd := [P1,P2, · · · ,PNd ]′ ∈ RNd , Qd := [Q1,Q2,
· · · ,QNd ]′ ∈ RNd , θd = [θ1,θ2, · · · ,θNd ]′ ∈ RNd .
7.1.2 Game-Theoretic Framework
In a decentralized smart grid system, each bus i ∈Nd minimizes its cost function
(7.1) independently subject to the constraints (7.2), (7.3) and (7.4), which leads to
a noncooperative game with coupled constraints among Nd buses [13].
Let Ξ := 〈Nd,{Pi,Θi,Vi}i∈Nd ,{Ui}i∈Nd ,P〉 be the continuous-kernel strate-
gic game with a set Nd of Nd players (or buses). {Pi,Θi,Vi} is the action set of
each player i, where
Pi := {Pi ∈ R+ : 06 Pi 6 Pi,max};
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P denotes the feasible set defined by a set of coupled constraints (7.3) and (7.4).
The feasible set of game outcomes is given by PF :=
(⊗i∈NdPi)∩P . Note
that the utility functions of buses Ui in (7.1) are independent of each other. How-
ever, the game is coupled through the constraints given by the power flow equa-
tions (7.3) and (7.4). In addition, from (A3), for every fixed Pd , there exists
a solution to the power flow equations. Hence, θd,Vd can be seen as depen-
dent on Pd . Therefore, to indicate the direct dependence on Pd and to suppress
the dependence on θd and Vd , we use the notation Ui(Pi,P−i), i ∈ Nd , where
P−i := [P1, · · · ,Pi−1,Pi+1, · · · ,PNd ]′, to emphasize the coupling of bus i’s utility
with the power generation of other buses.
The game Ξ falls into a class of constrained games, which has been previously
studied in [13], [24], [140]. A Nash equilibrium (NE) solution P∗d of the game Ξ
is a point where no players can benefit from deviating from it. A precise definition
of NE is provided below.
Definition 3 (Nash Equilibrium, [13, 24]) The set of power generation profile
P∗d for the set of renewable resources Nd constitutes a Nash equilibrium (NE)
point if
Ui(P∗i ,P
∗
−i)6Ui(Pi,P∗−i),∀Pi ∈Ωi(P∗−i), i ∈Nd, (7.5)
where Ωi(P∗−i) is the projected constraint set
Ωi(P∗−i) = {Pi ∈Pi : (Pi,P∗−i) ∈PF}.
7.1.3 System-Wide Optimization
The non-cooperative game Ξ formulated in Section 7.1.2 describes a scenario
where every bus makes independent decisions without centralized coordination.
An opposite scenario is where the power system is planned and coordinated in
a centralized manner by solving a system-wide optimization problem. Let US :
∏Ndi=1Pi×∏Ndi=1Θi×∏Ndi=1Vi → R be the aggregate utility of the power system,
given by Us(zd) = ∑di=1βiUi(zi), where zi = (Pi,θi,Vi), zd := (Pd,θd,Vd), βi ∈
[0,1], i ∈Nd, are the weights on buses such that ∑Ndi=1βi = 1. The system-wide
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optimization problem (SO) is
(SO) min
zd
US(zd)
zd ∈PF .
From (A4), we have ensured that (SO) is feasible and admits a solution. The
optimization problem (SO) fits into the classical optimal power flow framework in
[141,142]. In [143], optimization methods and algorithms for optimal power flow
and dispatching problems are summarized. The following proposition connects
the game Ξ and (SO).
Proposition 1 Suppose that z◦d := (P
◦
d,θ
◦
d ,V
◦
d) is an optimal solution to (SO).
Then, it is also a local NE of the game Ξ in the neighborhood N(z◦d) of z
◦
d .
Proof: Since z◦d is an optimal solution, hence we have
US(z◦d) :=
Nd
∑
i=1
βiUi(z◦i )6US(zd) :=
Nd
∑
i=1
βiUi(zi),
∀ zd ∈ PF ∩N(z◦d).
Due to continuity at the point z◦d , we can choose zd =(z
◦
1, · · · ,z◦i−1,zi,z◦i+1, · · · ,z◦Nd)∈
PF and we arrive at
Ui(z◦i )6Ui(zi),∀zi s.t. zd ∈PF , i ∈Nd. (7.6)
Therefore, we can conclude that z◦ is also a local NE for Ξ. 
Proposition 1 mainly comes from the property of separable utilities of the objec-
tive function. To compare NE with the system-wide optimum solution to (SO), we
define two metrics to measure the efficiency loss due to the decentralized decision-
making [43, 44].
Definition 4 (PoA, PoS, [43, 44]) Consider an Nd-player game Ξ and its associ-
ated system-wide optimization problem (SO). Given a weighting profile β , we let
U◦S,β 6= 0 be the aggregate cost achieved at the optimal solution z◦d . Denote by
U∗G,β be the aggregate cost achieved under a NE solution z
∗ ∈Z ∗, where Z ∗ is
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the set of NEs of Ξ. The price of anarchy (PoA) for the game is defined by
ρA = max
z∈Z ∗
U∗G,β
U◦S,β
(7.7)
as the worst-case ratio of the aggregate game cost to the system-wide cost. The
price of stability (PoS) for the game is defined by
ρS = min
z∈Z ∗
U∗G,β
U◦S,β
(7.8)
as the best-case ratio of the aggregate game cost to the system-wide cost.
Remark 3 From Proposition 1, we can conclude that the PoS ρS of the game is 1
in the neighborhood of z◦d since a global optimal solution z
◦ ∈Z ∗. However, the
PoA ρA of the game may not be 1 since the reverse statement of the proposition
is not true due to lack of uniqueness. The smart grid system can suffer loss of
efficiency if it operates at an equilibrium that does not coincide with the system-
wide optimal solution.
7.1.4 Linearized Game and Iterative Algorithms
The utility functions of the game Ξ are convex in Pi. However, the major difficulty
in finding the NE of the game is the set of nonlinear power flow constraints (7.3)
and (7.4). To simplify the analysis, we can linearize the power flow equations at a
given operating point Ψ0 := (P0,Q0,V0,θ0) and hence yield the following linear
equations: [
∆P
∆Q
]
= J(Ψ0)
[
∆V
∆θ
]
, (7.9)
where ∆P := P−P0, ∆Q := Q−Q0, ∆V := V−V0, ∆θ := θ −θ0 and J(Ψ0) ∈
R(N+1)×(N+1) is the Jacobian matrix
J(Ψ0) :=
[
∂P
∂V
∣∣
Ψ0
∂P
∂θ
∣∣
Ψ0
∂Q
∂V
∣∣
Ψ0
∂Q
∂θ
∣∣
Ψ0
]
,
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where ∂P∂V =
[
∂Pi
∂V j
]
i, j=1,2,··· ,N
, ∂P∂θ =
[
∂Pi
∂θ j
]
i, j=1,2,··· ,N
, ∂Q∂V =
[
∂Qi
∂V j
]
i, j=1,2,··· ,N
, ∂Q∂θ =[
∂Qi
∂θ j
]
i, j=1,2,··· ,N
can be analytically found as follows: For the terms in which i 6= j:
∂Pi
∂θ j
= ViVj(Gi j sin(θi−θ j)−Bi j cos(θi−θ j)),
∂Pi
∂Vj
= Vi(Gi j cos(θi−θ j)+Bi j sin(θi−θ j)),
∂Qi
∂θ j
= −ViVj(Gi j cos(θi−θ j)+Bi j sin(θi−θ j)),
∂Qi
∂Vj
= Vi(Gi j sin(θi−θ j)−Bi j cos(θi−θ j));
and for the terms in which i = j :
∂Pi
∂θi
= −Qi−V 2i Bii,
∂Qi
∂θi
= Pi−V 2i Gii,
∂Pi
∂Vi
=
Pi
Vi
+ViGii,
∂Qi
∂Vi
=
Qi
Vi
−ViBii, i, j ∈N , j ∈Hi.
Since the generation bus and load bus have their predetermined power, we can let
Pi,0 = Pi,Qi,0 = Qi for generation buses and let Pi,0 = Pli ,Qi,0 = Q
l
i for load buses.
Assume that J(Ψ0) is nonsingular and has its inverse W(Ψ0). Hence[
∆V
∆θ
]
= W
[
∆P
∆Q
]
, (7.10)
where W(Ψ0) can be partitioned into
W(Ψ0) =
[
WA WB
WC WD
]
,
where Wl = [whi j]i, j=1,2,··· ,N ,h = A,B,C,D, are N-by-N real matrices, which yield
∆V = WA∆P (7.11)
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and
∆θ = WC∆P (7.12)
when ∆Q is negligible.
Therefore, with linearized relations (7.11) and (7.12), we can find the NE of Ξ
with linearized constraints [24]. Let Ξl0 := 〈Nd,{P¯i}i∈Nd ,{U¯i}i∈Nd ,P l0〉 be the
linearized version of the game Ξ around operating point Ψ, whereP l0 denotes the
feasible set defined by a set of linearized coupled constraints (7.11) and (7.12).
The set P¯i is defined by
P¯i := {∆Pi ∈ R : 06 ∆Pi+Pi,0 6 Pi,max},
and the cost function U¯i is defined in terms of ∆P.
The linearized game Ξl0 can be solved by substituting (7.10) into (7.1). The
objective function Ui can be rewritten in terms of ∆P as follows.
U¯i(∆Pi,∆P−i)=(ci−α)∆Pi+ γ
1
i
2
(
∑
j∈N
wAi j∆Pj +V˜i
)2
+
γ2i
2
(
θi,0+ ∑
j∈N
wCi j∆Pj
)2
,
where V˜i = Vi,0− Vˆi. Note that, in (7.13), for buses j ∈ Ng, ∆Pj = 0 as their
generation powers are fixed, and hence we can replace N with Nd in (7.13). In
addition, the utility functions are convex in ∆Pi, and hence, by taking the derivative
with respect to ∆Pi, we arrive at the first-order necessary and sufficient condition
for optimal response of bus i to ∆P−i:
(ci−α)+ γ1i wAiiV˜i+ γ2i wCiiθi,0+ γ1i ∑
j∈Nd
wAi jw
A
ii∆Pj + γ
2
i ∑
j∈Nd
wCi jw
C
ii∆Pj = 0, i ∈Nd,
which can be written into the matrix form
Ad∆Pd = bd,
where ξd := [ξi]i∈Nd ∈ RNd×Nd , ξi := γ1i wAiiV˜i+ γ2i wCiiθi,0,
bd :=

α− c1
α− c2
...
α− cNd
+ξd ∈ RNd ,
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and Ad ∈ RNd×Nd is described in (7.13).
Ad :=

γ11 (w
A
11)
2+ γ21 (w
C
11)
2 γ11 w
A
11w
A
12+ γ
2
1 w
C
11w
C
12 . . .
γ12 w
A
22w
A
21+ γ
2
2 w
C
22w
C
21 γ
1
2 (w
A
22)
2+ γ22 (w
C
22)
2 . . .
... . . . . . .
γ1Nd w
A
NdNd w
A
Nd1+ γ
2
Nd w
C
NdNd w
C
Nd1
γ1Nd w
A
NdNd w
A
Nd2+ γ
2
Nd w
C
NdNd w
C
Nd2
. . .
· · · γ11 wA11wA1Nd + γ21 wC11wC1Nd
. . . γ12 w
A
22w
A
2Nd + γ
2
2 w
C
22w
C
2Nd
. . . ...
· · · γ1Nd(wANdNd)2+ γ2Nd(wCNdNd)2
 . (7.13)
Assume that Ad is nonsingular, we obtain the NE solution P? = ∆P?+P0 for
the linearized game Ξl0 with reference to Ψ0, where
∆P?d = A
−1
d bd, (7.14)
and ∆P?i = 0, for i ∈Ng. To take into account the local constraints (7.2), we need
to project the solution ∆P∗d +Pd,0 onto the convex and compact setP
L
d := {Pd ∈
RNd : 06 Pi 6 Pi,max, i = 1,2, · · · ,Nd}, i.e.,
P∗d = ProjPLd (∆P
?
d +P0).
The above results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Existence and uniqueness of NE) There exists a NE of the lin-
earized game Ξl0. Furthermore, the NE is unique if Ad is nonsingular.
Proof: Note that the game Ξl has its cost functional U¯i continuous on P¯i and
convex in ∆Pi. In addition, P¯i is a closed, bounded and convex set for all i ∈Nd .
Hence, by invoking Theorem 4.4 in [13], the linearized game Ξl0 admits a NE in
pure strategies. In addition, following the above argument, we can see that when
Ad is nonsingular, the game admits a unique NE. 
119
7.1.5 Iterative Algorithm
In this subsection, we propose an iterative algorithm to find the NE of the game Ξ
in Subsection 7.1.2. Since the operating point Ψ0 is chosen arbitrarily in Subsec-
tion 7.1.4, we can continue to construct a linearly constrained game Ξlk+1 around
the NE solution P∗k of the linearized game Ξ
l
k, where P
∗
k = ∆P
∗
k +P
∗
k−1 and ∆P
∗
k
solves (7.14). We iterate the process until we achieve ‖∆Pk‖6 δ for some preci-
sion δ > 0.
Algorithm 2 Iterative Algorithm to Find NE of the Game Ξ
Initialization :
Set the prices α,ci, i = 1,2, · · · ,Nd .
Specify (Pli ,Q
l
i) for load bus and (Pi,Qi) for generation bus.
Ψ0 := (P0,Q0,V0,θ) // Initialize with nominal values of each bus.
Calculate matrices G and B.
Iterative update:
while ‖∆Pd,k‖> δ do
Construct linearized game Ξlk around operating point Ψk−1.
Calculate Jacobian J and its inverse W.
Find P∗d,k that satisfies the constraint.
Obtain NE P∗d,k = ∆P
∗
d,k +P
∗
d,k−1 of the linearized game Ξ
l
k.
Define new operating point Ψk using P∗d,V
∗
d,θ
∗
d .
end while
Proposition 3 If Algorithm 2 converges, then it converges to a NE of Ξ.
Proof: From Proposition 2, we can show that there exists a NE for every lin-
earized game Ξlk at iteration k. When Algorithm 2 converges, P
∗
k converges to
some P+ as k→ ∞ and ∆P→ 0. P+ is an operating point that satisfy (7.3) and
(7.4). In addition, since P+ is a NE of the linearized game and hence, no bus can
benefit from deviating from P+. Therefore, it converges to a NE of Ξ. 
7.1.6 Approximate Solutions
In this subsection, we study two approximation schemes: one is fast decoupled
power flow and the other one is DC power flow [139].
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Fast Decoupled Power Flow
Here, we assume that the reactances on the power lines are much more signifi-
cant than the corresponding resistances, which results in Gi j ' 0, ∀i, j ∈N . In
addition, we assume that voltages and voltage angles are close to each other, i.e.,
Vi 'Vj =V,θi ' θ j,∀i, j ∈N , which leads to cos(θi−θ j)' 1 and sin(θi−θ j)'
θi−θ j. With these two assumptions, we can obtain the fast decoupled power flow
approximation, for i ∈N , j ∈Hi,
∂Pi
∂θi
=−BiiV 2i ,
∂Pi
∂θ j
=−ViVjBi j, ∂Pi∂Vi = 0,
∂Pi
∂Vj
= 0; (7.15)
∂Qi
∂θi
= 0,
∂Qi
∂θ j
= 0,
∂Qi
∂Vi
=−BiiVi, ∂Qi∂Vj =−Bi jVi. (7.16)
Hence, the Jacobian matrix J becomes block-diagonal in the form of
J =
[
J11 0
0 J22
]
,
with J11 =−VBV and J22 =−VB, where V= diag{V1,V2, · · · ,VN} and Vi 'V '
1 for all i ∈N . Under fast coupled power flow approximation [139], we can find
explicitly
∆θ =− 1
V
B−1 ·∆P. (7.17)
and
∆V =− 1
V
B−1 ·∆Q. (7.18)
Hence we find WC = − 1V B−1 and WA = 0 in (7.11) and (7.12). The matrix Ad
is reduced to B−1B, where B= 1V diag{γ21 wC11,γ22 wC22, · · · ,γ2NwCNdNd}. Ad is nonsin-
gular or a NE solution of linearized games exists when B is nonsingular and the
diagonal elements of its inverse are non-zeros.
Remark 4 With assumption (A2), (7.18) leads to ∆V = 0 and (7.17) becomes
independent of the operating point. Hence, provided that V 6= 0 and B is nonsin-
gular, there exists a unique solution for each iteration of Algorithm 2. In addition,
(7.17) leads a DC approximation (to be discussed in the next section). The appli-
cation Algorithm 2 under fast decoupled power flow assumptions does not yield
convergence unless bd is in the null space of B. However, we can find a NE under
DC approximation explicitly.
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DC Approximation
Here, we simplify further the analysis in Section 7.1.1 using DC approximation.
We assume that the reactance is much smaller than the resistance on transmission
lines; the voltage angles θi, i ∈N , are close to 0 and the voltages Vi, i ∈N , are
equal to 1. Hence, sin(θi− θ j) ' θi− θ j, cos(θi− θ j) ' 1, and the power flow
equations can be reduced to a set of linear relations:
P =−Bθ . (7.19)
The term γ2i (Vi−Vˆi)2 = 0 for all i ∈Nd in (7.1). We can define game
ΞDC := 〈Nd,{Pi}i∈Nd ,{Ui}i∈Nd ,PDC〉
based on the DC approximations, where P is the feasible set that corresponds
to the coupled constraint (7.19). Assume that B is nonsingular and (7.19) can be
rewritten as θ = HP, where H := [hi j]i, j∈N =−B−1.
Proposition 4 Assume that B is nonsingular and hii 6= 0,∀i ∈Nd . The DC ap-
proximated game ΞDC yields a unique NE P∗d in the form of
P∗d = ProjPLd
[
H−1d
(
bDCd −HgPg
)]
, (7.20)
where bDCd =
[
α−ci
γ2i hii
]
i∈Nd
∈RNd and Hd = [hi j]i, j∈Nd ∈RNd×Nd , Hg = [hi j]i∈Nd , j∈Ng ∈
RNd×Ng .
Proof: By substituting the constraint (7.19) into (7.1) and using the first-order
optimality condition, we arrive at
(ci−α)+ γ2i hii
(
∑
j∈Nd
hi jPj + ∑
j∈Ng
hi jPj
)
= 0. (7.21)
Therefore, the proposition follows from (7.21). 
7.1.7 Simulations and Illustrations
In this subsection, we first illustrate the game-theoretic framework with a numer-
ical example based on a 3-bus power system. Figure 7.7 depicts a power sys-
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Figure 7.3: Renewable power vs. iterations.
Figure 7.4: Cost function vs. iterations.
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Figure 7.5: Renewable power generations at buses 1 and 2 vs. electricity market
prices.
Figure 7.6: Voltage magnitudes at buses 1 and 2 vs. electricity market prices.
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Figure 7.7: PowerWorld system configuration of a 3-bus power network.
tem configuration in which a generator supplies power to two loads through three
transmission lines. Two load buses are capable of generating solar energies inde-
pendently, and they can either consume the generated power or sell it to the power
market. In smart grid systems, load buses can make individual decisions for re-
newable power generation in order to maximize their profits without coordination.
Hence, the two load buses can be viewed as players in the non-cooperative game
described in Section 7.1.2. We interface Matlab with PowerWorld [144] as a tool
to compute the Nash equilibrium using Algorithm 2.
We let the cost production solar energy be proportional to the price of a so-
lar panel and take α as the average electricity price during an operation period.
Hence, we set the parameters of the objective functions U1,U2 as follows: c1 =
c2 = 60$/MWh;α1 = α2 = 142$/MWh;Pl2 = 200MW,P
l
3 = 100MW;Vˆ2 = Vˆ3 =
1p.u. with 1p.u.= 230kV. Let γ1 = 0.4,γ2 = 0.04, which implies that voltage mag-
nitude regulation is emphasized more than angle difference minimization. This is
because voltage magnitude directly affects the quality of power supply at the load.
We show in Fig. 7.3 the renewable power generation by bus 2 and bus 3, re-
spectively, at each iteration. We can see that the algorithm converges in the end to
the Nash equilibrium P∗1 = 128.8753MW and P
∗
2 = 14.3430MW. In Fig. 7.4, we
show the values of cost functions at each iteration and they converge to equilib-
rium costs as P1 and P2 converge to the Nash equilibrium.
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We investigate further the influences of the renewable energy unit cost and elec-
tricity market price on individual decision-makers. In Figs. 7.5 and 7.6, we fix the
production cost of unit renewable energy and vary the market price α . It can be
seen from Fig. 7.5 that when the electricity price increases, both players increase
their amount of renewable power generations at the Nash equilibrium. In addition,
it can be seen from Fig. 7.6 that as the market price increases, voltage profiles on
buses are closer to 1p.u., which is a consequence of higher level of renewable
power generation. This observation agrees with the intuition that the voltage pro-
file improves, i.e., closer to 1p.u., when load buses generate more energy on their
own.
In the next simulation, we compare the NE solution obtained using Algorithm
2 with its counterpart obtained using DC approximation. In order to make a fair
comparison, we assume that the voltage magnitudes are close to 1p.u., and hence
γ1 = 0. In Fig. 7.8, we vary the values of γ2i , i = 1,2, and plot the NE solutions
obtained using Algorithm 2 and the result in Proposition 4, respectively. We can
see that the NE solutions can be closely approximated under DC assumptions
at high energy market prices. The efficacy of the DC approximation scheme is
directly linked to the viability of the assumptions that Vi, i = 1,2, are close to
1p.u. At high energy prices, the players tend to generate their own renewable
energies and hence it is easier to regulate bus voltages to 1p.u., which has also
been observed in Fig. 7.6. Therefore, this explains the observation that high
market prices lead to better DC approximations.
We investigate a more general 9-bus power system, WECC (Western Electricity
Coordinating Council) power system, depicted in Fig. 7.1, whose parameters are
specified in Section 7.3 in [74]. We let buses 6 and 7 be two players connected
to solar energy, and set their parameters in the cost functions same as the ones in
3-bus system. We show in Fig. 7.9 the amount of renewable power generation
and voltage magnitude at NE vs. different electricity market prices for buses 6
and 7, denoted as player 1 and player 2, respectively. Figure 7.9 shows an in-
creasing relation of these equilibrium quantities with market price. This has been
also observed in the 3-bus system, which verifies the impact of price change on
renewable energy generation. In Fig. 7.10, we plot the voltage magnitudes of the
power flow without renewable energy resources and their counterparts at NE pro-
duction of renewable energy. It can be seen that voltage magnitudes on buses all
stay close to 1p.u.. In particular, the voltage magnitudes of buses 6 and 7 change
from 0.9507p.u. to 0.9568p.u. and from 0.9662p.u. to 0.9669p.u., respectively,
126
Figure 7.8: A comparison of renewable energies at buses 1 and 2 vs. γ2i , i = 1,2,
respectively, under AC and DC models.
after the introduction of renewable energy resources.
7.2 Value of Demand Response
The advent of advanced information and communication technologies (ICTs) has
enabled a smart metering infrastructure capable of sensing and measuring power
consumptions of consumers. The integration of ICTs into the power grid provides
bi-directional flow of information between consumers and generation companies
(gencos), allowing consumers to control and manage their own electricity usage
and gencos to effectively control the power generation. Leveraging this technol-
ogy, Demand Response Management (DRM) is the response system of end-users
to changes in electricity prices over time or across different energy sources [145].
It is believed that DRM can yield lower bills and higher utility efficiency for end-
users, and reduce the cost of power generation or improve the revenues of gencos.
However, without wide adoption of ICTs and implementation of DRM, it has not
yet been shown that DRM can always provide a better performance in all mar-
ket and consumer conditions. Building and integrating ICT infrastructure can be
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Figure 7.9: Voltage magnitude and renewable power generations at NE vs.
electricity market prices.
Figure 7.10: Voltage magnitude without renewable energy resources vs. voltage
magnitude at NE renewable energy production at each bus.
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costly. It is imperative to demonstrate that the industrial and government invest-
ment will yield valuable performances not only for gencos and regulators but also
for consumers in expected and unexpected conditions. It is also important for us
to find mitigating solutions for cases where DRM can bring unanticipated effects
onto the power grid before putting all resources into establishing the new infras-
tructure.
In this section, we ask the fundamental question: What is value that DRM can
bring to gencos and consumers in the smart grid? The answer to this question
is essential for understanding the tradeoffs and impact of DRM in future power
grid. In addition, it is of great importance to characterize its value before massive
investment in building the critical infrastructure. To address this issue, we adopt
a hierarchical system model illustrated in Fig. 7.11, where the power market
is hierarchically decomposed into multiple processes, with consumers at the last
level [146]. Built on the system model, we develop a Stackelberg game framework
based on the economic dispatch problem to capture hierarchical interactions be-
tween the market operator and the consumers. The operator can be viewed as the
leader in the game, who optimally determines the generation level for each genco
and the associated market price. On the other hand, the consumers are aggregated
as one single player who collectively responds to the received price signal from
the operator and strategically determines the level of consumption. The Stack-
elberg game has been used in many engineering applications, such as resource
allocations in communication networks [147], power generation in imperfect mar-
ket [148], and proactive defense for secure routing [149]. The wide application
is due to the inherent hierarchical structure of the system and the leader-follower
type of relations between players. However, different from the classical definition
of Stackelberg equilibrium solutions, the problem in the context of DRM has a
special structure in which the action observed by the follower is not the primal de-
cision variable but the dual variable that corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier or
shadow price. Hence, we need to develop new solution techniques to address this
issue presented by the model, and we use a consistency principle to characterize
the equilibrium solution with a fixed point relation.
Based on the equilibrium solution to the game and the optimal solution to the
economic dispatch problem, we define the value of demand response (VoDR) for
both gencos and users. We have seen that the VoDR for the gencos can be very
different from the VoDR for the users, and sometimes they are conflicting with
each other, i.e., DRM benefits users but not the gencos, depending on certain user
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behaviors. We use logarithmic utility functions to illustrate the solution concepts
and provide closed form equilibrium solutions.
Figure 7.11: Illustration of the hierarchical system model composed of multiple
processes of power generation, transmission, distribution and consumption [146].
The power generation is at the top level; the market operation and economic
dispatch are at the middle level, i.e., the market level. The consumers reside at
the bottom of the hierarchy. There are NR residential consumers and NI industrial
consumers. The power distribution is assumed to be ideal and the demand
decisions from the consumers are made at the bottom level.
7.2.1 Related Work
Enabled by modern communication technologies, DRM plays a key role in im-
proving the efficiency, reliability and security of the current power grid. It allows
consumers to respond to changes in electricity prices over time or across different
energy sources. It is believed that this price-induced elasticity of the demand for
electrical energy would improve the operation of electrical market [146].
Recent years have witnessed a surge of research activities in the area of de-
mand response, in both theory and applications. In [150], a hierarchical dynamic
monitoring and decision system is proposed to ensure sustainable services and
the complexity of the smart grid. In [151], the authors have considered a dis-
tributed system where price is modeled by its dependence on the overall system
load. Based on the price information, the users adapt their demands to maximize
their own utility.
For theoretical investigations of DRM, game theory has been widely adopted
as a framework to capture complex interactions among different players in energy
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systems. In [152], the authors have formulated an energy consumption schedul-
ing problem as a static non-cooperative game among the consumers for increasing
strictly convex cost functions. In [153], a two-level dynamic game framework is
established to model distributed dynamic side management. At the lower level,
each household schedules different appliances for energy consumption. At the
upper level, a dynamic game is used to capture the interaction among different
players in their demand responses through sticky market price. In [154], a multi-
resolution two-layer game is studied using mean-field game approach to incorpo-
rate inner interactions between users in the region, and outer interactions between
regions for dynamic distributed demand response in the smart grid.
Our work makes use of a hierarchical Stackelberg game model to investigate the
value of demand response in the future smart grid in comparison to its counterpart
without demand response. Different from the previous work in this field, we aim
to provide a fundamental understanding of the benefit of demand response for the
future power grid.
7.2.2 System Models
In this subsection, we describe two system models. The first model is based on
the classical economic dispatch problem without demand response, and the second
one is the modified hierarchical model with users adopting demand response man-
agement and following the price signal sent from the market operator. Figure 7.11
illustrates a general energy system with a hierarchical system model [155]. The
energy system is composed of many different players. At the upper level, gencos
are generating companies who own a single plant or a portfolio of plants of dif-
ferent types. They produce and sell electrical energy to the wholesale market. A
market operator balances load and generation and an independent system operator
(ISO) runs such market real time in order to maintain the security and reliability
of the power system. The generated power is then delivered first through a trans-
mission system and then to a distribution system before reaching consumers. At
the lower level, there can be different types of energy consumers, such as residen-
tial and industrial ones, depending on geographic and economic characteristic of
the area. The entire energy system is a complex hierarchical system [156]. In this
work, we focus on the market level of the system and hence simplify our model
by assuming an ideal transmission and distribution system. In addition, instead of
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considering individual consumers as depicted in Fig. 7.11, we aggregate all the
users as one single entity. These abstractions lead to the two models in Fig. 7.12
and Fig. 7.13, which will be discussed in detail in the ensuing two subsections
respectively.
Figure 7.12: Illustration of the economic dispatch problem without demand
response. N gencos submit their cost functions Ci to the market operator. The
ISO forecasts the demand Dˆ and then optimally dispatches power generation
level Pi to each generator.
Economic Dispatch Problem
We first introduce the economic dispatch problem described in Fig. 7.12. The
power generation companies (gencos) submit their bids to the wholesale market
and the operator determines the power generation level depending on the day-
ahead aggregate demand forecast Dˆ ∈R+. LetN = {1,2, · · · ,N} be the set of N
gencos participating in the same power market. Each genco i ∈N generates an
amount of power Pi at a cost Ci(Pi), where Ci : R+→ R+ is the cost function for
genco i. The cost functions Ci can be assumed to have the following properties:
(i) Ci are smooth functions, (ii) Ci are monotonic increasing, i.e., C′i > 0, (iii) Ci
are convex, i.e., C′′i > 0. Each genco has its own capacity constraints:
Pi,min 6 Pi 6 Pi,max, (7.22)
where Pi,min,Pi,min are the minimum and the maximum levels of power generation
of genco i, respectively. The market operator aims to determine the optimal dis-
patch vector P := [P1,P2, · · · ,PN ]′ by minimizing the total cost while balancing the
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supply and demand, i.e.,
N
∑
i=1
Pi = Dˆ. (7.23)
Hence, the economic dispatch problem (DP) is described as follows:
(DP) min
P∈RN+
∑Ni=1Ci(Pi)
s.t. ∑Ni=1 Pi = Dˆ
Pi,min 6 Pi 6 Pi,max, i ∈N .
In the problem (DP), the day-ahead forecast of demand Dˆ is made by the market
operator, and the demands of users are aggregated into the total demand without
capturing the response of individual consumers to the market price. Hence the
model considered in (DP) does not have the feature of demand response. The
Lagrange multiplier λ ∈ R+ associated with the constraint (7.23) of (DP) can be
seen as the price determined by the operator. For the simplicity of analysis, we
further assume that the constraints (7.22) are not active when each generator has
sufficient capacity. Hence, the dual problem of (DP) is given by
(DDP) max
λ∈R+
G(λ ),
where the dual function
G(λ ) := min
P∈RN+
N
∑
i=1
Ci(Pi)+λ
(
N
∑
i=1
Pi− Dˆ
)
.
The dual problem (DDP) provides a clear picture of how the market price is de-
termined through maximizing the dual function G(λ ). Since the problem (DP)
is convex and the feasible set is nonempty, there exists a global optimal solution
(λ ◦,P◦) and its associated optimal total cost is given by
C◦ =
N
∑
i=1
Ci(P◦i ). (7.24)
Remark 5 For studies where the impact of transmission systems are significant,
the economic dispatch problem (DP) can be further extended by replacing (7.23)
with power flow constraints that describe the interconnections of power network
between the loads and the generators owned by each genco. The detailed repre-
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Figure 7.13: Illustration of demand response driven energy market model. ISO
sends price signal λ to an aggregate group of users and they respond to λ by a
total demand D.
sentation of the network leads to an optimal power flow problem (OPF) [143].
The general analysis of OPF is challenging and its complexity depends on the
underlying topology of interconnections [156, 157]. In order to achieve more in-
sights into the problem, we use (7.23) to simplify OPF constraints and to capture
the fundamental relation between the loads and the generators.
Demand Response Model
Based on the economic dispatch model discussed in Section 7.2.2, we establish a
theoretical framework for modeling demand response of consumers to the price
signal from the market. Let λ ∈R+ be the price determined by the market operator
from solving (DP). Here, the price coincides with the Lagrange multiplier or the
shadow price, which can be interpreted as the marginal optima cost with respect to
infinitesimal change in forecast demand Dˆ. Modern information technologies for
the smart grid will enable effective two-way communications between end-users
and the market, which allows consumers to respond to λ in real time and change
their level of demand. Figure 7.13 illustrates this feature with users receiving a
price signal λ and responding with an aggregate demand D. Note that the demand
D can be different from the forecast demand Dˆ, and the market operator needs to
set a new price according to the new demand. The equilibrium of the dynamic
decision process can be capture by a Stackelberg game framework.
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It is clear that in the hierarchical energy system, the market behaves as a leader
who announces a price for end-users to respond. The goal of the market operator
or ISO is the same as the one in (DP). However, the operator can minimize the
generation cost more strategically with the knowledge of how consumers will ad-
just their demand to price signals. On the other hand, the users act as followers
who observe the price signal and respond to it by changing their levels of demand.
The goal of the users here is to maximize the level of comfort or utilities while
minimizing the cost of the electricity bill. To capture this leader-follower strategic
interactions, we establish a two-person Stackelberg game framework where the
operator acts first as the leader PL while the users are aggregated collectively as
player PU who responds to the action of the leader.
Based on the received signal, the users adjust their demand level by changing
the load from the forecast or nominal load Dˆ to a total demand D := Dˆ+∆D,
where ∆D ∈ R is the adjusted demand. Positive ∆D means increasing the total
effective load while negative ∆D mean reducing the total load. The adjustment
∆D is strategically determined in response to λ by maximizing the payoff function
J˜U : R2+→ R, which represents a collective group of users. The payoff function
has two components. One is the utility achieved by the total demand D and the
other is the cost. Let U˜ : R+→ R be the utility of PL, which quantifies the level
of comfort when users consume D amount of power. Hence the cost function can
be expressed as follows:
J˜U(D,λ ) := U˜(D)−λD, (7.25)
where the term λD is the consumption cost at unit price λ . We let U˜ be a separable
function such that U˜(D) =Uc(Dˆ)+U(∆). Hence, player PU ’s problem is to solve
the following optimization problem given λ :
max
D∈R+
J˜(D,λ )
and hence an optimal response R˜U : R+→ R+ of PU is obtained as
R˜U(λ ) ∈ arg max
D∈R+
J˜(D,λ ). (7.26)
Since the users only decides on ∆D, we can use a payoff function JU :R2+→R
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to represent the equivalent decision problem of PU , given by (UP1) below:
(UP) max
∆D>−Dˆ
JU(∆D,λ ) :=U(∆D)−λ∆D, (7.27)
and the associated optimal response RU : R+→ R+ is
RU(λ ) ∈ arg max
∆D>−Dˆ
JU(∆D,λ ). (7.28)
In general, RU is not necessarily unique. In this chapter, we assume that (UP)
yields a unique optimal response function for every feasible λ . Hence, we observe
that RU(λ ) = R˜U(λ )− Dˆ.
The utility function U can be represented by different functions for different
contexts of applications. In general, we require U to be a monotonic increas-
ing function, and it is also desirable for U to be continuous and differentiable.
Logarithmic functions have been used to capture the demand behaviors that are
constantly increasing but the marginal utility decreases [148]. The function is
concave and takes the following form:
U(∆D) = γ ln(α∆D+β ), (7.29)
where γ,α and β are positive parameters. Sigmoidal functions are another class
of smooth functions that can used to describe demand behaviors with switching.
One candidate Sigmoidal function is the Fermi-Dirac function in the form of
U(∆D) =
ea∆D−b
ea∆D−b+1
, (7.30)
where a and b are positive parameters. The utility contains a switching behavior
at ∆D = b/a and the switch is sharper at larger values of a. This type of functions
can describe cases where comfort level of users drastically drops when demand
level is not satisfactorily met.
The market operator, on the other hand, minimizes the generation cost similar
1UP stands for “Users’ Problem.”
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to (DP) by solving (LP2) below:
(LP) min
P∈RN+
JL(P) := ∑Ni=1Ci(Pi)
s.t. ∑Ni=1 Pi = D,
Pi,min 6 Pi 6 Pi,max, i ∈N .
We can see that the optimal solution P will depend on the adjusted demand.
The two-player demand response Stackelberg game model can be characterized
by two interrelated problems {UP,LP} between players PU and PL. Note that in
(LP), the market operator announces the marginal price λ associated with the bal-
ancing constraint to PU , while sending the optimal dispatch decisions P to gencos,
which is illustrated in Figure 7.13.
Remark 6 In this chapter, we assume that the game is of complete information for
both players, i.e., they have the knowledge of the problems {UP,LP} that other
players aim to solve; and the players are rational agents, who seek to achieve
their goals by maximizing the utility (or minimizing the cost). These assumptions
are reasonable in the context of demand response in the smart grid. It is common
knowledge and publicly known that users tend to minimize their electricity bill for
maximum comfort or utility, while minimizing the generation cost is the essential
goal of the gencos. The model described here can also be extended to include
human factors such as psychological effects, delay in response and human errors.
An important solution concept associated with the two-person game model is
Stackelberg equilibrium, which we define as follows.
Definition 5 [Mirror Stackelberg Equilibrium] Let RU be the unique demand re-
sponse of users to the price signals, and denote the feasible set of PL by Fλ :=
F 1λ ∩F 2, where
F 1λ :=
{
P ∈ RN+ :
N
∑
i=1
Pi = Dˆ+Ru(λ )
}
is associated with the balancing constraint, and
F 2 :=
{
P ∈ RN+ : Pi,min 6 Pi 6 Pi,max, i ∈N
}
2LP stands for “Leader’s Problem.”
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is associated with physical generation constraints.
A 3-tuple (λ ∗,P∗,∆D∗) is a mirror Stackelberg equilibrium (MSE) solution if
the following conditions are satisfied:
(C1) The pair (P∗,µ∗) solves (SP3) below:
(SP) min
P∈Fλ∗
JL(P)
with µ∗ being the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint F 2λ ∗ ,
whereFλ ∗ is feasible set of PL at λ ∗;
(C2) µ∗ is consistent with λ ∗, i.e., λ ∗ = µ∗;
(C3) ∆D∗ = RU(λ ∗).
The above definition of SE equilibrium also provides methodologies to compute
and find such equilibrium solutions. (C1) yields an equilibrium strategy for PL by
taking into account the optimal response behavior of the users. (C2) imposes
the requirement that the price announced to the users at the equilibrium should
be consistent with the price determined by PL through its Lagrange multiplier, or
shadow price. (C3) gives the equilibrium demand in response to the equilibrium
price.
Remark 7 The definition of SE is an extension to the one in classical Stackelberg
game models [13, 147]. Note that in our model, the leader PL announces its dual
variable λ to the follower while its primal variable to the gencos in the higher
layer. It is not sufficient to solve just the primal problem which contains the dual
variable λ , and hence we need to impose consistency between µ∗ and λ ∗.
At the SE (λ ∗,P∗,∆D∗), the total generation cost achieved under the demand
response at the equilibrium is
J∗L =
N
∑
i=1
Ci(P∗i ), (7.31)
and the users’ payoff is
J˜∗U := J(∆D
∗,λ ∗)+Uc(Dˆ). (7.32)
3SP stands for “Stackelberg Problem.”
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7.2.3 Value of Demand Response
Having introduced two models in the previous subsections, in this subsection, we
compare the solutions to both models and study the value of demand response
(VoDR). We define VoDR for the gencos as the ratio between (7.31) and (7.24),
i.e.,
VoDRg :=
J∗L
C◦
(7.33)
and the VoDR to the users as the ratio between (7.32) and the user payoff without
demand response, i.e., J˜◦U :=Uc(Dˆ)−λ ◦Dˆ.
VoDRu :=
J˜∗U
J˜◦U
(7.34)
It is clear that when VoDRg < 1 and VoDRu > 1, demand response will benefit
both sides for reducing the cost and saving energy. Whether demand response in
the future smart grid will be able to provide inherent value to both players will de-
pend on the solutions that characterize both models. In the following subsections,
we will discuss methodologies to compute SE and provide examples to illustrate
the concepts numerically.
Characterization of Mirror Stackelberg Equilibrium
Here, we provide methodologies to characterize and compute the SE solution of
the game. Since the behavior of PU is in response to the dual variable, it is more
convenient for us to study the dual problem of (SP). Assuming that the constraints
associated withF are inactive, the dual problem of PL is described by
(DSP) max
µ∈R+
G˜(µ,λ ),
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the balancing constraint, G˜ :
R+→ R is the dual function given by
G˜(µ,λ ) := min
P∈RN+
N
∑
i=1
Ci(Pi)+µ
(
N
∑
i=1
Pi−RU(λ )− Dˆ
)
. (7.35)
Here, λ is the price signal received from PL, and it is not necessarily the same
as µ in (7.35). It is straightforward to see that the optimal solution µ∗ to (DSP)
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depends on the value of λ . We assume that there exists a unique function Φ such
that µ∗ = Φ(λ ). This is known as a parametric programming problem [158].
From (C2) in Definition 5, at SE (λ ∗,P∗,∆D∗), λ ∗ and µ∗ should be consistent,
and we arrive at the following fixed point equation
λ ∗ = µ∗ =Φ(λ ∗). (7.36)
Hence the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the SE equilibrium can be
characterized by the mapping Φ.
Logarithmic Utility Function
In this subsection, we use logarithmic utility functions (7.29) to provide analyt-
ical SE solutions for the game-theoretic demand response model. We consider
quadratic cost functions for gencos as in [148, 159], i.e.,
Ci =
1
2
aiP2i +biPi+ ci, i ∈N , (7.37)
where Pi is in kW ; ai,bi,ci are nonnegative parameters of proper units; the cost Ci
is measured in dollars. Since (7.29) is strictly concave, we arrive at a unique best
response of PU given by
RU(λ ) =
γ
λ
− β
α
, (7.38)
where λ is the price in $/kW ; β and α are assumed to be chosen so that RU >−Dˆ;
otherwise, we need to project RU onto the domain [−Dˆ,∞).
Remark 8 In this chapter, we have derived RU as a function of λ from utility func-
tions that model rational human behaviors. In practice, we can obtain RU through
interpolation of collected data on how users change their demands according to
prices. RU can be dependent on the time of day as well as the geographical loca-
tions and seasons of the year.
With (7.37) and (7.38), we use (7.35) to find the dual function G˜(µ) by substitut-
ing Pi =
µ−bi
ai
into (7.35). The obtained dual function is strictly concave in µ and
the optimal µ can be obtained in closed form. In the case of two gencos,
µ =Φ(λ ) =
a1a2
a1+a2
(
γ
λ
− β
α
+ Dˆ
)
+
a2b1+a1b2
a1+a2
. (7.39)
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With (7.39), we can use the consistency principle to find the equilibrium price,
which is the intersection between the curves µ =Φ(λ ) and µ = λ , which is further
illustrated in Fig. 7.14. To find the fixed-point in Fig. 7.14, we let aA := a1a2a1+a2 and
Figure 7.14: Illustration of the consistency principle: The equilibrium price is at
the intersection of two curves: one is µ =Φ(λ ) and the other is µ = λ . The
equilibrium price here is λ ∗ = µ∗ = 0.176$/kW .
aB := a2b1+a1b2a1+a2 , and the equilibrium price λ
∗ is the positive root to the quadratic
equation:
λ 2+aCλ −aAγ = 0, (7.40)
where aC :=
aAaB
α −aADˆ−aB. This yields the 3-tuple SE given by
λ ∗ =
1
2
(√
a2C +4aAγ−aC
)
, (7.41)
∆D∗ = RU(λ ∗), (7.42)
P∗i =
λ ∗−bi
ai
, i = 1,2. (7.43)
The expressions for SE in cases where N > 3 can also be derived and they are in
similar form as the ones above.
7.2.4 Case Study and Numerical Examples
In this subsection, we use numerical examples to illustrate the solutions to the sys-
tem models described in Section 7.2.2. We consider the same two-genco scenario
in Section 7.2.3. We set the parameters ai = 0.01 $/ kW2, bi = 0.1 $/kW, ci = 1
$ for i= 1,2, and Dˆ= 10 kW, γ = 1 $, α = 2 kW−1, β = 1, Uc = 2 $. Without de-
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mand response, under the economic dispatch model, P◦1 = 5 $/kW, P
◦
2 = 5 $/kW,
λ ◦ = 0.15 $/kW, the optimal cost for the gencos is C◦ = 3.25 $ and the users pay-
off is J˜◦ =Uc−λ ◦Dˆ = 0.5 $. With demand response, at the SE, P∗1 = P∗2 = 7.59
kW, λ ∗ = 0.176 $/kW, ∆D∗ = 5.18 kW, the gencos incur total cost of J∗L4.095 $
while the user payoff becomes J∗U = 1.76 $. Hence we obtain
VoDRg = 1.26,
VoDRu = 3.52.
We can see the demand response management (DRM) leads to 26% higher cost for
the gencos while the payoff of the users have increased tremendously. It appears
that DRM does not always reduce cost and save energy for the gencos. In this
example, we have seen the case whether the users have responded to the price
signal aggressively and leads to a higher demand for achieving a higher payoff or
comfort at the equilibrium and higher price for the power. When we increase the
value b1 = b2 = b, we find that the equilibrium price λ ∗ increases almost linearly
with the marginal cost b as shown in Fig. 7.15, while λ ∗ increases in a nonlinear
fashion as the parameterα increases (Fig. 7.16).
Figure 7.15: Equilibrium price λ ∗ ($/kW) versus cost parameter b ($/kW) for the
two-genco case.
7.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed two problems of energy management in the
future smart grid. We first have presented a game-theoretic framework to model
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Figure 7.16: Equilibrium price λ ∗($/kW) versus cost parameter α ($/kW2) for
the two-genco case.
independent decision-making of buses connected to renewable resources. The
game formulation has taken into account economic factors as well as physical con-
straints. We have proposed an iterative algorithm to compute the Nash equilibrium
of the nonlinear constrained game. Through numerical examples and simulations,
we have demonstrated the equilibrium solution and the convergence of the algo-
rithm. Our framework differs from the classical optimal power flow problem, and
game theory is shown to be a useful tool for understanding strategic behaviors in
smart grid systems. As future work, we intend to explore security aspects of dis-
tributed renewable energy generation under this framework. We can modify the
model to incorporate malicious agents whose goal is purely for their economic
benefits rather than system stability. It will also be interesting to understand the
robustness and resilience of the distributed energy system framework.
In the second part of the chapter, we have studied and compared two models
for investigating the value of DRM. The first model is based on the economic
dispatch problem used in current energy market operations, while the second one
is a Stackelberg game framework in which the users are followers who respond
to the price signal sent from the market. The second model is an extension of
the first one incorporating DRM. We have studied simplified versions of these
models, aiming to provide analytical solutions that will lead to insights for DRM
mechanisms. We have discussed a novel methodology using consistency principle
to characterize and compute the mirror Stackelberg equilibrium associated with
the game.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Security and resilience issues that arise in the smart grid constitute a pivotal con-
cern in modern critical infrastructures. In this dissertation, we have discussed a
six-layer security architecture for complex hierarchical systems, which allows us
to adopt a divide-and-conquer approach for addressing problems residing on in-
dividual layers as well as a holistic approach for cross-layer system-level analysis
and design. In this dissertation, we have addressed the robust and resilient con-
trol problem across the cyber and physical layers of the system, secure routing
problem at the networking layer, and the management of information security and
smart grid energy systems.
With increasing integration of information technologies into the power grid,
robust and resilient control system design is essential for assuring the robust per-
formance of power systems in face of adversarial attacks. We have presented a
hybrid game-theoretic framework in which the occurrence of unanticipated events
is modeled by a stochastic switching, and deterministic uncertainties are repre-
sented by the known range of disturbances. The design of robust controller at
the physical layer takes into account risks of failures due to cyber system, while
the design of the security policies is based on its potential impact on the control
system. The cross-layer coupled design results in solving a zero-sum differential
game for robust control nested in and coupled with a zero-sum stochastic game
for security policy. The joint design results in a robust and resilient controller
switching between different modes for guaranteeing performance in face of unex-
pected events. Interesting future work on this topic includes studying the impact
of information structures, imperfect observations and delayed measurements on
the control system design. This framework can also be extended to investigate
multi-agent systems, where the interconnections of the cyber networks can lead to
performance interdependencies of the physical layer control systems.
At the data communication and networking layers, we have investigated the
distributed secure routing problem and proposed a routing protocol based on fully
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distributed strategy and payoff learning algorithms. The protocol has the inherent
feature of scalability and resilience, which equips the network with a self-recovery
mechanism. It has been applied to cognitive radio networks as well as smart grid
data networks arising from the adoption of IP-based network technologies due
to the wide use of PMUs and smart meters. We have also illustrated the hybrid
structure of the routing protocol to incorporate the desirable features of the cen-
tralized and decentralized architectures. Future work on this topic includes an ex-
tension of security protocol by including lightweight and scalable cryptographic
techniques for providing security against eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle
attacks. In addition, the hybrid learning algorithm can be further extended to gen-
eral stochastic games, for which the estimation of the payoff function will become
the learning of the Q function as in Markov decision problems. The learning al-
gorithms proposed in the dissertation can also be used to compute Stackelberg
equilibria in which the leader can observe the decisions made by the follower at
each step.
At the higher level of the information security management layer, we have dis-
cussed a series of policy-making decisions on vulnerability discovery, disclosure,
patch development and patching. We have adopted a system approach to under-
stand the interdependencies of these decision processes. In particular, we have
studied an optimal patching decision problem for industrial control systems. This
framework can be further extended to a dynamic noncooperative game by includ-
ing decision model for the adversaries who decide on the attack rates. In addition,
in order to provide a holistic picture of information security management, we need
to extend the theoretical framework here to study the decisions involving vulner-
ability disclosure and the R&D development of control patches.
The emerging smart grid applications impose many challenges for efficient
management of distributed energy resources and demand response participated
by active utility users. In the dissertation, we have established game-theoretic
frameworks and addressed fundamental questions such as “What is the system
equilibrium under distributed power generation?” and “What is the value that de-
mand response management can bring to the smart grid?”. We have presented a
set of new analytical methods and computational tools for analyzing games with
coupled constraints based on game linearization. In addition, we have proposed
the mirror Stackelberg equilibrium to characterize the equilibrium solution for
Stackelberg games in which the decision of the follower relies on the dual vari-
able of leader’s problem. We have shown that a consistency principle can be used
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to find the equilibrium solution. We have observed that the value of demand re-
sponse heavily depends on the behaviors of the users. The implementation of
communication systems for demand response may not result in cost reductions at
supply and demand sides. This framework provides fundamental understanding
of pricing, energy policies and infrastructural investment. As future work, we will
investigate the impact of communication security on demand response manage-
ment based on this equilibrium concept. In addition, games-in-games structure
can be applied to study the impact of demand response on physical layer control
of power systems.
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APPENDIX A
PRICE OF ANARCHY
Motivated by the flow control problem in Section 5.2.3, in this appendix, we study
a class of flow control games and characterize its efficiency loss in a generalized
differential game framework. Consider the infinite-horizon scalar N−person LQ
DGs, with quadratic cost function
Li(u) =
∫ ∞
0
(
qix2(t)+ riu2i (t)
)
dt, i ∈N , (A.1)
x˙(t) = ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
biui(t), x(0) = x0 , (A.2)
where qi > 0, ri > 0, x0 6= 0, bi 6= 0 are all scalar quantities. Let b := [b1, . . . ,bN ].
We are interested in strongly time-consistent state-feedback (SF) Nash equilib-
rium (NE), where further the NE policies are required to be stationary (that is
time invariant). We will refer to such equilibria in short as Feedback NE. The
following theorem provides their characterization.
Theorem 14 [Feedback NE, [13]] Let {ki, i ∈N } solve the set of coupled alge-
braic Riccati equations
2
(
a−
N
∑
j=1
s jk j
)
ki+qi+ sik2i = 0, i ∈N (A.3)
satisfying the stability condition a−∑Ni=1 siki < 0 , where si := b2i /ri. Then, the N-
tuple of policies γ∗i (x) =−biri kix, i ∈N , constitutes a feedback NE, with the cor-
responding cost for Player i being J∗i = kix20. Furthermore, the positively weighed
total cost is J∗µ = k¯x20, where k¯ = ∑
N
i=1 µiki.
If the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations do not admit a solution which is
also stabilizing, then the DG does not have a feedback NE. 
The main challenge in computing the feedback NE solution for this DG is that
equation (A.3) is a nonlinear coupled system of equations. The fact that we have
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a scalar problem alleviates the difficulty somewhat, since it is possible to turn it
into a linear problem through a change of variables, as outlined in [160], [161].
Let σi = siqi, σmax = maxiσi, pi = siki, i = 1, . . . ,N, and
λ =
N
∑
i=1
pi−a. (A.4)
Multiplying (A.3) by si, we rewrite it as
p2i −2λ pi+σi = 0, i = 1, . . . ,N. (A.5)
Let Ω ⊂N be an index set, Ω−i = Ω\{i}, and nΩ = |Ω|. For every Ω 6= /0, we
have (after some manipulations)
∏
j∈Ω
p jλ =
1
2nΩ−1
{
∑
i∈Ω
σi ∏
j∈Ω−i
p j−∑
i/∈Ω
∏
j∈Ω
p j pi+a∏
j∈Ω
p j
}
. (A.6)
When Ω= /0, we define
∏
j∈Ω
p jλ := λ =
N
∑
j=1
p j−a. (A.7)
Hence, for every Ω, we have an equation in the form of either (A.6) or (A.7).
Let p = [1, p1, p2, . . . , pN , p1 p2, . . . , p1 pN , p2 p3, . . . , pN−1 pN , . . . ,∏Ni=1 pi]T . We
can write (A.6) and (A.7) into
M˜p = λp. (A.8)
Let k := [1,k1,k2, . . . ,kN ,k1k2, . . . ,k1kN ,k2k3, . . . , kN−1kN , . . . ,∏Ni=1 ki]T and D =
diag{1, s1, s2, . . ., sN , s1s2, . . ., s1sN ,s2s3, . . . , sN−1sN , . . . ,∏Ni=1 si} . Hence, we
can rewrite p = Dk and (A.8) into
Mk = λk, where M := D−1M˜D . (A.9)
Equation (A.9) is an eigenvalue problem with each index set Ω corresponding to
a row enumerated starting from the empty set. It has maximum 2N distinct eigen-
values and 2N eigenvectors. The vector formed by the second entry to the N+1-st
entry of the eigenvectors yields the solution to (A.3) when the first entry of the
vector is normalized to 1 and they satisfy the stability condition of Theorem 14.
This leads to:
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Theorem 15 [Feedback NE Computation, [162]] Suppose M is a nondefective
matrix with distinct eigenvalues. Let (λ ,k) be an eigenvalue-eigenvector pair
such that λ ∈ R+ and λ > σmax. Then, a feedback NE γ∗i (x) = −biri ki x, i ∈N ,
is yielded by k∗ = 1T k provided that the resulting solution is stabilizing, where
1 = [0,1, . . . ,1,0, . . . ,0]T is a vector whose 2nd to N+1-st entries are 1’s.
Theorem 16 [Uniqueness of Feedback NE] Let p¯ :=∑ j∈N p j, p−i :=∑ j∈N , j 6=i p j.
There exists a unique feedback NE for the LQ DG described by (A.1) and (A.2)
under either one of the following two conditions:
(i) N is sufficiently large such that p−i > a,∀i, or (ii) a = 0.
Furthermore, the solutions to the coupled algebraic Riccati equations that char-
acterize the feedback NE are of the following forms under the corresponding con-
ditions above:
(s-i) pi = (p¯−a)−
√
(p¯−a)2−σi ;
(s-ii) pi = p¯−
√
p¯2−σi, where
p¯−a = 1
N−1
(
N
∑
i=1
√
(p¯−a)2−σi+a
)
. (A.10)
Moreover, the stability condition a−∑Ni=1 siki < 0 is satisfied, and hence the FB
NE is stabilizing.
Proof: From (A.5), we obtain
p2i +2(p−i−a)pi−σi = 0, (A.11)
which admits the solutions:
pi = (a− p−i)±
√
(a− p−i)2+σi. (A.12)
Since we need pi > 0, we retain the one with “+ ” sign. By rearranging the
positive solution of (A.12), we arrive at
(p¯−a)2 = (p−i−a)2+σi , (A.13)
and, therefore, in terms of p¯, we have
pi = (p¯−a)±
√
(p¯−a)2−σi. (A.14)
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Under condition (i), we have pi− p¯+a < 0, hence we obtain the unique solution
(s-i). Under scenario (ii), (A.14) reduces to pi = p¯±
√
p¯2−σi. Since, pi < p¯, we
again obtain the unique solution (s-ii).
By summing over (A.14), we have a fixed point equation (A.10). Let
P¯(p¯) :=
1
N−1
(
N
∑
i=1
√
(p¯−a)2−σi+a
)
− (p¯−a) .
Its derivative is given by
dP¯
d p¯
=−1+ p¯−a
N−1
(
N
∑
i=1
1√
(a− p¯)2−σi
)
.
Since σi > 0 and p¯−a > 0, it follows that
dP¯
d p¯
> −1+ p¯−a
N−1
(
N
(p¯−a)
)
(A.15)
=
1
N−1 > 0, for N > 2. (A.16)
This says that P¯ is a monotonically increasing function, and hence the solution to
P¯ = 0 is unique. Hence, under (i) or (ii), there exists a unique feedback NE.
The fact that the solution is stabilizing follows directly from (A.3), where the
first term has to be negative because the second and third terms are positive. 
A.1 Team Model
When players form a team to achieve an optimal social objective, a specific total
cost is minimized. Let q¯µ = ∑Ni=1 µiqi, Rµ = diag{µ1r1, . . . ,µNrN}, and consider
(FOC) min
u(t)
∫ ∞
0
(
q¯µx2(t)+uT (t)Rµu(t)
)
dt
s.t. x˙(t) = ax(t)+
N
∑
i=1
biui(t) , x(0) = x0 6= 0 .
The solution to this optimal control problem is standard, and is given below for
future reference (where we suppress the dependence of q¯ and R on µ).
Theorem 17 [Centralized Optimization] The optimal control problem (FOC) ad-
mits a unique feedback solution which is further stabilizing. The optimal policies
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are
γ◦i (x) =−
bi
µiri
kˆµ x , kˆµ :=
a+
√
a2+ q¯b¯
b¯
, (A.17)
with b¯ := ∑Ni=1(b2i /µiri), and minimum cost is J◦µ = kˆµx20.
The optimal control can also be expressed in open-loop form, as:
u◦i =−
bi
µiri
kˆµΦ(t,0)x0,
where Φ(t,0) is the unique solution to
Φ˙(t,0) =
(
a−
N
∑
i=1
b2i
µiri
kˆµ
)
Φ(t,0), Φ(0,0) = 1.
A. 2 Price of Anarchy (PoA)
Here, we provide a closed-form expression for the PoA in the feedback LQ DG,
where we make the natural assumption that x0 6= 0, as otherwise the costs are all
zero.
Theorem 18 The PoA of the LQ feedback DG described by (A.1) and (A.2) is
characterized by the following:
(i) Given a weight vector µ , the PoA ρµ is equal to
ρFBµ = maxk∈K
[µT k ]/kˆ , (A.18)
where µ = [0,µT ,0, . . . ,0]T andK is the set of all eigenvectors of the matrix
M.
(ii) Suppose µi = µ¯i := si /∑Nj=1 s j, i ∈N . Then,
ρFBµ¯ 6 [ρ(M)+a ]/
N
∑
i=1
sikˆ ,
where ρ(M) is the spectral radius of M.
(iii) Let µsmax =maxi∈N µi/si. Given a weight vector µ that satisfies∑Ni=1 µi = 1,
the PoA is bounded by
ρFBµ 6 µsmax(ρ(M)+a)/kˆ. (A.19)
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Proof: The proof is a direct application of the results in Theorem 14 and The-
orem 17. PoA is the worst-case ratio of the game cost under feedback NE to the
optimum social cost. Under the feedback IS, an LQ DG has
ρFBµ = max
k∗
∑Ni=1 µik∗i (x0)2
kˆ(x0)2
= max
k∈K
µT k
kˆ
.
This leads to statement (i). The price of anarchy under µ¯ is
ρFBµ¯ = max
k
∑Ni=1 µ¯iki
kˆ
= max
k
siki
∑Ni=1 sikˆ
= max
λ
λ +a
∑Ni=1 sikˆ
. (A.20)
The last equality is due to (A.4). Hence, by taking the largest eigenvalue, we
obtain (ii). The equality is achieved when ρ(M) is an eigenvalue in the eigenvalue-
eigenvector pair that yields the equilibrium from Theorem 15. For an arbitrarily
picked µ , (A.18) yields
ρFBµ¯ = max
k
∑Ni=1
µi
si
siki
kˆ
6max
k
usmax∑Ni=1 siki
kˆ
= max
λ
usmax(λ +a)
kˆ
6 u
s
max(ρ(M)+a)
kˆ
. (A.21)
Using (A.4) and taking the worst case, we obtain statement (iii). Since
max
i∈N
µ¯i
si
=
1
∑Nj=1 s j
,
the last inequality is achieved when µ = µ¯ . 
The next corollary further characterizes the bound on PoA.
Corollary 3 The following follow from Theorem 18:
(i) Given a µ and a 6= 0, PoA is bounded above by
ρFBµ 6
(
1+
1
2a
(N+σmax−1)
)
s•, (A.22)
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where σmax = maxi∈N σi, and
s• :=
N
∑
i=1
si
min j∈N s j
.
The upper-bound is independent of µ .
(ii) If a = 0, PoA is bounded above by
ρFBµ 6
µsmax√
q¯
√
µsmin
√
N(N+σmax−1), (A.23)
where µsmin = mini∈N µi/si.
Proof: The matrices M = [mi j] and M˜ = [m˜i j], i, j = 1, . . . ,2N , share the same
set of eigenvalues. From Gersgorin theorem, we can obtain
ρ(M˜)6min
{
max
i
2N
∑
j=1
|m˜i j|,max
j
2N
∑
i=1
|m˜i j|
}
6max
i
2N
∑
j=1
|m˜i j|.
From (A.6) and (A.7), the absolute row sum RSk,k = 1, . . . ,2N , can easily be
evaluated by letting pi = 1:
RSk = [a+∑
i∈Ω
σi+(N−nΩ)]/ [2nΩ−1],
where k is the row index corresponding to the set Ω. When Ω = /0, we let RS1 =
N+a. From (A.19),
ρFBµ 6 [ρ(M)+a ]/(kˆ/µsmax).
The numerator is upper-bounded by (skipping some steps):
ρ(M)+a 6 max
{
max
16nΩ6N
(2a+σmax−1)nΩ+N
2nΩ−1 ,2a+N−1
}
6 max{2a+N+σmax−1,2a+N−1}
6 2a+N+σmax−1. (A.24)
The second inequality holds because the quantity
(2a+σmax−1)nΩ+N
2nΩ−1
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increases with nΩ. The denominator has a lower bound:
2a
b¯µsmax
> 2a
∑Ni=1
(
maxi∈N µi/si
µi
)
b2i
ri
> 2a
∑Ni=1
si
mini∈N si
=
2a
s•
. (A.25)
The last inequality is due to maxi µi/si 6 maxi µi maxi 1si . Combining (A.24) and
(A.25), we have, for a 6= 0,
ρFBµ 6
(
1+
1
2a
(N+σmax−1)
)
s•
When a = 0,
kˆ =
√
q¯/b¯ =
√
q¯
∑Ni=1
si
µi
>
√
q¯µsmin√
N
.
Using this together with (A.24), we arrive at the inequality (A.23). 
The upper bound on price of anarchy in the preceding corollary provides a worst
case of efficiency loss.
The next result studies the large population game and its proof relies on the
Taylor series expansion of the square-root term in (A.14).
Theorem 19 Suppose the number of players in the LQ DG is sufficiently large so
that
(C-i) p−i > a,∀i ∈N , (C-ii) a N , (C-iii) σmax σ¯ ,
where σ¯ = ∑Ni=1σi. Then, the following quantities can be approximated as given:
(i) pi ∼ σi√
2σ¯
, (ii) ui ∼− σi
bi
√
2σ¯
x ,
(iii) J∗ ∼ q¯√
2σ¯
(x0)2 , (iv) J∗ ∼ q¯√
2σ¯
(x0)2 ,
(v) ρFBµ ∼
q¯
kˆ
√
2σ¯
, and for a = 0, ρFBµ ∼
√
q¯b¯
2σ¯
.
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Proof: By Taylor series expansion, (A.14) can be written as
pi = (p¯−a)
[
1−
√
1− σi
(p¯−a)2
]
=
σi
2(p¯−a)
[
1+O
(
σi
(p¯−a)2
)]
, (A.26)
where O(·) is a function such that limx→0 O(x) = 0. In a similar way, (A.10) can
be rewritten as (skipping some steps):
p¯−a = p¯−a
N−1
(
N
∑
i=1
√
1− σi
(p¯−a)2 +a
)
=
p¯−a
N−1
[
Nσ¯
2(p¯−a)2
(
1+O
(
σmax
2(p¯−a)2
))
+a
]
. (A.27)
Hence, we obtain for large N
p¯−a =
√
σ¯
2
[
1+O
(
σmax
2(p¯−a)2
)]
. (A.28)
Note that p¯−a > 0 due to the stability condition. Let σ¯ = ∑Ni=1σi, as before. Let
a solution of (A.28) be p¯ =
√
σ¯/2+a, i.e.,
p¯−a =
√
σ¯
2
[
1+O
(σmax
σ¯
)]
. (A.29)
(A.29) is consistent provided that σmax  σ and a  N. Since, by Theorem
16, the solution is unique under (C-i), p¯ can indeed be approximated by p¯ ∼
a+
√
σ¯/2, which leads to pi ∼ σi√2σ¯ from (A.26). Hence, (ii)-(v) follow. 
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